Problems of Communism

JULY-AUGUST 1987



Gorbachev's Gamble

Thane Gustafson & Dawn Mann

Consolidating Power

Jerry F. Hough

Polish Intellectuals in Opposition

Jakub Karpiński

African National Congress: Cadres and Credo

Michael Radu

Special Section on *Perestroyka*

Worker Participation	Russell Bova
Economic Reform	Valentin Litvin
"Basic Provisions"	John E. Tedstrom
Yazov and the Military	Dale R. Herspring

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

4

JULY-AUGUST 1987 VOL XXXVI

Problems of Communism (ISSN 0032-941x) is a bimonthly publication providing analyses and significant information about the contemporary affairs of the Soviet Union, China, and comparable states and political movements. Views of contributors, as well as geographic boundaries and names, do not necessarily reflect the policies of the United States Government.

On all editorial matters, communications should be addressed to: The Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, United States of America, 301 4th Street SW, Washington, DC, 20547, USA. Telephone (202) 485-2230.

On subscriptions, communications should be addressed to: The Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 20402, USA, preferably using the subscription form provided at the back of this issue. Outside the United States, please address inquiries to the Public Affairs Section, Embassy of the United States of America.

Copyright: Reproduction or republication of texts from *Problems of Communism* is permissible, and no claim of copyright is asserted. However, the Editors request that they be advised of reprint usage and that source credit be given both to the authors of individual articles and to *Problems of Communism.* Should textual items in the journal ever be subject to a claim of copyright, such claim will be clearly stated. Graphics and pictures which carry a credit line are not necessarily owned by *Problems of Communism,* and users bear responsibility for obtaining appropriate permissions.

An annual index for *Problems of Communism* appears in the November-December issue (No. 6) of each year except in the case of the first three volumes, which are covered in a combined index in the November-December issue (No. 6) of Vol. III. Material from the journal is also indexed in *ABC POL SCI, Bibliographie Internationale des Sciences Sociales (all Sections), Current Contents, Economic Abstracts, Historical Abstracts, Index to US Government Periodicals, International Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service, Social Sciences Citation Index, Social Sciences Index, Strategic Studies Reference Guide,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

1 Gorbachev's Next Gamble
by Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann

21 Gorbachev Consolidating Power
by Jerry F. Hough

44 Polish Intellectuals in Opposition
by Jakub Karpiński

58 The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo
by Michael Radu

SPECIAL SECTION ON *PERESTROYKA*

76 The Role of Workplace Participation
by Russell Bova

87 Reforming Economic Management
by Valentin Litvin

93 Analyzing the "Basic Provisions"
by John E. Tedstrom

99 Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military
by Dale R. Herspring

Cover: General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev. Photo by Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

EDITOR
Wayne Hall

SENIOR EDITOR
Sophia Sluzar

ASSOCIATE EDITOR
Maria O. Pryshlak

DESIGNER
Gary Soderstrom

PRODUCTION COORDINATOR
Sarah E. Mewborn

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT
Kim Taylor

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

Gorbachev's Next Gamble

Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann

Soviet party leader Mikhail Gorbachev is dramatically pursuing an increasingly radical policy agenda in the USSR despite strong evidence that he has far from fully secured his power as General Secretary. He hopes to find confirmation of both his policies and his personal political position at an extraordinary conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, scheduled for June 1988. He is gambling that the party rank and file will vote to override conservative elements in electing delegates to that conference, which evidently will have the power to change the membership of the party's Central Committee.

Gorbachev Consolidating Power

Jerry F. Hough

In contrast to the above interpretation, this article argues that Mikhail Gorbachev is consolidating his power as general secretary with remarkable speed, a process that is a classic demonstration of the venerable, if recently neglected, "circular flow of power theory" in the Soviet polity. Beginning under Yuriy Andropov, Gorbachev has exercised major influence over appointments of regional party officials, who elect the Central Committee, which elects the Politburo and General Secretary. The General Secretary is likely to be around for a long time, and to be in a position to pursue his chosen policies of reform.

Polish Intellectuals in Opposition

Jakub Karpiński

A hallmark of contemporary Poland is the existence of a network of groups, organized independently of the state's authorities, which promote world views different from the official ideology. Although there are analogies in other East European states to Poland's intellectual opposition, the alliance between a mass movement and the intellectual opposition created when Solidarity came into being, is so far unique to Poland.

The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo

Michael Radu

The African National Congress, launched as a "nationalist" movement aimed at the political liberation of Blacks and the forging of a national consciousness out of the disparate ethnic allegiances of South Africa's majority race, has gradually evolved into a Marxist-Leninist organization. ANC President Oliver Tambo has characterized his movement's alliance with the South African Communist Party as "a living organism that has grown out of the struggle," and the ANC consistently aligns itself with the "anti-capitalist" and "anti-imperialist" positions of Moscow. A true multiracial democracy in South Africa that would include all races in a power-sharing system guaranteeing both minority rights and property rights is clearly not what the ANC envisages for South Africa.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Special Section on *Perestroyka*

The Role of Workplace Participation

Russell Bova

Mikhail Gorbachev has given considerable emphasis to the expansion of workplace democracy and worker participation in his drive to "restructure" Soviet society. In some regards, his approach toward increasing productivity is similar to Western management theory, however Soviet workers are generally skeptical of the existing organizations, which are, with a few exceptions, consultative institutions that are not permitted to become genuine articulators of the interests of workers as a group vis-à-vis other groups. Inherent in Gorbachev's promotion of workplace participation are elements of the carrot and the stick. The opportunity to become involved in the affairs of one's enterprise is being touted as a positive inducement for workers to improve work habits and to show greater concern for the performance of the enterprise, but the Soviet leadership has also calculated that mass participation can be an effective means of monitoring the behavior of rank-and-file workers as well as a useful means of monitoring and controlling enterprise managers, who are expected to be granted increased operational independence under Gorbachev reform proposals.

Reforming Economic Management

Valentin Litvin

The economic transformation that is underway in the Soviet Union is the first attempt to restructure radically the Soviet economic system since Stalin put it in place in the late 1920's. Should it succeed, it will have serious effects on the political system. Envisaged in the economic reforms is the substitution of "control from above" with "control from below." For this reason, the restructuring faces formidable opposition from the party and state bureaucracies, but is also impeded by the skepticism of a population that has seen too many reform attempts aborted.

Analyzing the "Basic Provisions"

John E. Tedstrom

The "Basic Provisions for the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management," ratified by the June 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, are the most extensive economic reform measures to be approved since the Khrushchev reforms, perhaps even since the New Economic Policy of the 1920's. Although they fall far short of creating a totally new, decentralized, and efficient economic system, they should be considered an important step in that direction.

Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military

Dale R. Herspring

A close reading of the Soviet military press during the Gorbachev years reveals considerable foot-dragging in the military's response to the General Secretary's demands for greater productivity, responsibility, and exactingness. Gorbachev expressed his frustration with the military at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In this context, the appointment of General Dmitriy Yazov, who had long stressed in his writings the same human factors that Gorbachev counts on to "restructure" Soviet society, was a logical—if to outsiders surprising—choice to replace the aged Defense Minister, Marshal Sergey Sokolov, in the aftermath of the shocking breach of Soviet national security by a young West German pilot in May 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachev's Next Gamble

Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann

In the year and one-half since the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has pursued an unprecedented strategy to consolidate his personal power. If he succeeds—and the extraordinary Party Conference scheduled for June 1988 will be a crucial test of Gorbachev's strategy—we will need to reexamine some of our basic assumptions about the rules of the game in Soviet politics.

Previous general secretaries began by building their personal power gradually. Typically, they used policy issues as tactical pawns to build a centrist consensus within the elite, while simultaneously wielding the "personnel weapon" (the power of appointment) to build a loyal following, principally among the provincial chiefs of the party.[1] The leader then parlayed this backing into support first at party congresses and ultimately at the top of the political structure: in the Central Committee (CC), the Secretariat, and the Politburo. Only after this game was won and the new general secretary had enough power to silence or displace his rivals did he formulate a full policy program of his own.[2] This circular build-up of patronage-based loyalties, while never the sole source of the general secretary's power in the past, has always been one of its most essential ingredients.[3]

But Gorbachev has reversed the usual order. Although the policy proposals of his first year were restrained enough,[4] since the 27th CPSU Congress he has advanced a policy program that has grown more radical by the day—before he has fully consolidated

Thane Gustafson is Associate Professor of Government at Georgetown University (Washington, DC). Dawn Mann is a Fellow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington, DC). *The authors would like to thank Timothy Colton, Werner Hahn, Michel Tatu, and Elizabeth Teague for their advice and criticism.* *Information herein, where not explicitly sourced, is based on the authors' reading of the central Soviet press, Foreign Broadcast Information Service translations of Soviet radio broadcasts, the files of Radio Liberty (Munich), and the on-line computer services of* SOVSET' *and* SOVT. *Additional biographical information on Soviet officials was drawn from* Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR odinnadtsatyy sozyv *(Deputies of USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation), Moscow, Izvestiya, 1984.*

[1]Leonid Brezhnev represents a variant on the pattern: he used the power of appointment to *undo* the changes wrought in the party apparatus by Nikita Khrushchev in 1962 and after.

[2]For commentary on past strategies, see, e.g., T. H. Rigby, "Khrushchev and the Rules of the Game," in Robert F. Miller and Ferenc Feher, Eds., *Khrushchev and the Communist World*, London, Croom Helm, 1984, pp. 39–81. George Breslauer's portrait of the initial political strategies of Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev in *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1982, is cast in similar terms. Stalin's strategy is described in many sources, but see particularly Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 143–46. A valuable account of the origins of the strategy is T. H. Rigby, "Early Provincial Cliques and the Rise of Stalin," in *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), January 1981, pp. 3–28.

[3]The term "circular flow of power" originated with Robert V. Daniels. See his "Soviet Politics since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, New York, Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971, pp. 22–23. Jerry Hough comments on the applicability of the theory in the various successions in *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, pp. 145, 200, 213, 454, and 455 (see also his article in this issue—**Eds.**).

[4]On the eve of the 27th Congress, Western observers were still describing Gorbachev as a modern-sounding but nevertheless ultimately traditional party politician, more technocrat than liberal, more tinkerer than reformer. In an earlier article, for example, the present authors wrote that "Gorbachev gives the impression of a man with a basically conservative temperament . . . . He would probably settle for the 1965 Kosygin reforms if he could . . . ." See "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1986, p. 16.

Zhores Medvedev made this observation about Gorbachev's first year: "The changes in domestic policy were merely cosmetic. Policies were better presented, the style was more modern, but there was little new in the contents." See Zhores Medvedev, *Gorbachev*, New York, Norton, 1986, p. 208.

Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica commented that Gorbachev's reformism "stresses authoritarian rule, discipline, and predictable conformist behavior. Cultural experimentation, not to speak of expanded political rights, has no place in his world." Bialer and Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), No. 3, 1985, p. 620.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Delegates at the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union vote on the agenda of the proceedings.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

his power at the top and middle levels of the system! Despite unprecedented personnel turnover during his first year, by the spring of 1986 Gorbachev had not achieved a clear majority of "new" men in the Council of Ministers or in the provincial party apparatus. Indeed, the farther down the ranks and away from Moscow one looked, the fewer new men there appeared to be.[5]

The slimness of his following is not fully reflected in the numbers. The Central Committee elected at the 27th CPSU Congress in March 1986 contained 30.6 percent "new" full members (i.e., individuals who had not been elected a full or candidate Central Committee member or a member of the party's Central Auditing Commission in 1981 or earlier)—a better score than any previous general secretary had achieved in his "first" Central Committee. Despite this, Gorbachev appeared very far from having a majority even nominally committed to his side. Moreover, according to established practice, he could not anticipate making any major changes in CC composition until 1991, when the next party congress would elect a new Central Committee.

That Gorbachev fell short of a solid majority in the Central Committee after only one year is not surprising; no Soviet leader has ever consolidated his power that quickly.[6] But the result is a unique "power inversion": after two and one-half years as general secretary, Gorbachev appears to enjoy more solid support (in the demonstrable sense of being able to impose his way or to appoint his people) in the Politburo and the Secretariat than in the Central Committee or in the rest of the elite. His ability to name four new members to the Politburo at a single sitting, as he did in June 1987, was his most im-

[5]See Gustafson and Mann, loc. cit.; also Elizabeth Teague, "Turnover in the Soviet Elite under Gorbachev: Implications for Soviet Politics," paper presented at a meeting of the Washington DC Chapter of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, May 1986, reproduced by Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* (Munich), Supplement 1/86, July 8, 1986.

[6]For example, unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev did not expand the size of the full membership of the Central Committee, even though this would have given him an opportunity to bring in more supporters.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pressive display of strength to date.[7] It is revealing that of the Politburo's 14 voting members, six are senior secretaries, a departure from the carefully balanced regional and institutional representation in the body observed under Brezhnev; this suggests that Gorbachev's greatest strength currently resides in the Secretariat of the Central Committee.[8]

The Central Committee itself is another matter. Since the party congress, Gorbachev has complained repeatedly about resistance to his program among leading cadres, and he has said plainly that this resistance can even be found in the Central Committee, although he has been careful to distinguish between resistance and opposition. "There are concrete carriers of resistance (*tormozheniye*)," he complained to the Komsomol last April, "in the Central Committee and the government."[9]

The events surrounding the January 1987 CC Plenum provide the most evidence of resistance to date. The meeting, which had initially been scheduled for the autumn of 1986, was postponed three times because, as Gorbachev put it, "We could not go into the plenum without clarity on basic questions."[10] According to Politburo member Lev Zaykov, when the Central Committee finally met, Gorbachev's opening speech was received with "a tense silence, " and some of the speeches that followed disagreed with the General Secretary.[11] One can sense the intensity of the exchanges that took place from Gorbachev's words to an audience in Riga the following month: "I have posed the issue in many places, even in the Central Committee, 'If there is any alternative to *perestroyka* and acceleration, then propose it.' "[12]

The Central Committee has not proposed any alternatives, but it is clearly ambivalent about Gorbachev's program. The final resolution adopted by the Central Committee in January 1987 fell short of Gorbachev's proposals in several places. In particular, his ideas on reforming voting procedures in party elections were diluted to a noncommittal phrase.[13]

The spring of 1987 saw more skirmishing, this time over the date of the next Central Committee plenum, which was expected to consider the leadership's proposals on economic reform.[14] If this meeting, convened in June 1987, proved more successful, it may be because the Politburo postponed submitting the full texts of the draft decrees to the Central Committee and sought only its general endorsement for a program whose details would come later.[15] Less than six weeks after that, the full texts were officially promulgated by decree and published in an edition of 500,000 copies.[16] Gorbachev may have chosen to use his control of the agenda to avoid a debate over the details of the reform package in the Central Committee. This suggests that his ability to push policy measures through is not an accurate measure of his real support in the Central Committee.

How serious a threat does such resistance pose to

[7]The four new members of the Politburo were Aleksandr Yakovlev, Nikolai Slyun'kov, and Viktor Nikonov as full members, and Dmitriy Yazov, the new minister of defense, as a candidate member. Most Western observers agree that the net effect of the promotions was highly favorable to Gorbachev, although they differ on whether the choices reflected the influence of other Politburo members as well.

Yakovlev and Yazov are clearly Gorbachev picks, since their rise is unambiguously tied to Gorbachev's patronage. Slyun'kov's career, on the other hand, is closely associated with that of Nikolay Ryzhkov. Slyun'kov's official pronouncements on economic reform, however, line up closely with Gorbachev's positions. Nikonov's promotion is the most ambiguous of the four, but he presumably gained Gorbachev's good opinion when he was deputy minister of agriculture, from 1979 to 1983; Nikonov has no apparent ties to any other patron (unless one considers Ligachev, who appears to have added agriculture to his portfolio at the beginning of 1987—see Ye. Ligachev, "The Human Factor, Economic Accountability, and *Perestroyka* in the Agroindustrial Complex," *Kommunist* [Moscow], No. 4, March 1987, pp. 28–42). Thus, even if one visualizes the June promotions as a "package deal" among senior Politburo members, it is hard to argue that the main beneficiary was not Gorbachev himself.

[8]The last time there were so many senior secretaries on the Politburo interestingly enough, was in 1957, on the eve of Khrushchev's confrontation with the "anti-party group." The authors are grateful to Michel Tatu for this observation.

[9]M. S. Gorbachev, "Youth—The Creative Force of Revolutionary Renewal," *Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 17, 1987.

[10]Gorbachev's speech to the 8th Trade Union Congress, "*Perestroyka*—A Vital Concern of the Nation," ibid., Feb. 26, 1987.

[11]Zaykov was speaking to an audience in Czechoslovakia. See *Pravda* (Bratislava), Mar. 5, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 11, 1987, p. F/3. In particular, it is known that there were disagreements over *glasnost'*, Gorbachev's policy of openness. See, e.g., V. V. Karpov, "Act! Act in a Creative Manner!" *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 4, 1987.

[12]*Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1987.

[13]See "Resolution of the CC CPSU Plenum On Restructuring and the Cadre Policy of the Party," *Pravda*, Jan. 29, 1987.

[14]Moscow abounded in rumors throughout the spring, most of them suggesting that the Central Committee would meet in early June. The leaders, meanwhile, carefully kept silent. When Ligachev was quizzed by the press during his visit to Budapest in April, he declined to name a date, joking that if his answer turned out not to be the right one, rumors would fly of a split (*raskol*) within the leadership. See *Radio Liberty Daily Report*, Apr. 29, 1987, as carried on the computer network "SOVSET'."

[15]Gorbachev's statement at a preparatory meeting on economic reform held at Central Committee headquarters on June 8 and 9, 1987. See the TASS account as published in *Pravda*, June 13, 1987, under the title of "The Fundamental Question of *Perestroyka*." Gorbachev did not explicitly say that the decision to send the drafts back for revision was prompted by opposition in the Central Committee, or for that matter, in the Politburo, but he admitted that the framing "has not been a simple matter, and big debates have been going on at all levels." See also the Western press commentary: e.g., Martin Walker, "Guarding Change at the Kremlin," *The Guardian* (Manchester), June 10, 1987; Mark d'Anastasio, "Gorbachev Faces Scuttling of Radical Economic Plan," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), June 18, 1987; Philip Hanson, "Central Committee Plenum on the Economy," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 234/87, June 30, 1987; and Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Planning Changes in Controlled Economy," *The New York Times*, June 26, 1987.

[16]*O korennoy perestroyke upravleniya ekonomiki: sbornik dokumentov* (On a Fundamental Restructuring of the Management of the Economy: A Collection of Documents), Moscow, Politizdat, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachev? Could it lead to a show-down between the General Secretary and the Central Committee? Such questions raise one of the central puzzles about power and the unwritten rules of the game in Soviet politics. Formally speaking, according to the party statutes, it is the Central Committee, not the Politburo, that elects the General Secretary.[17] But only once in the last half-century has the Central Committee come to a real vote and exercised real power in supporting or opposing a general secretary—and what happened in that one instance is still being debated by Western scholars.[18] Consequently, the Central Committee's potential power is untested in this generation, and Gorbachev's theoretical vulnerability to a Central Commitee revolt against him is impossible to assess.

The issue is further complicated by the fact that as part of his campaign for democratization, Gorbachev promised at the January 1987 Plenum to give elective bodies—first and foremost the Central Committee—greater authority over executive ones. In short, Gorbachev has seemingly promised to give greater power, or at least a greater voice, to a Central Committee that he does not yet securely control.

If Gorbachev faces at least a remote threat of an adverse vote in the Central Committee, can one infer that he tailors his strategy accordingly? Does he count votes? Most important, does he consciously guard against creating too many "dead souls" in the Central Committee (i.e., full members who have lost the state or party posts that gave them Central Committee status in the first place)?[19] But do "dead souls" really vote? If they do, they could presumably constrain Gorbachev's entire personnel policy. However, we do not know whether they do, or even whether they continue to attend Central Committee meetings. In short, we are missing some of the most important pieces of the puzzle.[20]

Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev examines products at a knitwear association in Tallinn, Estonia, in February 1987.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Even if resistance to Gorbachev in the Central Committee never comes to an overt challenge, it is clear enough that the elites represented in it can present obstacles to his program by watering down his measures and impeding their implementation. In addition, the knowledge that a large number of Central Committee members have misgivings about the General Secretary's policies almost certainly affects the calculations and behavior of the Politburo, which is itself far from fully

[17]See *Ustav Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Rules of Communist Party of the Soviet Union—hereafter, *Party Rules*), adopted Mar. 1, 1986, Section 4, Par. 38, in *Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1986.

[18]In 1957, outvoted in the Politburo, Khrushchev was able to summon an emergency meeting of the Central Committee, which reversed the decision of the Politburo majority and backed Khrushchev instead. See Jerry F. Hough, *How the Soviet Union is Governed*, pp. 217–19. According to Robert Conquest, however, it is possible that Khrushchev had managed to reverse the Politburo vote before the Central Committee met, and that the CC members' direct role was limited to endorsing a Politburo decision taken without them. See Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, 1961, pp. 292–328.

If the Conquest version is correct, one could still argue that just the threat of a Central Committee meeting was enough to enable Khrushchev to win, and this could still be counted as evidence of the Central Committee's potential power. Both tellings agree that the participants all paid at least lip service to the authority of the CC to reverse a Politburo decision.

[19]For elaboration on the principle that Central Committee status is awarded to holders of certain job slots, rather than the reverse, see Robert V. Daniels, "Office Holding and Elite Status: The Central Committee of the CPSU," in Paul Cocks, Robert V. Daniels, and Nancy Whittier Heer, Eds., *The Dynamics of Soviet Politics*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1977, pp. 77–79.

[20]For speculation that "dead souls" are indeed a factor in Gorbachev's personnel decisions, see Elizabeth Teague, " 'Dead Souls' in the Central Committee," RFE-FL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 17/87, Jan. 12, 1987.

In the case of the Supreme Soviet, current procedure has been to accept the resignations of such ex-officials, as the phrase goes, "in connection with their personal statement." Thus, as of the end of May 1987, 108 of the Supreme Soviet deputies elected in 1984 had been relieved of their mandates in this way, including 9 former members of the Central Committee apparatus, 26 members of the USSR Council of Ministers, and 14 RSFSR regional party committee first secretaries. For example, in late August, Radio Alma-Ata announced that Dinmukhamed Kunayev had resigned as deputy. See *Radio Liberty Daily Report*, Aug. 26, 1987.

"Dead souls" played an active part in Polish politics before the July 1981 Party Congress removed them. For example, former Radom party first secretary Janusz Prokopiak was among those challenging General Secretary Stanisław Kania at at the June 1981 Plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, proposing (ironically enough) a vote of confidence by secret ballot. See Werner Hahn, *Democracy in a Communist Party: Poland's Experience since 1981*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1987, pp. 116–18.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

united. Thus, even in the absence of an open test of strength, the behavior of the General Secretary will be subtly constrained.

Therefore, whether directly or indirectly, the present "power inversion" threatens Gorbachev's program and ultimately his position. There are indications that Gorbachev shares this assessment. His latest and most startling response has been to summon to life an institution that last met 46 years ago, the all-Union party conference. Gorbachev has served notice that precedents exist for using party conferences to make changes in the party rules and in personnel at both the local level and in the Central Committee itself. At the June 1987 Plenum, harking back to the early years of the regime, Gorbachev said:

As you know, party-wide conferences were frequently convened in our party between congresses. There was a period before 1941 when this was a regular practice. Many conferences held at important turning points of our history resolved issues that went far beyond the bounds of the tactical. In a number of cases, tasks of a strategic character were raised at them; changes were made in the party rules and in the composition of central party organs.[21]

That is clearly throwing down the gauntlet: Gorbachev is serving notice that he will use the party conference to weed out opponents in the top ranks of the party. The process (he hopes) will work this way: the months leading up to June 1988 will be devoted to an intense reports-and-elections campaign throughout the party apparatus that will provide him with an opportunity to bring in active supporters of *perestroyka*. In discussing the process, Gorbachev stated:

*It is very important . . . that the most active supporters of social transformation join the leadership (**prishli k rukovodstvu**) of the party organizations . . . people of principle, who understand the demands of the times, real "**proraby**" [engineers] of **perestroyka**.*[22]

These supporters would control the election of the delegates to the party conference. Gorbachev has already gotten the Central Committee to agree that the delegates are to be selected by secret ballot (although there has been no mention so far of multiple candidacies, an idea that Gorbachev broached at the January plenum but has since soft-pedaled).[23]

At the party conference, Gorbachev will undoubtedly try to secure a clear majority in the Central Committee, and he may press ahead with several new proposals, such as instituting secret ballots and multiple candidacies in all party elections, and establishing fixed terms of office for party officials. If he is successful, the circular flow of power could become a rush, sweeping the opponents of *perestroyka* from the party apparatus and replacing them with a loyal Gorbachev following.

The question is, will Gorbachev be able to do it? That depends, first, on what the powers of the June 1988 Party Conference turn out to be. The current party rules provide only that party conferences may "discuss pressing matters of party policy."[24] To find authority for party conferences to make changes in Central Committee membership, one must go back to the 1939 version of the party rules, which state that up to one-fifth of the full membership may be renewed at a party conference, with the new full members to be selected from the ranks of the candidate members, and new candidate members to be elected to replace them.[25] Thus, with the current rules silent and the last precedent nearly a half-century old, it seems likely that the authority of the party conference will itself be a major political issue between now and next June. Indeed, the only thing the party rules do say on this subject could pose a problem for Gorbachev: it is the Central Committee that determines the powers of a party conference, and the Central Committee could meet twice before June 1988.

A second crucial question is whether Gorbachev can find the people he is looking for. After all, he has been wielding the broom right along, ever since the 27th Congress. By the time of the June 1987 Plenum, 67 percent of all USSR ministers and heads of state committees and 55 percent of the provincial first secretaries had been appointed under Gorbachev. If he has not succeeded in finding the right people to appoint thus far, why not, and why should he be able to do so now?

Third, and more fundamental, is it possible for Gorbachev's confrontational strategy to work in this way, in the open, against high-level resistance? If so, it would be a unique achievement, the first time that a general secretary ever built his power by so frontal an assault on the elite and its vested interests, and the first time that a general secretary's consolidation of power at middle and

[21]Gorbachev's speech to the June CC CPSU Plenum, *Pravda*, June 26, 1987.

[22]Ibid.

[23]See V. Malyayev and T. Popov, "The All-Union Party Conference," *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 14, July 1987, pp. 30–32.

[24]*Party Rules*, loc. cit., Sect. 4, par. 40.

[25]The 1939 party rules were adopted by the 18th CPSU Congress and remained theoretically in force until new rules were adopted at the 19th CPSU Congress in 1952. The latter did not provide for party conferences at all, and it was not until the 23rd CPSU Congress in 1966 that provisions for holding party conferences returned to the party statutes. In the 1939 rules, Central Committee members not selected as delegates to party conferences could attend, but with a consultative vote only. See Malyayev and Popov, loc. cit.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lower levels followed (and stemmed from) his achievement of preeminence in the Politburo and his control of the Secretariat. If Gorbachev pulls it off, we will be required to take a whole new look at what is meant by "the circular flow of power," not to mention the "law of diminishing general secretaries."

If this head-on challenge is to succeed, Gorbachev must have complete control of the personnel weapon. Any restraint that he may have shown so far must be traceable to calculation or forbearance, and possibly to the lack of enough proven "new" men, but not to political weakness or to discord within the Politburo. Is this, in fact, the case? Gorbachev told the June 1987 Plenum:

When we demanded of the leading cadres of the party, the soviets, and the economy to start straightening out their work and making it more efficient, we often heard the answer: "We understand the new tasks, but give us time to appraise the situation, to learn the new methods and ways of acting, and to apply them in practice." The Politburo reacted to this with understanding. We said then that everyone will be given time and opportunity for ***perestroyka****. But matters will no longer wait . . . . The workers correctly write us that whoever wanted to restructure himself has already done so and has gotten down to work. And those who haven't yet reached an understanding of the new tasks are still clinging to the past and through their lack of action are in actual fact sabotaging* ***perestroyka****.*[26]

Has Gorbachev, up to now, been showing forbearance and caution, or weakness? The prospects for the success of his strategy over the next year depend on the answer to this question. In the rest of this article, we shall attempt to shed light on it by reviewing the patterns of personnel turnover in high-level party and government organs since Gorbachev became general secretary, with a particular focus on the differences between Gorbachev's first year and the subsequent period. Who has been in charge of personnel policy? Who has been exercising patronage powers? What politics do the apparent patterns of turnover suggest? What do they imply for the upcoming party elections and the potential struggle over the party conference?

The Secretariat

With the departure of Mikhail Zimyanin from the Central Committee's Secretariat in January 1987, the turnover of party secretaries is almost complete; only two remain from the time of Brezhnev's death in November 1982: Gorbachev himself and Vladimir Dolgikh.[27] Most of the new secretaries, including at least three of the senior ones, are beholden to Gorbachev for their positions and have closely associated themselves with his policies;[28] only Yegor Ligachev has increasingly taken public positions that differ in tone from those of Gorbachev.[29] In particular, the two key secretaries in charge of organization and personnel, Anatoliy Luk'yanov and Georgiy Razumovskiy, clearly have close ties to the General Secretary.[30]

Turnover among the Central Committee department chiefs has been equally spectacular. Only one, Nikolay Savinkin, Chief of the Administrative Organs Department, remains from before 1982. Four of the current incumbents were appointed by Andropov, and the remaining 11 are Gorbachev-era appointees.[31] Consistent with the practice generally followed since 1983, Gorbachev has largely refrained from replacing Andropov or Chernenko appointees, except to promote or transfer them laterally.[32]

[26]Speech to June Plenum, loc. cit.

[27]Dolgikh's survival is quite remarkable, since he is a Brezhnev holdover without noticeable ties to the new leadership. His stewardship over heavy industry and energy matters dates back to 1972, and one might have thought he would share in the blame for the downturn in those sectors in the late 1970's.

[28]This is true of Lev Zaykov, one of several highly placed Leningraders who switched their allegiance from Grigoriy Romanov and joined Gorbachev's bandwagon in 1985. Aleksandr Yakovlev has had clear ties to Gorbachev since the two men met in Canada in 1983. Nikolay Slyun'kov, as previously noted, is a less clear case.

[29]Ligachev's public statements are analyzed and compared with Gorbachev's in Aleksandr Rahr, "Ligachev versus Gorbachev?" RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 325/87, Aug. 15, 1987. Ligachev's most recent speeches show a conservative bent. See, in particular, *Uchitel'skaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Aug. 27, 1987.

[30]Luk'yanov attended the Law Faculty of Moscow State University at the same time as Gorbachev, and his appointment as chief of the General Department, which acts as the Politburo's secretariat, would not have been possible without Gorbachev's consent. Razumovskiy, while serving as chief of the Department of the Agroindustrial Complex in the USSR Council of Ministers from 1981 to 1983, reported to Gorbachev, who was the CC CPSU secretary in charge of agriculture.

[31]The four appointees from the 1983–84 period are Nikolay Kruchina, Stepan Chervonenko, Venyamin Afonin, and Ivan Yastrebov. The 11 Gorbachev appointees are Oleg Belyakov, Arkadiy Vol'skiy, and Nikolay Stashenkov, all from 1985; Aleksandr Mel'nikov, Viktor Pasternak, Leonid Bobykin, and Yuriy Voronov from 1986; and from 1987, Yuriy Sklyarov, Ivan Skiba, Valentin Grigor'yev, and Valeriy Boldin (who succeeded Luk'yanov in May). Gostev, Luk'yanov, and Yakovlev were also first-year appointees; they have since been promoted.

In addition, four secretaries (Slyun'kov, Anatoliy Dobrynin, Vadim Medvedev, and Razumovskiy) double as department heads, although with Slyun'kov's promotion to full Politburo membership, he will likely be replaced as chief of the Economic Department. Three departments have been abolished: International Information, Agricultural Machine-Building, and Letters.

[32]E.g., in 1986, Medvedev was transferred from the Department of Science and Education, to which he had been appointed in 1983, to head the Department of Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Key Gorbachev appointments to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, from left to right: Lev Zaykov, Nikolay Slyun'kov, and Aleksandr Yakovlev.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

At the same time, it is among the department chiefs that one finds the first ambiguities in Gorbachev's appointments. Specifically, one would have expected the new department chiefs to be significantly younger than their predecessors; but, the mean age only dropped from 67 in 1982 to 60 in 1987,[33] and the group as a whole is distinctly older than the new state officials whom they supervise.

The department chiefs appointed in Gorbachev's first year had a conservative cast to them: all but two already held prominent staff positions in central Moscow institutions at the time of Brezhnev's death, and several had had many years of prior experience in the Central Committee apparatus.[34] Their big career break typically came in 1983, under Andropov, and their further advancement to departmental leadership in 1985 seemed to be their reward for having performed well in the interim. Of the handful of exceptions brought in from outside, only one—Aleksandr Yakovlev—was clearly Gorbachev's pick.[35]

Since the 27th Party Congress, the newly-named department chiefs have constituted a more varied group, with representatives from Moscow central institutions less prominent than they were among the officials selected in Gorbachev's first year.[36] Except for Valeriy Boldin,[37] it is, however, still difficult to detect Gorbachev's personal touch. The new chiefs presumably brought themselves to Gorbachev's attention through their early allegiance in his first year. Except for Nikolay Slyun'kov's ties to Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov, no other plausible patronage ties are apparent.

[33]The 1982 mean is based on 18 department chiefs for whom information is available (at the time of Brezhnev's death, the chief of the Chemical Industry Department had not been identified); the 1987 mean is based on 14 department chiefs (the ages of Veniamin Afonin and Vladimir Grigor'yev are not currently available). CC secretaries who double as department chiefs were not included.

[34]When Brezhnev died, Oleg Belyakov was already deputy chief of the Defense Industry Department; Arkadiy Vol'skiy was first deputy chief of the Machine-Building Department (in which he had served since 1978); Georgiy Razumovskiy was chief of the Department of the Agroindustrial Complex within the Administration of Affairs of the USSR Council of Ministers; Nikolay Stashenkov was deputy USSR minister of trade; and Boris Gostev had been in the Central Committee apparatus for nearly 20 years. Even Yakovlev, then nearing the end of a decade of "exile" as ambassador to Canada, had previously served 20 years in the CC Department of Propaganda.

[35]Yakovlev was serving as the USSR ambassador in Ottawa at the time of Gorbachev's 1983 visit. Shortly thereafter, Yakovlev was appointed director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations.

By contrast, Aleksandr Mel'nikov rose straight through the ranks of the Tomsk party organization and appears to be a Ligachev protégé (whom he replaced as oblast party first secretary in 1983); Leonid Bobykin rose through the Sverdlovsk party organization and presumably had ties with Ryzhkov there.

[36]Slyun'kov spent most of his career in Belorussia despite nine years as deputy chairman of Gosplan for machine-building. Viktor Pasternak comes straight from a career in Khabarovsk. Ivan Skiba left the position of first secretary in Ivano-Frankovsk oblast in 1983 to become first deputy head of the CC Agriculture and Food Industry Department. Yuriy Voronov rose through the Leningrad Komsomol before coming to Moscow in the late 1970's as editor of *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*. Grigor'yev, though a Muscovite, served at the Moscow Energy Institute rather than in any central party or goverment positions. Even Yuriy Sklyarov, who has held Moscow media positions since 1969, began his career in the Kharkiv party apparatus.

[37]Boldin was identified as a personal assistant to Gorbachev in April 1985 (see *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* [Moscow], Nov. 20, 1985, p. 741). He was previously agricultural editor of *Pravda*. The fact that he is a Supreme Soviet deputy from a district in Rostov oblast suggests a possible southern origin.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Several department chief positions lay vacant for long periods, suggesting possible conflict over who was to be chosen. The Economic Department had no chief from December 1985 to January 1987, while the top position at the Science and Education Department was empty from the spring of 1986 to April 1987. The Culture Department was apparently without a chief for at least a month: the old chief, Vasiliy Shauro, was dropped from candidate membership in the Central Committee in March 1986, and Yuriy Voronov was not named to head the department until April. There were similar delays in filling vacancies in some of the corresponding state organizations (a five-month delay in naming a successor to Guriy Marchuk as chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology, and a two-month delay before Vasiliy Zakharov replaced Petr Demichev as minister of culture).

Just who is the senior secretary in charge of cadres right now is a puzzle. At the end of Gorbachev's first year it appeared that Ligachev retained jurisdiction over cadres, overseeing Razumovskiy, who had succeeded him as chief of the Organizational Party Work Department.[38] But since Razumovskiy's promotion to the Secretariat in March 1986, Ligachev has hardly mentioned personnel matters in his speeches and articles, and his public appearances suggest other duties, among them agriculture.[39] It is possible, therefore, that Razumovskiy now reports directly to Gorbachev, and that Ligachev has suffered a real loss of authority over personnel as well as over ideology (though at this writing he apparently remains semi-officially second secretary).

The most intriguing question about Gorbachev's control over personnel policy is the mixture of change and continuity in the Central Committee departments in charge of such matters. The most important of these is the Organizational Party Work (OPW) Department, which handles the placement of leading party cadres throughout the country.[40] On the one hand, as one might expect, there have been important changes in the OPW Department since Brezhnev's death: Ivan Kapitonov, who was in charge of party cadres for almost the entire Brezhnev period, was replaced in 1983 by Ligachev, who was in turn succeeded by Razumovskiy in 1985. All but one of the five current deputy chiefs are new since Gorbachev's accession.[41] Finally, turnover among sector chiefs, while more difficult to assess, has also increased under Gorbachev.

In addition, the role of the OPW Department has been expanded to include the preparation of cadres working within the department itself for further advancement, most notably to positions as party first secretaries of oblasts in the Russian republic (RSFSR). Two positions in particular—deputy chief and inspector—have become

[38]See Gustafson and Mann, loc. cit., for evidence from the 27th CPSU Congress on this point.

[39]See fn. 7, supra.

[40]Analysis in the following section is based on the forthcoming (September 1987) *Radio Liberty Research* report by Dawn Mann, "The CPSU Central Committee Organizational Party Work Department."

[41]Konstantin Mohyl'nychenko was appointed in January 1984; N. S. Igrunov, May 1985; N. A. Zolotarev, March 1986; Georgiy Kryuchkov, August 1986; and Hryhoriy Kharchenko, March 1987.

Key figures in the administration of personnel matters in the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, from left to right: Yegor Ligachev, Yuriy Razumovskiy, and Anatoliy Luk'yanov.

—Sovfoto.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

virtual revolving doors, as potential candidates for promotion acquire experience and then leave to assume new responsibilities.

Significant ties to the past do, however, remain. The current first deputy chief, Yevgeniy Razumov, served as a deputy chief throughout virtually the entire Brezhnev period and was promoted to his present position by Ligachev in 1983. Ligachev had presumably known Razumov since the early 1960's, when both men served in the RSFSR Party Bureau—Razumov as an aide to the first deputy chairman, Andrey Kirilenko, and Ligachev as a deputy chief in the Bureau's Department of Party Organs. Razumov's continued presence in the OPW Department suggests that Ligachev, though politically weakened, might still retain considerable influence over cadre policy.

There has not been an outright purge of the men who managed OPW for so long under Brezhnev, but rather a series of soft landings and even promotions between 1983 and 1985. No one has been treated in such a way as to suggest serious dissatisfaction with his performance or with the work of the department.[42] This is somewhat odd, because at the 27th Congress, Moscow party chief Boris Yel'tsin sharply criticized the department,[43] presumably with Gorbachev's blessing. Could Ligachev have been his target? In any case, there was no further mention of the subject until the June 1987 CC Plenum, when Gorbachev sharply but indirectly criticized the OPW and other Central Committee departments for their failure to bring lower-level party bodies into line.[44] This is clearly an important issue if Gorbachev hopes to prevent conservatives in the party apparatus from manipulating the selection of delegates to the upcoming party conference.

Links to the past are also visible in the other two departments that manage personnel. The Department for Cadres Abroad has been headed by Stepan Chervonenko since 1983, and Georgiy Tsukanov, formerly one of Brezhnev's aides, has been his first deputy for only a slightly shorter period of time. An even more striking case of continuity is found in the Administrative Organs Department, which is in charge of overseeing personnel appointments in the military and the police. Its chief, the 74-year-old Nikolay Savinkin, has held high positions in the department since the 1950's and has headed it since 1968.[45]



Nikolay Savinkin, veteran chief of the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Not only are these departments still staffed by men with ties to the Brezhnev era, but the "soft landings and promotions" pattern of personnel turnover within these departments, as well as within the OPW Department,

[42]Kapitonov was appointed chairman of the party's Central Auditing Commission in 1986, and though no longer a CC secretary, he enjoys a protocol ranking directly below that of the CC secretaries. His first deputy chief in the OPW Department, Nikolay Petrovichev, was appointed chairman of the State Committee for Professional and Technical Education in July 1983 before retiring in 1986. Ligachev, of course, received a big promotion, moving up to become the senior CC secretary in charge of cadres one month before Gorbachev's election.

The three deputy chiefs identified at the time of Brezhnev's death have also seen their careers advance. Razumov became first deputy chief; Pavel Smol'skiy was elected first secretary of the Ryazan' oblast party committee in December 1985; and Valentin Nikiforov was appointed deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of personnel in December 1985.

[43]See Gustafson and Mann, loc. cit., p. 5.

[44]Gorbachev called upon "the departments of the CPSU Central Committee to exercise more profound influence on the state of affairs in republic, kray, and oblast party organizations, and to ensure oversight of implementation of the decisions of the Central Committee." June Plenum speech, loc. cit.

[45]Savinkin's career appears to have been linked to Brezhnev's from the mid-1930's, when the two men served together in the Red Army in the Transbaykal region. Savinkin was appointed deputy chief of the Administrative Organs Department at about the same time that Brezhnev was appointed CC secretary with responsibility for military industries, and in 1968, he was promoted to department chief, as Brezhnev consolidated his leadership over the party apparatus.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shows the same caution that Gorbachev has exercised in most areas (with the prominent exception of Central Asia), as we shall see below.

USSR Council of Ministers

Turnover has been high in the USSR Council of Ministers (CM) both before and after the 1986 party congress. Twenty-six new ministers and chairmen of state committees were appointed between March 1986 and June 1987, compared with 30 in Gorbachev's first year. In addition, the more recent period has seen the appointment of four new members to the Presidium of the CM, versus seven appointees in the earlier period. As a result, 68 of the 106 current members of the Council are new since March 1985.[46] In the Presidium, there has been nearly a clean sweep in the years since 1985, when Ryzhkov was appointed premier.

Appointments to the USSR CM since the party congress are, however, noticeably different from those made in Gorbachev's first year. In an earlier article, we observed that the new ministers and heads of state committees appointed prior to the 27th Congress averaged a surprisingly high 57 years of age, and that nearly half had had conventional "Brezhnevian" careers, rising straight up the ladder of their ministries or near-equivalent organizations.[47] In other words, the pattern of promotions was still rather conventional. By contrast, the post-congress appointees are younger (the new ministers and Presidium members, in particular, averaged four years younger at appointment), and their careers have been less conventional.[48] Several appointees in technical fields spent a few years in the all-Union or republican party secretariats, mostly after Brezhnev's death, instead of rising straight up the ladder of their ministries. Even those appointed from a position of first deputy or its equivalent frequently have turned out to have unusual twists to their résumés (see Table 1).[49]

Another striking feature of the post-congress group of CM appointees is the high percentage of provincials. Half had previously spent two years or less in Moscow jobs; many were promoted directly from enterprise director or oblast party committee first secretary to minister. They, like Gorbachev himself before 1978, have spent most of their working lives in only one province.

The post-congress pattern of appointments conveys a strong impression of purpose, tied more to economic policy than to vote-counting in the Central Committee. The absence of conventional career backgrounds and the strong presence of provincials fits with the stated determination of the new leaders (many of whom are provincials themselves) to challenge the big Moscow bureaucracies. There is a noticeable absence of clear "patronage tails" associated with specific leaders. Only one appointment is patently a career-end gift from Ligachev: Fedor Loshchenkov, named to a minor state committee after 25 years in Yaroslavl', has ties to Ligachev going back 45 years. Three appointees have connections to Stavropol': Aleksandr Budyka, Marat Gramov, and Sergey Manyakin (although only Budyka has a clear and direct tie to Gorbachev himself). Yet each of these administers a relatively minor agency—the Minis-

[46]A note on counting conventions is in order. The listing is current as of early June 1987, i.e., it includes Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov and Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry Igor Belousov. In the overall totals for the Council of Ministers, we have counted only "net new faces," not changes in positions. Consequently, transfers and promotions within the Council itself are not included (e.g., we omitted Vladimir Kamentsev, who moved from minister of the fishing industry to the Presidium of the Council of Ministers; Yuriy Batalin, former chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages, now Chairman of the State Construction Committee and a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Ivan Silayev, former minister of the aviation industry and now chief of the Bureau for Machine-Building and a Council deputy chairman; and Anatoliy Mayorets, who went from the Ministry of the Electric Equipment Industry to the Ministry of Power and Electrification).

In addition, five agricultural ministries were absorbed into the new State Agroindustrial Committee in November 1985; of the six officials involved, only two—Yevgeniy Sizenko and Leonid Khitrun—are still members of the Council of Ministers, and were not counted as changes (Khitrun has since been elected first secretary of the Ryazan' oblast party committee). In September 1986, the construction industry was reorganized along regional lines; the respective ministers have been counted among the appointments of Gorbachev's *first* year, for that is when they first appeared in the Council of Ministers.

Chairmen of republic councils of ministers, though technically ex officio members of the USSR CM, are omitted from our totals, as is the chairman of the secretariat of the CM.

We have included Leonid Bibin (a first deputy chairman of the State Construction Committee with ministerial rank) and Aleksandr Iyevlev (first deputy chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee with ministerial rank) in the totals, although not in the biographical analysis (for lack of data).

To avoid double-counting in the overall Council totals, where an individual is both a new member of the Presidium and a new chairman of a state committee, as well as a "new face" on the Council (Vsevolod Murakhovskiy, Lev Voronin, and Boris Tolstykh), we have counted him in the Presidium ranks but not in the state committee. We have used the same convention for biographical analysis.

Finally, the Ministry of the Electrical Equipment Industry has changed hands twice under Gorbachev, but this is counted as a single change in the overall Council totals because Gennadiy Voronovskiy has come and gone, leaving only one new face, Oleg Anfimov.

[47]Gustafson and Mann, loc. cit., p. 8

[48]The analysis that follows excludes Presidium members and focuses solely on the ministers and chairmen appointed after the party congress.

[49]Thus, Lev Ryabev should not really be classified among those with "conventional ladder" careers, because he spent at least nine years in party service, first in the Gor'kiy oblast party committee and then in the CPSU Central Committee; Kondrat Terekh has spent his career in trade, but in consumer cooperatives (*potrebsoyuzy*) of the Belorussian Republic, rather than the conventional Ministry of Trade; Aleksandr Volkov was a military officer, as were all recent civil aviation ministers; and Yazov had two spectacular promotions over the heads of a dozen more senior officers. In fact, only Nikolay Panichev and Boris Belousov match the classic "ladder" pattern.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Recent Career Patterns of New USSR Ministers and State Committee Chairmen

Technical specialists promoted from the number two position of the same or related ministry (or close equivalent)

Yevgeniy Chazov	deputy minister
Nikolay Panichev	first deputy minister
Lev Ryabev	first deputy minister
Aleksandr Volkov	dep. commander, Air Force
Kondrat Terekh	dep. chair, Belorussian Council of Ministers (for trade)
Boris Belousov	first deputy minister
Nikolay Gorshkov	deputy minister
Valentin Pavlov	career in Gosplan and the Ministry of Finance
Dmitriy Yazov	deputy minister
Leonid Bibin	deputy chair., State Construction Committee

Technical specialists with service in apparatus of all-Union or republic Central Committee

Oleg Anfimov	Latvian party and Central Committee
Yuriy Bespalov	CC Chemical Industry Department
Vladimir Durasov	CC Heavy Industry Department
Aleksandr Budyka	CC Agriculture Department
Nikolay Ol'shanskiy	Ukrainian CC Chemical Industry Department

Political specialists with long service in apparatus of all-Union CC Secretariat

Marat Gramov	16 years in CC apparatus
Aleksandr Kamshalov	16 years in CC apparatus

Direct rise from a position in the field (or the equivalent)

Yuriy Vol'mer	Far East shipping
Nikolay Kotlyar	Far East fishing
Nikolay Lukonin	nuclear power plant director
Nikolay Pugin	GAZ auto plant
Vadim Malyshev	nuclear power plant director

Move up from an oblast party committee first or second secretaryship

Fedor Loshchenkov	25 years in Yaroslavl'
Sergey Manyakin	26 years in Omsk
Leonid Smagin	21 years in Tatariya
Vasiliy Zakharov	10 years in Leningrad

try of Grain Products, the State Committee for Physical Culture and Sports, and the People's Control Committee respectively—and collectively they hardly amount to a Gorbachev network. A handful of other appointees may have other high-level patrons.[50] In contrast to Gorbachev's first year, there is less of an observable "Uralo-Siberian connection" in recent appointments,[51] and only a faint "Leningrad connection."[52] In sum, personal

New figures in the USSR Council of Ministers; at left, Minister of the Machine-Tool and Tool-Making Industry of the USSR Nikolay Panichev, a veteran of heavy industry management; at right, Sergey Manyakin, new chief of the People's Control Committee, a former oblast first secretary.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

and geographic connections do not appear to be very significant. What is much more striking is that several of the post-congress appointees owe their promotion to their ties to major policies of the last decade, which is presumably what brought them to the attention of the top leadership.[53]

In short, there is no suggestion of blockage, paralysis, log-rolling, or decision-by-committee in appointments to the Council of Ministers. The current situation suggests one person's will, or at least a strong consensus, rather than disunity and a scramble to build lines of patronage. Gradually, Gorbachev appears to be finding the unconventional executives he could not quite locate in the first year. If it is too early to call them alumni of

[50]Terekh to Siyun'kov; Durasov perhaps to Dolgikh; Zakharov to Ligachev; and Yazov to Gorbachev.

[51]Those identified include Gennadiy Vedernikov (Chelyabinsk); Durasov (Urals); Loshchenkov (Novosibirsk); and Manyakin (Omsk).

[52]*Bespalov and Zakharov may belong in this category.*

[53]Thus, Chemical Industry Minister Bespalov was formerly director of one of the earliest and most successful scientific-production associations (Plastpolimer); Ryabev, Lukonin, and Malyshev were all beneficiaries of the post-Chernobyl' purge of the nuclear industry; Minister of Mineral Fertilizer Production Nikolay Ol'shanskiy has ties to Sumy; Minister of the Machine Tool and Tool Building Industry Nikolay Panichev made micro-ballbearing grinders; and Volkov was in charge of military transportation during the 1979 intervention in Afghanistan and after. We have already mentioned Terekh's background in trade; Health Minister Yevgeniy Chazov has been a visible presence in Soviet anti-nuclear diplomacy in addition to having cared for a succession of moribund general secretaries; and Yazov, as chief of the Main Directorate of Personnel, was busy cleaning out the dead wood in the Ministry of Defense after having drawn Gorbachev's attention in the Far East in 1986 (see Dale R. Herspring's article in this issue—**Eds.**)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perestroyka, they have at least distinguished themselves in the five years since Brezhnev's death.

As has generally been the case throughout the party and state apparatus, very few of the post-1982 appointees to the Council of Ministers have been challenged. Almost all of the officials that have been replaced since the party congress, just as in Gorbachev's first year, were holdovers from the Brezhnev era, and only 15 of those now remain.[54] In contrast, only four post-Brezhnev appointees have been replaced, even though some have now been in their current jobs for nearly five years.[55]

Gorbachev has been notably unadventurous in making changes in the military-industrial sector. Here the overall rate of turnover has been slower than elsewhere, and the successors fit the conventional pattern of advancement without exception: in the military-industrial ministries, three ministers remain from the Brezhnev period, and all six of those appointed since November 1982, all were previously first deputies of their ministries or close equivalents—the classic "Brezhnevian" promotion pattern.[56] Does this reflect caution or high opinion? The large numbers of former military-industrial executives appointed to high positions since Brezhnev's death suggests the latter.[57]

The Provincial Elite

Let us now turn to developments among provincial-level party organizations. We shall first explore developments within the exceptionally important Russian republic, then explore general developments in other republics, and then attempt to unravel just what is going on in Ukraine—the last a subject of considerable speculation and controversy.

Provinces of the RSFSR. The first secretaries of the Russian republic have traditionally comprised the core of the CPSU Central Committee membership and the single most important source of future leaders. All 72 of the first secretaries of RSFSR oblast, territory, and autonomous republic party committees in office at the time of the 27th Congress were elected full members of the Central Committee at that gathering. At the time, one-third of these officials had been appointed in Gorbachev's first year and were considered new members of the CC.[58]

In the following 16 months, turnover in this key group slowed sharply (16 left their first secretaryship vs. 25 in Gorbachev's first year).[59] The pattern of change in both periods is significant. First, in each period, the departing secretaries were almost entirely holdovers from the Brezhnev or even the Khrushchev years;[60] in other words, the first secretaries appointed after November 1982, with few exceptions, have been left in place, presumably both to provide stability and also to allow them to prove themselves further.

Second, only one of the changes in regional first secretaries since the party congress was an outright dismissal; many, indeed, consisted of promotions, although not such glittering ones as in Gorbachev's first year (rather more typical is Loshchenkov's previously mentioned transfer to the Council of Ministers). This pattern suggests the same general policy as in the first year: to promote the best (or the best-connected) of the holdovers and to treat most of the rest with care (see Table 2).

One clear aim has been to retire the oldest of the group. Of the secretaries born in 1922 or before, only three remain out of the group of 26 that existed at the

[54]Sergey Afanas'yev, Boris Bakin, Mikhail Busygin, Vasiliy Dinkov, Pavel Finogenov, Yuriy Izrael', Yevgeniy Kozlovskiy, Ivan Nayashkov, Erlen Pervyshin, Petr Pleshakov, Vasiliy Shamshin, Mikhail Shkabardnya, Lev Vasil'yev, Ivan Vladychenko, and Aleksandr Yezhevskiy. Of this group, Afanas'yev and Dinkov were initially appointed to ministerial-rank positions under Brezhnev, but have since been given new jobs.

[55]The four are Yevgeniy Kulov, Sergey Sokolov, Grigoriy Vashchenko, and Gennadiy Voronovskiy (as of June 1987).

[56]Apollon Systsov was first deputy minister of the aviation industry from 1981 until his promotion in November 1985; Boris Belousov was appointed a deputy minister of the defense industry in 1980 and rose to first deputy; Vladislav Kolesnikov was first deputy minister of the electronics industry from 1971 until becoming minister in 1985; Ryabev was appointed deputy minister of medium machine-building in 1984 and first deputy in 1986 prior to becoming minister.

There are two slight deviations from this norm: Igor' Belousov was first deputy minister of the shipbuilding industry before moving over to general machine-building in January 1984, and Oleg Baklanov served as a mere deputy minister in the general machine-building ministry (which apparently was without a first deputy chief for some time) before promotion to minister in April 1983.

[57]See Paul Cocks, "Soviet Science and Technology Strategy: Borrowing from the Defense Sector," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, New Orleans, November 1986; Christopher Davis, "Perestroika in the Soviet Defense Sector, 1985–87: National Security Elite Participation and Turnover," paper prepared for a Conference on Elites and Political Power in the USSR, Birmingham, England, July 1–2, 1987; Julian Cooper, "The Elite of the Defense Industry Complex," paper presented at the same Birmingham conference.

[58]For analysis of the first 25 RSFSR appointees, see Gustafson and Mann, loc. cit. The group analyzed here includes the first secretary of the important Moscow city party committee, but omits leaders of committees of autonomous oblasts.

[59]This count includes all changes through August 1, 1987.

[60]The exceptions are Vadim Bakatin, appointed Kirov first secretary in March 1985; Gennadiy Vedernikov, named Chelyabinsk first secretary in 1984; Gennadiy Kolbin, named to Ul'yanovsk in 1983; and Pavel Smol'skiy, named to Ryazan' in December 1985. The others (with the dates of their appointment as first secretary) are Nikolay Mal'kov (1978); Loshchenkov (1961); Dmitriy Kachin (1971); Manyakin (1961); Vadim Ignatov (1975); Mikhail Matafonov (1973); Nikolay Antonov (1972), Ivan Klimenko (1969), Nikolay Yermakov (1985), and Ivan Morozov (1965).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Current Position of Regional Party Committee First Secretaries Replaced Between March 1986 and August 1987

	Name	Position held
Transferred	Nikolay Mal'kov	First sec., Chita oblast
	Gennadiy Vedernikov	Dep. chmn., USSR Council of Ministers
	Fedor Loshchenkov	Chmn., USSR State Committee for Material Reserves
	Dmitriy Kachin	Amb. to Vietnam
	Sergey Manyakin	Chmn., People's Control Committee
	Gennadiy Kolbin	First sec., Kazakh CP
	Vadim Bakatin	First sec., Kemerovo
	Vadim Ignatov	Dep. chmn., USSR Agroindustrial Committee
Retired	Mikhail Matafonov	For health reasons, age 58
	Nikolay Antonov	Pensioned, age 65
	Ivan Klimenko	Pensioned, age 66
	Aleksey Rybakov	Pensioned, age 62
Fired	Midkhat Shakirov	
Deceased	Ivan Morozov	
	Pavel Smol'skiy	
	Nikolay Yermakov	

Table 3: Previous Position of Regional First Secretaries Appointed Between March 1986 and August 1987

Promoted from within same region	
Aleksandr Bogdanov	Second secretary
Stanislav Osminin	Second secretary
Petr Reznikov	Second secretary
Yuriy Samsonov	Second secretary
Igor' Tolstoukhov	Second secretary
Yevgeniy Pokhitaylo	Chairman, oblast executive committee
Vladimir Mel'nikov	Chairman, ASSR Council of Ministers
Transferred from another region	
Nikolay Mal'kov	First secretary
Vadim Bakatin[1]	First secretary
Transferred from Moscow	
N. D. Shvyrev	Inspector, CC CPSU
Ivan Nikulin[2]	Inspector, CC CPSU
Gennadiy Kabasin	Deputy chief, OPW Dept., CC CPSU
Yuriy Pogorelov	Sector head, OPW Dept., CC CPSU
Anatoliy Vlasenko	Sector head, CC CPSU Agriculture Dept.
Leonid Khitrun	Council of Ministers
R. Khabibullin	Council of Ministers

[1]Bakatin was the second secretary in Kemerovo before serving as first secretary in Kirov.

[2]Shvyrev was second secretary in the same oblast before moving to the CC. Nikulin was a secretary in a different oblast.

time of Brezhnev's death.[61] Not surprisingly, the rate of retirements is now slowing sharply: in Gorbachev's first year, 13 out of 25 departures were retirements; in the second period, there were only four. In short, Gorbachev is running out of easy targets.

The three biggest promotions from among RSFSR regional party leaders deserve special mention, because none had originally been a Brezhnev appointee and each has been on a fast track since 1983. Gennadiy Vedernikov moved from Chelyabinsk to become deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Gennadiy Kolbin was named from Ul'yanovsk to replace Dinmukhamed Kunayev as first secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party; and Vadim Bakatin returned from Kirov to become first secretary in his home oblast of Kemerovo. None of the three has obvious ties with either Gorbachev or Ligachev, but all three were favorably featured in the media before their promotion.[62]

Little information is available about the RSFSR regional party committee first secretaries appointed since the 27th Congress other than their most recent position.[63] Yet even this single piece of information shows a decline in the application of the innovative practice—seen in the Andropov years as well as Gorbachev's first year—of sending potential regional first secretaries for a brief spell to the central apparatus in Moscow. Of the 25 new secretaries appointed during Gorbachev's first year, 19 had served in some capacity in Moscow (16 in the Central Committee apparatus alone) immediately prior to their appointment as regional first secretary. But of the 16 new appointees promoted between March 1986 and August 1987, only five show a similar rotation, whereas seven were promoted from within their own region (see Table 3). Thus, we seem to be witnessing a return to the Brezhnev pattern of promotion from within a region.

[61]The three remaining are Boris Konoplev in Perm' (born 1919, appointed 1972); Aleksey Chernyy in Khabarovsk (born 1921, appointed 1970); and Aleksandr Filatov in Novosibirsk (born 1922, appointed 1978).

[62]Vedernikov has risen fastest. A metallurgist from Chelyabinsk, he switched to party work after 1978 and rose to secretary of the oblast party committee. He had evidently already attracted high-level attention, having served briefly as an inspector in the Central Committee in 1983.

Kolbin has the most obvious high-level associations. He rose under Kirilenko and Yakov Ryabev in Sverdlovsk oblast, and then worked as second secretary under Eduard Shevardnadze in the Georgian party from 1975 to 1983, before being named first secretary in Ul'yanovsk.

Little information is available about Bakatin. His appointment is of interest chiefly because he is one of a cluster of Kemerovo party officials to receive important if not spectacular promotion since Brezhnev's death. This may be a sign of some influence on the part of OPW deputy chief Razumov, who is himself from Kemerovo and may oversee the Uralo-Siberian area. Michel Tatu, "The Kemerovo Group," *SOVSET*, June 1987.

[63]The 1986 yearbook of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* covers 1985 and thus did not include biographical information on new members of the Central Committee (and hence on the new regional party first secretaries). Presumably this information will appear in the 1987 edition.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The treatment of the RSFSR regional party committee first secretaries is one of the most important features of Moscow's personnel policy to watch. Their treatment under Gorbachev so far suggests caution and a concern for stability. Whatever the intention, the effect has been to minimize the number of "dead souls" in the Central Committee from this particularly important group. Of the eight transfers since the congress, only three now stand to lose their status as full members at the June 1988 Party Conference, and if one includes the four retirees and one dismissal, the total number of "dead souls" from the ranks of the RSFSR regional first secretaries is at most eight.[64]

The non-Russian republics. Movement of cadres generally remains high in the non-Russian republics, but extreme variations exist from republic to republic. Central Asia (especially Kazakhstan) has led the way in every major category of turnover both before the 27th CPSU Congress and since, suggesting a continuing high priority attached by Moscow to fighting corruption and reasserting central control there. Ukraine, to date, represents the other extreme, with the fewest changes in nearly every category.

In all the republics, there is the same evidence of continuity of policy that we have noted for the central apparatus and the RSFSR: on the whole, officials appointed under Andropov and Chernenko have not been replaced (except to be promoted). Thus, turnover since the congress, as in Gorbachev's first year, continues to occur largely at the expense of Brezhnev-era appointees.

Six of the 14 republic party first secretaries have been replaced under Gorbachev, but their fates have varied quite widely. Four Central Asians have been dismissed, and one of these (Kunayev) was subsequently expelled from the Central Committee; two non-Central Asians (Shevardnadze of Georgia and Slyun'kov of Belorussia) have been promoted. If one leaves the Central Asians aside, the remaining pattern (i.e., two promotions, eight unchanged) suggests a cautious policy similar to that being practiced toward the RSFSR regional first secretaries. In this light, the otherwise surprising survival of both Semen Grossu of Moldavia and Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi of Ukraine is part of a larger puzzle.[65]

The republic party second secretaries are a different story. Only one second secretary from the Brezhnev era (Aleksey Tytarenko of Ukraine) is still in place today. Indeed, the policy applied to second secretaries under Gorbachev is virtually the opposite of that applied to the first secretaries: wherever the first secretary has not been replaced, the second secretary generally has—the only exceptions to this policy, in addition to Ukraine, are Azerbaydzhan and Moldavia, where the second secretaries were appointed under Andropov and Chernenko respectively (see Table 4).

A controversial changing of the guard in Kazakhstan: the replacement of Dinmukhamed Kunayev, left, by Gennadiy Kolbin as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan triggered rioting in that Soviet republic in December 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

The traditional Stalinist practice of sending Russians from Moscow to serve as second secretaries in the non-Russian republics evidently remains as strong under Gorbachev as in the past.[66] Nearly all of the Gorbachev appointees are Russians or have Russian-sounding

[64]The current positions of Loshchenkov (chairman of the State Committee for Material Supply) and Dmitriy Kachin (ambassador to Vietnam) would, on past form, rate no more than candidate status; that of Vadim Ignatov (deputy chairman of the State Agroindustrial Committee) has no status at all on the CC. The four retirees—Aleksey Antonov, Ivan Klimenko, Mikhail Matafonov, and Aleksey Ryabakov, as well as Midkhat Shakirov, who was fired—would presumably be removed from the Central Committee altogether.

[65]Five of the republic party first secretaries are holdovers from the 1970's: Shcherbytskyi (appointed in 1972); Karen Demirchyan (1974); Petras Griškevičius (1974); Karl Vaino (1978); and Semen Grossu (1980).

The case of Kyamran Mamed ogly Bagirov is unclear. He was appointed in December 1982, replacing Geydar Aliyev (who was promoted to first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), but Bagirov's promotion could well have been decided before Brezhnev's death.

[66]As John H. Miller observes, this administrative device has actually gained in use throughout the post-Stalin period with the brief exception of a few years under Khrushchev, and it represented a major exception to Brezhnev's avowed policy of local recruitment of cadres. See Miller, "Cadres Policy in Nationality Areas: Recruitment of CPSU First and Second Secretaries in non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Soviet Studies*, January 1977, pp. 3–36.

In Central Asia, the pattern of "native first secretary, Russian second secretary" has been especially consistent; for example, as Irwin Selnick observes in his important study of Uzbek elites, all the second secretaries appointed over a three decade period beginning the in early 1950's came from the center. See his "The Ethnic and Political Determinants of Elite Recruitment in the Soviet National Republics: The Uzbek Soviet Elite, 1952–1981," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, New York, 1984.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

names; and nearly all had previously served in the Central Committee in Moscow (see Table 4). Only Belorussia and Ukraine are definitely known to have both first and second secretaries who belong to the dominant nationality of their respective republic.

Table 4: Backgrounds of Republic Party Second Secretaries Appointed Since Brezhnev

Previous positions of second secretaries appointed under Andropov and Chernenko

Aleksey Tytarenko	Republic CC secretary (same republic)
Vasiliy Konovalov	CC CSPU OPW Dept. sector chief
Gennadiy Bartoshevich	First sec., city party committee (Minsk)
Viktor Smirnov	CC CSPU OPW Dept. sector chief
Boris Nikol'skiy	City party committee secretary (Moscow)

Nationality of appointees listed above

To Ukraine	Tytarenko	Ukrainian
To Azerbaydzhan	Konovalov	Russian
To Belorussia	Bartoshevich	Belorussian
To Georgia	Nikol'skiy	Russian
To Moldavia	Smirnov	Unknown

Previous positions of second secretaries appointed under Gorbachev

Petr Luchinskiy	CC CPSU dept. deputy chief
Nikolay Mit'kin	CC CPSU OPW Dept. sector chief
Vitaliy Sobol'yev	CC CPSU OPW Dept. sector chief
Gennadiy Kiselev	CC CPSU inspector
Yuriy Kochetkov	CC CPSU inspector
Sergey Nesterenko[1]	CC CPSU dept. instructor
Georgiy Aleshin	City party committee secretary (RSFSR)
Vladimir Anishchev[2]	Secretary republic CC (same republic)
Sagidullah Kubashev	Oblast party first sec. (same republic)

Nationality of appointees listed above

(New from March 1985 to March 1986)

To Armenia	Kochetkov	Russian
To Estonia	Aleshin	Russian
To Kirgiziya	Kiselev	Unknown
To Tadzhikistan	Luchinskiy	Moldavian
To Uzbekistan	Anishchev	Russian

(New after March 1986)

To Kazakhstan	Kubashev	Kazakh
To Latvia	Sobol'yev	Russian
To Lithuania	Mit'kin	Russian
To Turkmenistan	Nesterenko	Unknown

[1]Second previous position—second secretary Tashkent city party committee.

[2]Second previous position—CC CPSU inspector.

Turnover among regional party first secretaries in republics other than the RSFSR has remained high since the congress, 21 in all compared to 23 in the period March 1985–March 1986.[67] The highest rate of turnover is, once again, found in Central Asia. As in the RSFSR, the retirees (a total of 17, ten of whom retired in Gorbachev's first year) are, without exception, Brezhnev appointees. There have been a surprising 18 lateral transfers among the non-RSFSR first secretaries (10 in year one, 8 in year two); even more surprising is the fact that 12 came from Central Asian republics. The transfers were almost evenly divided between Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev appointees (10 and 8 respectively). In contrast, only seven have been fired (2 in Gorbachev's first year and 5 since).

The most striking feature of the non-RSFSR regional party first secretaries appointed since March 1985 is that the vast majority come directly from their home republic. However, the pattern of promotion is not exactly "Brezhnevian," in that few of the appointees come directly from previous positions in their home regions (see Table 5). Only a handful come from the apparatus of the Central Committee in Moscow, in sharp contrast to the case with republic party second secretaries.[68]

This does not resemble the policy of "inter-regional exchange of cadres" that Ligachev recommended at

[67]As of August 1, 1987.

[68]In Kazkahstan, Valeriy Lokotunin of Karaganda oblast served as a CC CPSU inspector after being second secretary in Lipetsk oblast; Vladimir Grigor'yev of Vitebsk in Belorussia was a CC CPSU inspector after previously serving as chairman of the Brest oblast executive committee; Hryhoriy Revenko of the Kiev oblast party committee in Ukraine served as a Central Committee department chief after having been second secretary in the same oblast that he now leads; and Makhmut Aripdzhanov of Andizhan in Uzbekistan likewise served in the Central Committee. The pattern of a Central Committee "tour" applies to only four of 40 appointments in the category of non-RSFSR regional first secretaries, and it appears to be on the decline (of the four, only Lokotunin was appointed to a regional post after March 1986).

Table 5: Previous Position of Non-RSFSR Regional Party First Secretaries Appointed under Gorbachev

	When appointed	Same region[1]	Same republic	Outside
Central Asia	3/85–3/86	5	15	1
	3/86–6/87	4	11	1
Ukraine	3/85–3/86	1	2	1
	3/86–6/87	1	7	0
Belorussia	3/85–3/86	1	2	1
	3/86–6/87	1	1	0

[1]Included in the total for "Same republic."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 27th Congress and others have since endorsed. Apparently, Moscow has opted to continue the tradition of expressing its wishes through the second secretary rather than instituting the direct rotation of regional first secretaries.[69]

The Ukrainian case. The figures for personnel turnover in Ukraine since Gorbachev became general secretary have been among the lowest of any republic. Only one full member of the Ukrainian Politburo has been replaced;[70] three candidate members have been dropped and four added.[71] Turnover among secretaries and Central Committee department heads has been somewhat higher (57 and 39 percent respectively), but the Ukrainian Council of Ministers has been among the stablest (a new chairman was recently elected to replace the ailing 75-year-old Aleksander Lyashko); only Lithuania, Estonia, and the RSFSR have had more continuity in their councils. Ten regional party first secretaries out of a total of 25 have changed hands under Gorbachev as of August 1, 1987; of these changes, three were retirements, three were transfers, and four were dismissals.[72]

In the replacements that have occurred, Moscow's hand has been not nearly as visible in Ukraine as in the other non-Russian republics. Only one regional first secretary comes directly from a previous job in the Central Committee in Moscow.[73] The only other major "emissary" from Moscow (albeit an important one) is the new first secretary of the Kiev city committee, Konstantyn Masyk, appointed in April 1987.[74]

By comparison, Ukraine has fared rather better in "exporting" cadres to the central government in Moscow, suggesting that the Ukrainians' overall performance is not viewed badly in the Soviet capital. The list of prominent Ukrainians appointed to leading positions in Moscow includes Georgiy Kryuchkov (appointed deputy chief of the OPW Department after many years as chief of the corresponding department in Kiev); Vladimir Reshetilov (appointed USSR minister of construction in 1986, after serving as deputy and first deputy minister of heavy industrial construction in Ukraine from 1980 to 1983); and Arkadiy Shchepetil'nikov (promoted to USSR minister of industrial construction after heading the counterpart ministry in Ukraine). The list also includes USSR ministers Vladimir Luk'yanenko and Nikolay Ol'shanskiy, who were promoted directly from Sumy; Ivan Skiba, first deputy chief of the CC CPSU Agriculture and Food Industry Department; Viktor Myronenko, First Secretary of the Komsomol; and Aleksander Kapto, the current ambassador to Cuba.

The abrupt dismissals in the spring of 1987 of the first secretaries of Voroshilovgrad, Dnipropetrovsk, and L'viv regional party committees in Ukraine amid charges of gross misconduct have been taken by some as evidence that Moscow has been "closing in" on Shcherbytskyi by eroding his support in his own apparatus.[75] It is true that two of the ousted officials, Viktor Boyko of Dnipropetrovsk and Viktor Dobryk of L'viv, come from Shcherbytskyi's base in the Dnipropetrovsk party organization,[76] and the dismissals do appear to represent a break in the pattern of the previous two years, in which criticism from Moscow did not lead to the dismissal of the officials involved. Upon close examination, however, it is not clear that these three cases can be intepreted as part of an effort to weaken Shcherbytskyi. Dnipropetrovsk and L'viv have long been criticized on numerous grounds;[77] and Borys Honcharen-

[69]At the same time, it might be noted that several scholars have argued that the real power of the second secretary over local cadres appointments may actually be fairly weak. See, e.g., Miller, op. cit., and Selnick, loc. cit.

[70]The full member who was dropped was Aleksander Lyashko. Valentina Shevchenko was elected a full member of the Politburo of the republic party after her appointment as Chairman of the Presidium of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet.

[71]Aleksander Kapto lost his candidate membership in the republic Politburo when he was appointed ambassador to Cuba in January 1986; Viktor Dobryk was released as a candidate member of the republic Politburo after his dismissal as first secretary of the L'viv oblast party committee. Stepan Mukha was released as a candidate member in July 1987.

The four new candidate members are Volodymyr Ivashko, until April the Ukrainian CP secretary for ideology, but now first secretary of the Dnipropetrovsk oblast party committee; Vitaliy Masol, chairman of the Ukrainian Gosplan; and Stanislav Gurenko and Vasiliy Kryuckkov, Ukrainian CP secretaries. Masol was promoted to full membership in July 1987.

[72]Volodymyr Tsybul'ko, Mikhail Vsevolzhskiy, and Viktor Makarenko were retired. Ivan Lyakhov, previously chief of the Ukrainian CP's Organizational Party Work (OPW) Department, was transferred to Voroshilovgrad. Andriy Hirenko was first secretary of the Kherson oblast party committee before his transfer to the Crimean oblast party committee. Anatoliy Korniyenko left Ternopol' to fill the vacancy created in the Ukrainian CP's OPW Department by Lyakhov's transfer. Viktor Boyko, Viktor Dobryk, Borys Honcharenko, and Zinoviy Koval'chuk were fired (see below).

[73]This is Hryhoriy Revenko, now Kiev oblast first secretary. He served briefly as deputy chief in a CC CPSU department, but his position prior to that was Kiev oblast second secretary. The other new oblast committee first secretaries are, without exception, Ukrainians who, as far as can be determined from the available information, have made their careers in Ukraine.

[74]Masik, 51, is a Ukrainian and began his career in the Kiev Komsomol organization. He then served as an inspector in the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party before moving to Odessa as secretary and then second secretary of the oblast party committee. Between 1981 and October 1986, Masik was a deputy chairman on the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. From October 1986 until his appointment to Kiev, he served as an inspector in the CC CPSU.

[75]See, e.g., Philip Taubman, "Gorbachev Pushes to Win Control in Ukraine," *The New York Times,* Mar. 22, 1987.

[76]See Roman Solchanyk, "A Gorbachev-Inspired Purge in Ukraine?" RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 164/87, Apr. 2, 1987.

[77]Dnipropetrovsk had been the target of sharp criticism since Gorbachev's election as general secretary. In April 1985, Ligachev visited the city and criticized economic and cadre policy there (see *Radyanska*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, seated, and Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, standing, vote on the report of the Mandate Commission at the start of the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

ko's departure from Voroshilovgrad appears to be connected to the "Berkhin affair," in which local KGB officials illegally arrested Viktor Berkhin, a local investigative reporter.[78] In all instances, although the investigations were launched by Moscow, the dismissals were announced by Shcherbytskyi himself, and perhaps most significant, in every case the replacements came from high up in the Ukrainian party, suggesting that they are Shcherbytskyi's own choices, not Moscow's.[79]

The most recent dismissals occurred in Volyn oblast, where Zinoviy Koval'chuk, the party first secretary, and V. Zhibrov, the second secretary, were both fired for misconduct. Their dismissals are apparently related to a housing scandal in the city of Lutsk, where the local prosecutor successfully brought charges against the former chairman of the city executive committee

Ukraina [Kiev], Apr. 6 and 7, 1985). In a June 26, 1985, speech in Dnipropetrovsk, Gorbachev criticized the local metallurgical industry for failing to fulfill a CC CPSU resolution passed in February 1985 (see *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* [Moscow], May 17, 1987). In September 1986, *Partiynaya Zhizn'* published a lengthy article by the Party Control Commission in Moscow revealing widespread corruption and embezzlement in Dnipropetrovsk and accusing oblast second secretary N. Zadoya of failing to take proper actions (No. 18, September 1986). In February 1987, speaking before a Congress of the Ukrainian Union of Journalists, Shcherbytskyi noted an "incorrect attitude with regard to articles in the press," in Dnipropetrovsk, and he promised that the CC of the Ukrainian CP would investigate the matter (*Radyanska Ukraina*, Feb. 15, 1987). Further abuses of the legal system and persecution of journalists were revealed in *Pravda*, and at a March 1987 oblast party plenum, First Secretary Boyko was roundly criticized and dismissed (see Solchanyk, loc. cit.).

A similar pattern of complaints about economic and cadre policy, and about suppression of press criticism, can be found in L'viv. The attack began in the September 25, 1985, *Pravda*, and continued in the November 1 issue of the same newspaper. Shcherbytskyi also mentioned problems in L'viv in the course of his address to the journalists' congress. Dobryk was dismissed three days after Boyko.

[78]Shcherbytskyi, KGB Chairman Viktor Chebrikov, and USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandr Vlasov all responded to *Pravda* articles concerning the "Berkhin affair." See *Pravda*, Jan. 8 and 30, 1987.

[79]Volodymyr Ivashko and Yakiv Pohrebnyak were both Ukrainian CP secretaries, while I. A. Lyakhov was the chief of the Ukrainian CP CC Organizational Party Work Department. See *Pravda*, July 5, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(among others) but subsequently found the charges reversed by the oblast party committee.[80] When the Ukrainian CP Central Committee investigated the matter, it upheld the decision of the prosecutor and relieved Zhibrov of his duties on the spot. At that time, Koval'chuk received a reprimand, which—it now appears—was considered insufficient punishment.

Is there a struggle going on, then, for control of Ukraine, consisting of rising pressure from Moscow and a stubborn rear-guard action by Shcherbytskyi? This question has become especially interesting in light of the removals of Viktor Grishin and Kunayev from their party posts in Moscow and Kazakhstan respectively. Both were clearly weakened by a vigorous campaign to undermine their base; there were high rates of personnel change in Moscow and in Kazakhstan long before the two leaders were toppled. So far, at least, the story in Ukraine has been quite different. Is it plausible to conclude that Shcherbytskyi has succeeded where Grishin and Kunayev failed? Is the Gorbachev who can name four new members of the Politburo at a sitting unable to remove this one? Or is there perhaps something more complicated going on? At this point, we do not know.

Conclusions

Are there any patterns to post-congress turnover? The patterns of personnel movement in the Soviet elite since the 27th CPSU Congress show some significant changes compared to those of Gorbachev's first year. Appointments to the Council of Ministers and to the top posts in Central Committee departments have become distinctly more innovative. In addition (although we have not analyzed it here), turnover has accelerated at the top levels in three major state institutions that had previously been relatively unaffected: the KGB, the military, and the diplomatic service.

But far more striking are the elements of continuity. First, in both periods, sharp distinctions can be observed in every category between the treatment of officials appointed under Brezhnev and of those named since. The Brezhnev holdovers, especially the older ones, are still the principal targets for removal; officials appointed since 1982 have mostly not been challenged.

Second, a careful, even respectful, treatment of certain categories of officials has prevailed. These include RSFSR regional party committee first secretaries (except for the oldest Brezhnev appointees), non-Russian party leaders outside Central Asia, and to a lesser extent, senior officials in charge of cadres within the Central Committee apparatus.

Third, a "Brezhnevian" pattern of promotion—i.e., promotion up the ladder of a single organization or region—has continued (or returned) among some important groups. These include the leaders of military-industrial ministries and regional party committee first secretaries (despite a declared policy of "inter-regional circulation of cadres").

On the whole, then, Gorbachev has continued to exploit the easiest and least controversial targets, the Brezhnev holdovers. But there are few of them left—indeed, the largest single group of remaining "Brezhnevians" consists of the six republic party first secretaries that have remained in office since 1982. Gorbachev's failure to challenge them, as well as the post-1982 appointees at all levels, has left them largely free to build (or rebuild) their own followings below them.[81] This is true even in Central Asia, where few "Varangians" have been parachuted in from the center, except in the traditional spot of republic second secretary.[82] Sooner or later, Gorbachev will have to confront these groups, including some of his own appointees; this carries the certain danger of disrupting the tacit contract that the easy distinction between "Brezhnevian" and "post-Brezhnevian" cadres has made possible until now.

Does Gorbachev control the personnel weapon? The evidence suggests that until the 27th CPSU Congress, Gorbachev shared the levers of personnel appointment, but that since then he has gained essentially undivided control of them. The promotions of Luk'yanov and Razumovskiy to the Secretariat, and the apparent distancing of Ligachev from a direct role in cadres appointments, have given the General Secretary a freer hand. More recently, the emergence of Razumovskiy, rather than Ligachev, as the man in charge of preparations for the June 1988 Party Conference points in the same direction.[83]

How then can one explain Gorbachev's continued caution in using the personnel weapon? Our guess (and it is hardly more than that) is that it has been due to a

[80]See *Pravda Ukrainy* (Kiev), June 12, 1987.

[81]A. Salutskiy, "One's Own and Strangers," *Pravda*, Jan. 14, 1987; and Yu. Makhrin, "Renewal," ibid., Jan. 14, 1987.

[82]The one outstanding case of *varyazhshchina*, the appointment of Kolbin in Kazakhstan in December 1986, may not have been Gorbachev's preferred plan. Kolbin, a Sverdlovchanin, was a Kirilenko orphan and perhaps not a Gorbachev man. Could the move be attributed to Ligachev, and could the latter have been embarrassed by the rioting that resulted? That, at least, was suggested by Michel Tatu shortly after the event.

[83]On Razumovskiy's role, see Martin Walker, "New Struggle in Run-Up to Soviet Party Conference," *The Guardian*, Aug. 5, 1987. On developments in Bashkiriya, see *Pravda*, June 11 and 24, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 6: Status of Full Members of the 27th Central Committee of the CPSU

(N = 278)[1]

	Source of current appointment			Changes in job status			
Year achieved Full CC status	Appointed by Brezhnev[2]	Appointed by Andropov or Chernenko[3]	Appointed by Gorbachev[4]	Retired before 27th Congress	Retired or deceased since Cong.[5]	Transferred since Cong.	Total
1986	16	29	53	—	5	9	112
1983	—	2	—	1	—	—	3
1982	1	—	1	—	1	1	4
1981	19	4	16	—	3	6	48
1980	—	—	—	—	—	—	0
1979	1	—	—	—	—	—	1
1977	2	—	—	—	—	—	2
1976	16	6	12	1	10	6	51
1971	10	7	7	—	4	3	31
1966	2	2	2	2	4	—	12
1961	3	1	—	1	3	2	10
1956	—	—	—	1	2	—	3
1952	—	—	—	—	1	—	1
TOTALS	70	51	91	6	33	27	278

[1]Calculations exclude the 26 workers, peasants, brigade leaders, etc., who are largely ceremonial members of the Central Committee.
[2]Persons appointed to current job prior to November 1982.
[3]Persons appointed to current job between November 1982 and March 1985.
[4]Persons appointed to current job between March 1985 and March 1986.
[5]Three full members have died.

NOTE: The purpose of this table is to provide another way of looking at the possible allegiances of CC members. For example, there are 70 full members who were appointed to their current position under Brezhnev; they are generally considered "Brezhnevites" and part of the "conservative" coalition. However, 16 of that group were first made full members in 1986, i.e., under Gorbachev, and may therefore be more "loyal" to Gorbachev than might otherwise be expected.

combination of self-restraint and constraint by circumstances, rather than restraint by others. There have been enough easy and obvious targets to work on without disrupting the Andropov/Gorbachev continuity; and it has presumably not been easy to find new people one could be sure of. Several of Gorbachev's patterns of behavior reinforce this impression: first, his habit of promoting lower-ranking officials on the basis of short personal acquaintance (Yazov and Yakovlev); second, his decisiveness in taking advantage of unexpected opportunities to clean house, such as Chernobyl'[84] and the Rust affair. As more officials emerge who have shown themselves able to perform successfully under *perestroyka,* that particular source of constraint will fade.

This line of reasoning suggests that Gorbachev is increasingly in a position to adopt a more aggressive cadres policy if he chooses. An indirect indication of his growing control (or willingness to assert control) over personnel since the party congress is that although there have been few signs of a "Stavropol' mafia" rising to power, there have been no major "patronage tails" associated with any other top leader either. In particular, the dramatic rise of the Uralo-Siberians in 1985, perhaps associated with Ligachev's protection, has faded since the congress. And while some recent appointments show connections to Ryzhkov, the dominant pattern of appointments in the Council of Ministers suggests a strong hand coming from the party side.

Implications for the upcoming party conference. The stage is set for open confrontation on three battlegrounds during the coming year. The outcomes will determine Gorbachev's success at the June 1988 Party Conference and after. The first battleground will be appointments to the key regional party committees currently headed by those least enthusiastic about *perestroyka.* These appointments are crucial, because it is at this level that most party conference delegates will be selected. The second will be the Central Committee itself, which will meet perhaps twice more before next

[84]According to Michel Tatu, Shcherbytskyi was not one of those removed, because he had gone on record much earlier as being opposed to the building of the Chernobyl' nuclear power station.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

June, and which, according to the party rules, has the responsibility of defining the powers of the party conference. The third will be at the ballot box.

All three are related, at least in principle. The more regional party committee leaders Gorbachev replaces, the more "dead souls" he creates in the Central Committee, and the greater the potential danger—again, in principle—of an open revolt against him. On the other hand, the fewer he replaces, the more difficult it will be to prevent the delegate process from being subverted by conservative incumbents. By August 1, 1987, at least 33 voting members had lost the positions that had earned them their Central Committee status, in effect, becoming "dead souls" (see Table 6).

It is unlikely that Gorbachev is too concerned about a revolt. The Central Committee has, after all, approved the holding of a party conference and can hardly derail it now. Also, once the conference meets, it will undoubtedly define its own powers, setting aside any attempt by the Central Committee to contain them in advance. For these reasons, it is unlikely that Gorbachev spends much time counting the votes in the Central Committee. The more serious danger is that the local elections to select delegates to the party conference will be rigged. The delegates will be chosen not by local conferences, but by local plenums,[85] which are more easily manipulated by the local apparatus. The struggle has an ironic aspect: on one side is a reformist general secretary exploiting the most traditional of weapons, his control over the cadres department of the party, in pursuit of democratization; on the other, more dimly visible, is a conservative opposition whose only hope is that the very weapon of democratization can be turned against the General Secretary, by rigging the nominations or the ballot box if necessary.

Gorbachev's political strategy can be summed up this way: unlike his predecessors, he is attempting to build support for a radical policy program *before* fully consolidating his power within the elite by conventional means, and he is looking for this support primarily at the local level. He is gambling that through the secret ballot, local party elections, and the party conference, this support can be converted quickly into solid power at all levels of the system, thus enabling him to overcome resistance and implement *perestroyka*. Other general secretaries, notably Khrushchev, have played with populist approaches in the past, attempting to mobilize the masses against resistance to the party leader's policies at middle levels, but Gorbachev's strategy is true "party populism," something that has not been tried by any Soviet politician since Lenin.

His strategy is a gamble in two senses. The first is that Gorbachev, for the first time since he became general secretary, is openly defying the conservatives to do their worst. The second sense is more fundamental: Gorbachev is ultimately gambling that the election of delegates by secret ballot will confirm that the party rank and file are overwhelmingly in favor of *perestroyka*. Thus, he is staking the future of his reforms, and possibly his own political future as well, on the balance of friends and foes of change within the entire party membership. If he wins, Gorbachev's gamble could write very new rules to the game of Soviet politics. But is his silent majority really there?

[85]Malyayev and Popov, op. cit.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Gorbachev Consolidating Power

Jerry F. Hough

Over the last two years, the public discussion of Mikhail Gorbachev's prospects as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has emphasized the enormous strength of the opposition to him, yet we have witnessed time and again his ability to change both key personnel and policies. This apparent contradiction between perception and reality is not merely of academic interest, for how the West views the General Secretary's situation—is he strong in his own right, or does he desperately need an agreement with the United States to bolster his political position at home?—ultimately affects how one deals with Gorbachev's USSR.

Clearly, there is a serious need to reexamine the sources of Gorbachev's power and reassess the strength of the opposition to him. Paradoxically, we have come to accept a basically Marxist view of the Soviet political system and to rely on Moscow rumors—often officially inspired by Moscow—about Kremlin politics. Had we continued to accept the interpretation of the literature on totalitarianism, our initial assessments of Gorbachev's prospects would have been far more accurate.

Changing Views of the System

The totalitarian model of the Soviet political system emphasized the following features as essential: the relative absence of restraints on the political leaders; the political weakness of social groups, including the bureaucrats; an ideology that drove the leaders to transformation at home and world supremacy abroad (this transforming ideology was what distinguished it from an "authoritarian" political system); and a political culture that emphasized sacrifice and scorned "trade-union consciousness." The Soviet system was seen not as a continuation of tsarist Russia, but as the result of an alien ideology dedicated to eradicating the past.

According to this interpretation, the power of the general secretary rested on a number of factors, but the most important was his ability to build a political machine in the regional party apparatus. In this view, the general secretary controlled the regional party secretaries, who controlled the selection of the delegates to the ruling party congress, which in turn elected a Central Committee and a Politburo, and the Central Committee elected the general secretary. Hence, the general secretary was in a position to dominate the very institutions at the center that were supposed to control him. Robert Daniels labeled this mechanism "the circular flow of power."[1]

Toward the end of the Khrushchev era, this model came under question as observers like Michel Tatu saw a major conflict between liberal and conservative factions in the Soviet party leadership.[2] Moreover, Marxists such as Milovan Djilas retained the older Trotskyist image that communist societies were ruled by a bureaucratic "new class." Nevertheless, most scholars still drew their conclusions from the dynamism of party leader Nikita Khrushchev and his obvious ability to impose many of his idiosyncratic views on the Soviet political system. Scholars talked about "totalitarianism without terror," about "an ideological system" in which "the political system antedates society. Instead of reflecting society, the system is used by political leaders to create a

Jerry F. Hough is Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center on East-West Trade, Investment, and Communication at Duke University (Durham, NC), and a Fellow at the Brookings Institution (Washington, DC). He is author of numerous works on Soviet politics, including Russia and the West: The Politics of Gorbachev's Reform *(forthcoming in 1988).*

[1]Robert V. Daniels, "Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev," in John W. Strong, Ed., *The Soviet Union under Brezhnev and Kosygin*, New York, Van Nostrand-Reinhold, 1971, p. 20.

[2]The classic study demonstrating this point of view is Michel Tatu, *Power in the Kremlin*, New York, Viking, 1969.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

new society along the lines of their own beliefs and aspirations."[3]

Real questions regarding this model emerged with the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev and the selection of leaders with a far more cautious bent. Despite considerable evidence of a consolidation of his personal political position, Leonid Brezhnev never acted in the way that previous Soviet leaders had. Personnel change within the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the regional party apparatus was very gradual, and the proportion of living Central Committee members who were reelected at the succeeding party congresses came to hover around 90 percent. In addition, policy did not challenge the interests of any major institutional center of power, and in a real sense, policy-making diffused to the respective specialized institutions in each policy sphere. (I labeled this phenomenon "institutional pluralism"; others called it "bureaucratic ossification," or the like, but we were all talking about the same thing.)[4]

Two possible, but antithetical explanations for this situation exist. The first holds that Brezhnev would have liked to introduce some change in policy and especially in personnel, but that he was unable to do so. In one variant of this view, Khrushchev's defeat represented a final transfer of power from the general secretary to a ruling Politburo, which jealously guarded its collective power, in part by curtailing the "cadres weapon" of the general secretary. Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann have summarized this view in this journal:

Unwritten conventions on promotion and representation have come to limit a general secretary's choices in applying the cadres weapon. The distribution of political forces has shifted: the party apparatus in the provinces matters less, while the major state institutions in Moscow have increased their presence and influence. The end result is oligarchy rather than one-man rule, a politics of accommodation instead of dictate . . . . The long-term trend is for the power of successive general secretaries to decline.[5]

Another, increasingly popular variant of this interpretation suggested that even if the Politburo wanted to introduce change, it would be unable to do so because of the power of the bureaucracy. Thus, the failure of the Kosygin reforms of 1965 was attributed to the power of the bureaucrats to thwart actions against their interests, and this experience formed the basis for broader conclusions.

This latter variant was actually a Marxist one (in reality, the old Trotsky and Djilas one), although it was not always seen as such. In this view, all power is concentrated in the hands of the managers of the means of production (the bureaucrats), and the latter are concerned with only one narrow interest, their economic well-being and privilege. The leaders constitute a powerless political superstructure that cannot challenge the dominant economic class. Ideology is a conservative justification of the status quo and of the privileges of the ruling class. This view was very popular among dissidents and emigrants, who simply applied to the Soviet system the Marxism that the system had taught them; the view likewise became strongly held among those scholars and news correspondents with a great deal of contact with such sources.

The second explanation insisted that Brezhnev had accumulated tremendous power, but that he chose to use it simply to secure his position within the aging oligarchy and to prevent policy change, especially once his health began to fail in the mid-1970's. In this view, the unquestioned stagnation of the late 1970's and early 1980's was not the result of immobilism within the system, but of immobilism within the Brezhnev "administration." The old mechanisms of power still functioned, but for a different end.[6]

If this latter view were supplemented by a developmental interpretation of the Soviet society and polity, Brezhnev, like Mao Zedong in his last years, could be seen as a mighty dam that was holding back extremely powerful forces for change. The number of Soviet citizens with a high school diploma increased from 31 million in 1965 to 101 million in 1982, and those with a college degree rose from 6 million to 17 million over the same period.[7] These people should not be seen as conservative bureaucrats, but as a huge and growing middle class that was pushing for economic reform and more political freedom in much the same way as its counterparts in Argentina, Brazil, and now South Korea.

---

[3]Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR*, New York, Viking, 1964, p. 71; and Allen Kassof, "The Administered Society: Totalitarianism Without Terror," *World Politics* (Princeton), July 1966, pp. 558–75.

[4]Jerry F. Hough, "The Soviet System: Petrification or Pluralism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March-April 1972, p. 72.

[5]Thane Gustafson and Dawn Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year: Building Power and Authority," ibid., May-June 1986, pp. 1–2.

[6]See Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, *How the Soviet Union Is Governed*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 473–79. William G. Hyland wrote in 1982 (correctly, in my view) that "the story of Soviet politics over the last five years is largely a narrative of Brezhnev's accumulation of ever greater power." See "Kto Kogo in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1982, p. 19.

[7]*Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1964 g. Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The USSR National Economy in 1964: Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, Statistika, 1965, p. 33; and *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR, 1922-1982. Statisticheskiy yezhegodnik* (The USSR National Economy, 1922–1982: Statistical Yearbook), Moscow, Finansy i statistika, 1982, p. 42.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Such a developmental view led to a prediction not of immobilism, but of imminent change in the 1980's.[8] A party leadership wanting to ensure political stability at a time of great social change would pick a general secretary whose views represented the new middle class. With the old mechanisms for building a political machine still in place, the new general secretary would have the power to force through the types of reform—"truly revolutionary changes," in Gorbachev's words—that he and they wanted.

Growing Power of General Secretaries

Although it is commonly perceived that the authority of the general secretary has declined over time, I would argue the opposite. Well into the 1960's, the post of general secretary actually had little inherent authority, and it was only with Brezhnev and his successors that the general secretary came to be the acknowledged legitimate leader of the Soviet Union.

Vladimir Lenin, we should not forget, was never general secretary, but ruled from the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars—the equivalent of chairman of the Council of Ministers today. The general secretary was simply his lieutenant for personnel, the supervisor of the regional party apparatus.

As a result, the general secretary did not have automatic authority in the succession. The popular perception in the Soviet Union was that the successor to Lenin was the man appointed to Lenin's old job, Aleksey Rykov. Josef Stalin had to establish the authority of his own post at the same time that he was consolidating his power. As Nikita Khrushchev emphasized in his memoirs, Stalin continued to function in a consultative manner and to rely on a (shifting) Politburo and Central Committee majority, even as he forced through the massive social transformations of 1927–32.[9] Indeed, to the extent that the stories of the "Kirov opposition" have any basis in fact,[10] it is likely that they reflect the necessity for Stalin to submit to a Politburo majority and change his foreign policy in the winter of 1933–34 to endorse collective security and a Popular Front line.

After 1937, Stalin had a very special authority, but it was quite personal in character. He was the God-like *vozhd'* (leader, or chief). As he downplayed the role of the party congress, the Central Committee, and the Politburo as collective institutions, he did the same to the post of general secretary. In the postwar period, Stalin, like Lenin, essentially ruled as chairman of the Council of Ministers, with virtually all his top lieutenants serving as deputy chairmen of that institution. (Moreover, Stalin's authority may have rested as much on fear and terror as on political legitimacy within the system.)

Stalin in the late 1920's when he was engaged in gathering his enormous personal power.

—Sovfoto.

After Stalin's death, it was Georgiy Malenkov, the new chairman of the Council of Ministers, who emerged as leader. For approximately a year, his authority was clearly greater than that of the party chief Khrushchev; the latter, like Stalin, had to come to power in a two-stage succession. Indeed, even after Malenkov was replaced as chairman of the Council of Ministers in 1955 by Nikolay Bulganin, a man clearly subordinate to Khrushchev, the latter still apparently lacked sufficient authority to head the Soviet delegation to the 1955 Geneva Conference with President Dwight Eisenhower, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and Premier Edgar Faure. That role was reserved for Bulganin. Khrushchev felt he must become chairman of the Council of Ministers before he was really the legitimate leader, and he did so in 1958.

By the time of Brezhnev's election in 1964, the occupant of the post of general secretary was effectively the

[8]See Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1980.

[9]Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbot, Boston, Little, Brown, 1970, p. 50.

[10]See Boris Nicolaevsky, *Power and the Soviet Elite*, New York, Praeger, 1965, pp. 69–97.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, right, and Soviet Premier Georgiy Malenkov, center, visit a collective farm in 1954, when the two leaders shared power in the Soviet Union.

—Sovfoto.

Soviet Union's leader and Council of Ministers Chairman Aleksey Kosygin was number two (or even number three), although this was not necessarily so perceived. In his dealings with non-communist world leaders in the 1960's, Brezhnev still did not act as if he were the legitimate leader. It was Kosygin who mediated the India-Pakistan War at Tashkent in 1966 and who went to Glassboro, New Jersey, to meet US President Lyndon Johnson in 1967. Until 1970, all US negotiations about a Soviet summit with Richard Nixon assumed that Kosygin would be the President's interlocutor.[11]

Between 1964 and 1969, Brezhnev met with foreign communists as frequently as once every four days, but he met with non-communist foreigners only once every six weeks. With the 1971 CPSU Congress and then the summit meetings with President Nixon, the status and legitimacy of the General Secretary was greatly reinforced. The number of Brezhnev's contacts with non-communist foreigners soared.[12] He negotiated with Henry Kissinger without Kosygin present.[13] Even though the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was officially for heads of government, it was Brezhnev and his foreign minister, not the Soviet head of government, who attended.

Brezhnev's decision to have himself elected chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in 1977 seemed, however, to imply some lingering doubt about the legitimacy afforded by his party office. But by the time that Yuriy Andropov and then Konstantin Chernenko were elected general secretary, in 1982 and 1984 respectively, they exhibited no such doubt. Both confidently met non-communist foreign leaders at the

[11]Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1979, pp. 553, 706, and 831. The Germans also found Brezhnev's involvement in their relations with the Soviet Union to be weak prior to 1970–71, but to have changed radically at that time. See Archie Brown, "The Power of the General Secretary of the CPSU," in T. H. Rigby, Archie Brown, and Peter Reddaway, *Authority, Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, 1980, p. 149.

[12]As late as 1969, Brezhnev had officially announced meetings with foreigners on 92 days, but he met non-communists (including radical Third World figures) on only nine of these days. The proportion of non-communists among his foreign contacts rose to 26 percent of the total days of meeting with foreigners in 1970; 30 percent in 1972; 60 percent in 1973 (out of 109 days on which contacts occurred); and 57 percent in 1974 (out of 100 days with contacts). These counts are based on the annual volume of the US Central Intelligence Agency, *Appearances of Soviet Leaders*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office.

[13]Kissinger, op. cit., pp. 1137–54.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

funerals of their predecessors. Indeed, the meetings dramatized their status: the general secretary met the leaders of countries such as the United States, France, and Great Britain, while the chairman of the Council of Ministers met the leaders of countries such as Portugal and Greece.

Gorbachev's meetings after Chernenko's funeral in March 1985 followed this same pattern. Moreover, in his first year in office, he traveled to France to meet President François Mitterrand and to Geneva to meet President Ronald Reagan. Nothing illustrated the change in the general secretary's authority better than a comparison of the Geneva summits of 1955 and 1985. In 1955, Bulganin headed the Soviet delegation; in 1985, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolay Ryzhkov was not even on the delegation. Indeed, if Ryzhkov had headed the Soviet delegation in 1985 with Gorbachev officially a secondary member, this would have seemed bizarre to international observers. By 1985, everyone simply took it for granted that the party general secretary was the leader of the Soviet Union.

This development was far more than a question of protocol. When, in 1953, Malenkov was selected chairman of the Council of Ministers and Khrushchev secretary of the Central Committee, the Soviet leadership may well have been judging Khrushchev not as a potential leader, but as a check on Malenkov. Khrushchev had to win his authority over time, and in some sense, he may never have been thoroughly accepted as the legitimate leader.

When the Central Committee met in 1985 to elect a general secretary, however, its members knew full well that they were selecting the country's leader—and at that, one who might rule until the end of the century. Their decision implied a trust in Gorbachev's judgment that automatically gave him a mandate. To be sure, he

Leonid Brezhnev, left, leads the Soviet delegation at the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, held in Helsinki; to his left, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and aide Konstantin Chernenko.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had to observe some of the mores of the political culture, including the forms of collective leadership, but everyone ultimately knew that it would be an awesome decision to repudiate the man given the mantle of leadership, particularly in a period in which there was a widespread yearning for a strong leader.

General Secretary's Machine

In discussing the three successions since Brezhnev's death, Western observers, governmental and non-governmental alike, explicitly assumed that the power of decision resided in the Politburo rather than—as the party rules specify (and the circular-flow-of-power theory assumes)—in the Central Committee. Indeed, it was the secretary in charge of ideology, not the secretary in charge of personnel who came to be touted as the heir apparent. Gustafson and Mann even seemed to imply that the Central Committee secretary who headed the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee, and not the Politburo member who supervised him, was the "personnel secretary."[14]

This rejection of the traditional understanding of the structure of power in the USSR is a serious error. It leads to fundamental misunderstandings about Gorbachev's power and his ability to transform the Soviet system.

Against this view, I would propose that the operation of party congresses, of the Central Committee, and of the power to appoint cadres continued to be important throughout the Brezhnev period. Brezhnev had become personnel secretary in 1963. When he became general secretary, the post of personnel secretary was given to his chief rival, Nikolay Podgornyy; Brezhnev's closest ally for a decade, Andrey Kirilenko, had the key role in personnel selection in the Russian Republic (the RSFSR) as first deputy chairman of the (now defunct) Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR. Moreover, Podgornyy's ability to control personnel appointments was limited even within the other union republics. Two men with close Brezhnev connections—Dinmukhamed Kunayev and Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi—although demoted in 1962, returned to positions of authority immediately after Khrushchev's removal, as Kazakh party first secretary and chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers respectively. This was surely the work of Brezhnev.

By the 23rd Congress in 1966, Brezhnev was strong enough to remove Anastas Mikoyan from the Politburo and Podgornyy and Aleksandr Shelepin from their positions of power in the Secretariat (Andrey Kirilenko replaced Podgornyy as personnel secretary). By the 24th Congress in 1971, fully 61 percent of the delegates were elected in regions whose first secretary had been elected after Brezhnev had become general secretary. Even though personnel change was slow, Brezhnev did expand the size of the Central Committee at the 24th congress, with the consequence that 55 percent of the voting members of the Central Committee that emerged from that gathering had been elected since the removal of Khrushchev.[15]

This strategy of working through the party congresses revealed Brezhnev's caution as he built his political machine. It was no coincidence that he began pushing Kosygin out as the country's main foreign policy spokesman just before the 1971 Congress. Even after the Congress, Brezhnev's behavior can often be explained in terms of the imperatives of maintaining support in the Central Committee. One example was the adoption of extensive program for development of the provinces in the Black-Earth zone at just the time that many secretaries from those regions were being moved from candidate membership to full membership in the Central Committee.[16]

Brezhnev's sensitivity to the power of the cadres weapon was shown again when the economic slowdown after 1976 forced a choice between investment and growth, on the one hand, and social welfare policies, on the other. When Brezhnev decided to sacrifice growth, which was favored by Kirilenko, he was careful to remove Kirilenko from the personnel slot in the Central Committee Secretariat and replace him with another close aide, Konstantin Chernenko, who favored the new priorities.

The Andropov and Chernenko successions also cannot be understood without an awareness of the importance of the cadres weapon and of the politics of the regional party machine. Although Chernenko was personnel secretary during Brezhnev's last years, little change in personnel occurred during the period. Hence, most of the regional first secretaries in office in the early 1980's had been selected while Kirilenko was personnel secretary (from 1965 to 1977). Moreover, most of the regional first secretaries selected under Chernenko were young and were to fare extremely well in the Gorbachev period. Gorbachev served as Central Committee secretary for agriculture from 1978 to 1982,

[14]Loc. cit., p. 5.

[15]The names of delegates to party congresses and the party organization they represent are printed in the stenographic reports of the congresses. Changes in party secretaries are announced in *Pravda*, and the composition of the Central Committee is announced at the conclusion of each congress.

[16]See Jerry F. Hough, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1976, p. 7.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and these younger regional secretaries probably developed closer relations with him than with Chernenko.

The inability of Chernenko to build his own machine was a crucial fact in the post-Brezhnev succession. Although Kirilenko was declining physically as well as politically in the early 1980's, and was effectively removed from the Politburo in a humiliating manner in October 1982, a month before Brezhnev's death, the "faction" or machine that he had built remained largely intact. The person who became its de facto leader was Yuriy Andropov, a man who had gone to school in the Yaroslavl' city of Rybinsk in the 1930's, when Kirilenko was also a student there, and who shared Kirilenko's views on the issue of growth vs. social welfare.[17]

When Andropov was elected general secretary in 1982, the focus of Western analysis was on high Politburo rivalry, with little interest manifested in the wider alliances of the contenders.[18] However, Andropov's victory was really that of the leader of the Kirilenko machine in alliance with the leader of the younger regional secretaries on the Central Committee, Mikhail Gorbachev. Two political machines thus combined to determine the successful candidate for the position of general secretary. In return for his support of Andropov, Gorbachev would become the personnel secretary and heir apparent.

This arrangement was disrupted when Andropov's health unexpectedly declined more rapidly than Chernenko's. At the time of Andropov's death in March 1984, one of the contenders (Chernenko) had been personnel secretary from 1977 to 1982; the other (Gorbachev), from 1983 to 1985. We still do not know whether there was a struggle between the two or an agreement on a two-stage succession, with Gorbachev's position as heir apparent being guaranteed by the range of responsibilities he was given. In either case, Soviet sources say privately that Chernenko's years of work as personnel secretary had earned him a number of chits among the regional secretaries and had convinced them that he would be easy to work with.

When Chernenko died, on March 10, 1985, Gorbachev was elected general secretary in less than 24 hours. Rumors suggested that the decision was made in the Politburo, and only after a struggle. The playwright Mikhail Shatrov later told a Finnish weekly that the first vote had been 4 to 4, but that Andrey Gromyko had then cast the deciding vote. (Volodymyr Shchebytskyi was in the United States at the time and did not participate.)[19]

This story is highly dubious unless (as sometimes has happened in the past in the Soviet Union) a losing group was making a quixotic effort to save a hopeless position or to dramatize its opposition. Two developments since 1985 make it absolutely clear that the Politburo cannot have been the real center of power in the selection of the general secretary at this time.

For one, consider the voting membership of the Politburo in March 1985. After Chernenko's death, this leadership body included nine men in addition to Gorbachev. Of those nine, four were removed in 1985 and 1986 (Viktor Grishin, Kunayev, Grigoriy Romanov, and Nikolay Tikhonov), and a fifth (Gromyko) was transferred to a ceremonial job. The remaining four held in 1985 relatively secondary posts for Politburo members: Geydar Aliyev was first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Shcherbytskyi was first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party; Mikhail Solomentsev was chairman of the Party Control Committee; and Vitaliy Vorotnikov was chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR. Not a single one of these four men was promoted to a more important post after Gorbachev's accession to power, and in July 1987, they appeared to be the four least important members of a 13-man Politburo. Gromyko saw his control of foreign policy handed over to a totally inexperienced close friend of Gorbachev instead of to one of his own protégés.[20]

---

[17]When the obituary of the second secretary of Ukraine, I. Z. Sokolov, was published in the October 3, 1982, *Pravda*, Kirilenko's name was listed in its customary place among the signatories. Two days later, Kirilenko's name was absent from the *Pravda* obituary of the first secretary of the Tatar obkom, R. M. Musin. Even earlier, Kirilenko's name had been listed out of alphabetical order (after Grishin, Arvid Pel'she, and Chernenko) among the four Politburo members on the funeral commission for Mikhail Suslov. See *Pravda*, Jan. 27, 1982.

When Kirilenko was officially removed from the Politburo, Andropov was already general secretary, and he had the brief and official Central Committee communiqué give an unprecedented commendation to his patron: "General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yu. V. Andropov, noted that comrade A. P. Kirilenko actively worked for long years both in the local party organs and in the Central Committee, and we recognize his services to the party and country." See *Pravda*, Nov. 23, 1982.

[18]Analysis generally followed the rumors swirling around Moscow, the best description of which is found in Dusko Doder, *Shadows and Whispers*, New York, Random House, 1986. These rumors tended to emphasize the role of the military and the secret police. Myron Rush emphasized the police alone: "To compensate for Chernenko's strength in the party apparatus—hitherto the decisive political institution in the succession, but now weakened by Brezhnev's personal strategy—Andropov relied on the secret police." See Myron Rush, "Succeeding Brezhnev," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1983, p. 3.

[19]Paris AFP, Mar. 1, 1987, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), Mar. 13, 1987, p. R/1. Shatrov also very subtly presented the thesis of a serious contest with Grishin in an article in a Soviet journal: see "1917–1918: The Irreversibility of Changes," *Ogonëk* (Moscow), No. 4, January 1987, p. 5.

[20]Shevardnadze had been first secretary of the Georgian Komsomol from 1957 to 1961, when Gorbachev held the analogous post in contiguous Stavropol' territory. Shevardnadze then became Georgian party leader in 1972, when Gorbachev was party first secretary in Stavropol'. Gorbachev solidified the tie in the early 1980's, when he took a Georgian agricultural experiment as the model for development of rural agroindustrial complexes. (fn. continued on p. 28)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If the Politburo had indeed been the crucial decision-making body, this result would not have occurred. The Politburo would have been the scene of strenuous politicking in the weeks before the succession, when Chernenko was clearly dying. Jobs would have been offered by each contender to the lesser members of the Politburo (Aliyev, Shcherbytskyi, Solomentsev, and Vorotnikov), and they would have emerged in powerful positions after the succession. Gorbachev would have been the natural loser in most "cabinet making" scenarios. Indeed, the politicking would have been going on in 1984, when Chernenko and Dmitriy Ustinov were alive and provided two more votes against Gorbachev.[21] If it had had the power, the Chernenko Politburo would have added other anti-Gorbachev members, and Grishin would have been elected to the Secretariat of the Central Committee as a way to increase his political stature. (Andropov had been able to add three new Politburo voting members during his year in office, and Gorbachev named five during his first year, but no new member was selected in the Chernenko year.)

The only reasonable explanation for this combination of events and non-events is that Gorbachev had majority support in the Central Committee and that this body had the power of decision. No doubt, the Politburo made a recommendation, but it knew that Gorbachev would use his right to appeal the recommendation to the Central Committee, were another man chosen instead of him. The Politburo, even under Chernenko, must have hesitated to challenge Gorbachev, for fear that the result would be the same as in 1957 when a majority of top leaders had moved against Khrushchev, only to be overruled by the Central Committee. Undoubtedly, Gorbachev did not have unanimous support in the Central Committee in 1985. But the fact that 60 percent of the living Central Committee voting members at the time were reelected in 1986 at the 27th Congress gives some idea of the size of the working majority that Gorbachev would have enjoyed in 1985 had there been any showdown with someone like Grishin.

There were a number of reasons for the Central Committee to support Gorbachev. First, the country had had 10 years of extremely ill leaders, and it faced great foreign and domestic challenges. It was questionable enough to select a Chernenko as a brief transition figure, but something else entirely to select as Chernenko's successor a mediocre figure like Grishin who might live for years. Gorbachev had the qualities that promised to make him an effective leader, and his views were quite appealing to the growing middle class.

Second, when Gorbachev was selected to the Secretariat in 1978, it is likely that the leadership had already identified him as a probable future leader. Brezhnev needed a long-term heir apparent who would reassure the elite that the stagnation would not continue indefinitely, but who was too young to overthrow Brezhnev himself. Gorbachev had close political ties with both Chernenko and Andropov, and with the party's chief ideologist, Suslov,[22] and he obviously had the intelligence, the education, and the political star attributes that gave him real plausibility.

Third, "machine" politics in a narrow sense was also important in 1985. Gorbachev made his chief early appointments from among men who had close connections with Kirilenko in Sverdlovsk (Ryzhkov and Boris Yel'tsin), in Dnipropetrovsk (Viktor Chebrikov), and in the Central Committee apparatus in the early 1960's (Yegor Ligachev). Clearly, Gorbachev was making an alliance with the old Kirilenko machine.

In addition, however, Gorbachev had been building his own machine. He had been personnel secretary under Andropov and Chernenko, and in the two years since Brezhnev's death, party first secretaries had been changed in regions that were to send 32 percent of the delegates to the next party congress. An additional 31 percent of the delegates were to come from regions whose first secretaries were selected under Brezhnev but who were 55 years of age or younger in 1982,[23] and were likely to have looked to Gorbachev as their champion in the Central Committee Secretariat from 1978 to 1982.

In sum, the Gorbachev accession to the post of general secretary reflects many factors, but the power to appoint cadres and to use the party political machine to secure and maintain power and authority remained a crucial one. Gorbachev's maneuvering to consolidate power before, during, and following the 27th CPSU Congress further illustrates the degree to which these forces continue to shape Soviet politics.

Shevardnadze, for his part, staked out a highly reformist position early in the Chernenko years. At a plenum of the Georgian Central Committee, he called for "daring decisions," and he held a Central Committee conference on the need to export manufactured goods and another major conference on public opinion, with national participants. See *Zarya vostoka* (Tbilisi), Apr. 7, 11, 27, and 28, 1984.

[21]Some rumors suggested that Ustinov was supporting Gorbachev. However, although upon Ustinov's death, Chernenko honored the late Marshal by renaming the important city of Izhevsk after him, Gorbachev subsequently withdrew the honor. See *Pravda*, Jan. 3, 1985, and June 20, 1987.

[22]Gorbachev's first great patron was Fedor Kulakov, the first secretary in Stavropol', who promoted him in the early 1960's. Kulakov, in turn, had worked with Chernenko in the mid-1940's in Penza oblast, and Chernenko must have been instrumental in having Brezhnev select Kulakov as CC secretary for agriculture in 1965. Andropov came from Stavropol' territory, where Suslov had been first secretary before the war and head of the partisans during the war, and the two must have been in contact from that time on.

[23]On sources, see fn. 15.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Consolidating Power

As Gorbachev faced the prospect of the 27th Congress, some eleven months after his election, he had several political tasks. First, he needed to establish a new inner core in the Politburo. In February 1985, Gorbachev had occupied jobs that had been held by *four* Politburo members in 1980—the Central Committee secretary for the economy, the secretary for personnel, the secretary for ideology, and the secretary for agriculture and light industry. His elevation left all of these posts vacant, and in July 1985, he created another vacancy with the dismissal of his chief rival, Romanov, from the Politburo and Secretariat. Two other key posts in the political system—chairman of the Council of Ministers and foreign minister—were held by a 79-year-old and a 76-year-old respectively.

The process of building a new central core began at the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum with the election of Ligachev, Ryzhkov, and Chebrikov to the Politburo. Ligachev assumed Gorbachev's responsibilities as Central Committee secretary for personnel and ideology (and hence basically became second secretary), Ryzhkov became the Central Committee secretary for the economy, and Chebrikov continued to serve as chairman of the KGB. In July 1985, Eduard Shevardnadze joined this group when he was named foreign minister, as Andrey Gromyko became chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. When Tikhonov retired as chairman of the Council of Ministers in October 1985, he was replaced by Ryzhkov. In March 1986, Lev Zaykov, the first secretary of Leningrad oblast, was named to Ryzhkov's old post as Central Committee secretary for the economy and also became a member of the inner core.

Essentially, any assessment of Gorbachev's consolidation of power turns on his relationship to these men, especially to Ligachev, Ryzhkov, and Chebrikov. Together with Gorbachev, these three men had risen precipitately under Andropov, and if Andropov had selected the four as a team of semi-equals, one would have expected Gorbachev's emancipation from their control and his consolidation of power to be quite slow and painful. If, however, as suggested here, Gorbachev was more of a kingmaker in 1982 and was made the personnel secretary to guarantee his succession, then others should have been jumping on his bandwagon from the first and his consolidation of power would be relatively simple.

Certainly, Gorbachev's status in 1982 was strikingly different from that of his future colleagues on the Politburo. He had been a Central Committee secretary for four years and a voting member of the Politburo for two. Ligachev, by contrast, was then first secretary of the small and remote Tomsk oblast, and Ryzhkov was one of four first deputy chairmen of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan). Both worked directly under Gorbachev's supervision during Andropov's year in power.[24] Chebrikov was first deputy chairman of the KGB, and almost no one had ever risen to a higher position from that post. Zaykov had been chairman of the executive committee of the Leningrad city soviet—the seventh- or eighth-ranking job in the city—before Gorbachev had installed him as first secretary of the Leningrad oblast party committee in 1983. (Politburo members elected subsequently had even lower status at the time of Brezhnev's death: Viktor Nikonov was deputy minister of agriculture; Nikolay Slyun'kov was deputy chairman (not even first deputy chairman) of Gosplan, and Aleksandr Yakovlev was ambassador to Canada.)

The gap in status as of 1982 between Gorbachev and all his future subordinates was so great that their subsequent selection suggests a deliberate decision by the General Secretary to enhance his power vis-à-vis the Politburo. From this perspective, the selection of men with ties to different parts of the Kirilenko machine may have been more a gesture of reassurance to that machine than an indication of that group's veto power over policy or appointments. Moreover, where Brezhnev had preferred Gorbachev as a prospective heir apparent because he was too young to be selected as leader before Brezhnev died, so Gorbachev had reason to prefer as putative heir apparent Ligachev, a man 11 years older than himself. The regional party secretaries, who averaged 55 years of age in 1986, would have every reason to show their loyalty to a 55-year-old general secretary rather than a 66-year-old second secretary. By August 1987, the Gorbachev era had seen the replacement of first secretaries in 25 percent of the oblasts and krays, and this apparently dropped the average age to 54, by then 13 years younger than Ligachev.[25]

---

[24]Remember that Gorbachev's responsibilities within the Politburo included overall supervision of the Economic Department and the Organizational Party Work Department. Under Andropov, Ryzhkov headed the former, and Ligachev, the latter.

[25]Until the 1987 yearbook of the *Bol'shaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia) is published, we will not have the biographies of all Central Committee members, and even then, some of the regional secretaries in the non-Russian republics were not elected to the CC. The year of birth is available for all regional secretaries selected by March 1984, and their biographies are published in *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR. Odinnadtsatyy sozyv* (Deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 11th Convocation), Moscow, Izvestiya, 1984.

The year of birth has been found for 36 of the other 54 regional first secretaries as of March 1986 (usually either from oblast newspapers or from commendations published on their 50th or 60th birthday). The average (fn. continued on p. 30)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the same time, from Gorbachev's perspective, it was highly desirable to build up a network of people with whom he had developed a special trust in the past. As he moved to consolidate his power, he selected a disproportionate number of people from three such groups: (1) those who had worked in Stavropol' and contiguous regions in the RSFSR (especially Krasnodar) and in the Caucasus (Georgia and the Chechen-Ingush autonomous republic);[26] (2) individuals who graduated from Moscow University in the mid-1950's (Gorbachev graduated in 1955), and (3) persons who worked in the Young Communist League apparatus in the late 1950's and early 1960's, when Gorbachev himself was engaged in such work.

Before the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev made three particularly important appointments from the Caucasus area. In July, as already noted, Shevardnadze, the Georgian party first secretary, replaced Gromyko as foreign minister.

The second appointment occurred earlier, in April 1985, when Georgiy Razumovskiy was named head of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee—the number two position in the cadres area. At the 27th Congress, he became a Central Committee secretary while retaining his departmental post. Razumovskiy had worked for years in the party and soviet organs of Krasnodar territory, for a brief period as head of the sector of the agriculture department of the Central Committee that handled the Kuban, and later as head of the Agroindustrial Complex Department in the USSR Council of Ministers. In the Secretariat hierarchy, Razumovskiy was formally subordinate to the personnel secretary on the Politburo, Ligachev. Still, it seems most likely that he really reported to Gorbachev and that his job was to ensure that the political machine being built was loyal to Gorbachev, not to Ligachev.

Then in November 1985, Vsevolod Murakhovskiy was named first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the new State Agroindustrial Committee. Murakhovskiy had been party first secretary in Stavropol'. In 1955, as first secretary of the Stavropol' territorial Komsomol committee, he had given Gorbachev his first job after college, as deputy head of the Propaganda-Agitation Department of the committee, and later named him first secretary of the city Komsomol committee. Somewhat surprisingly, Murakhovskiy was not moved onto the Politburo, but his presence on the Council of Ministers meant that Gorbachev had a representative in all Council of Ministers discussions and a person who could report on the other members of that body.

During 1985 and 1986, Gorbachev also named some other figures from the Caucasus to key posts: Valeriy Belikov, the commander of the Soviet Group of Forces in Germany, had been commander of the North Caucasian military district; Vladimir Arkhipov, commander of the crucial Moscow military district, had been commander of the Transcaucasian military district;[27] and Aleksandr Vlasov, minister of internal affairs, had been first secretary of the Chechen-Ingush obkom (oblast party committee). A number of other men with experience in this part of the USSR were appointed to less important jobs—e.g., minister of grain products, head of the Chemical Industry Department of the Central Committee, and first secretary of the Rostov, Smolensk, and Volgograd oblast party committees. Moreover, A. K. Vedernikov, the long-time head of the section of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Central Committee in charge of Moldavia and at least part of Ukraine,

year of birth for 132 first secretaries on whom information is available is 1930, but the more recent electees were born in 1934 on average. If this pattern holds for the 18 unknowns (and, if anything, they are likely to be younger), the average year of birth advances to 1931. Between the 27th Congress and August 1987, oblast committee first secretaries were changed in 37 of 150 oblasts and territories. The ages of most of the new first secretaries are not known, but these changes probably bring the average date of birth to 1932 or, more likely 1933.

[26]Clearly, Gorbachev had few allies in the Rostov party organization. Not only was the first secretary (Ivan Bondarenko) quickly retired, despite being only in his late fifties, but his first replacement, Aleksandr Vlasov, was a former Komsomol official who had been party first secretary in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic; he has since become Minister of Internal Affairs, in a move evidently designed to bring the police under Gorbachev's control. The next first secretary in Rostov, Boris Volodin, was also brought in from the outside; he had been head of the agriculture department of the Stavropol' territorial committee in Gorbachev's last year there. See *Stavropol'skaya Pravda*, June 1, 1977. No Rostov official has been identified among the promotions of the Gorbachev period, although, of course, the head of the North Caucasus Military District is based in Rostov and is usually a member of the bureau of the Rostov oblast committee. This was true, for example, of General Valeriy Belikov, who is to be discussed shortly. See *Molot* (Rostov), Jan. 14, 1979.

[27]Arkhipov also has had close connections with other military commanders who have subsequently been promoted. He served from 1979 to 1983 as chief of staff of the Central Asian Military District. The commander there from 1979 to 1980 was Petr Lushev, who became first deputy minister of defense in July 1986; and the commander from 1980 to 1983 was Dmitriy Yazov, who became defense minister in May 1987. Lushev and Yazov were both born in 1923, whereas Arkhipov was born in 1933. It is hence quite possible that he was an enthusiastic supporter of his former commanders' candidacies for higher posts, feeling that his time would come in the early 1990's. Gorbachev's military appointments will be discussed further in footnote 61.

[28]Vedernikov was head of the Organizational Party Work Department of the Stavropol' territorial party committee for Gorbachev in 1971 and organizational-personnel secretary in 1974. See *Stavropol'skaya Pravda*, Feb. 21, 1971, and Feb. 23, 1974. Vedernikov attended many Central Committee sessions in Moldavia and also oblast committee meetings in Ukraine. See, e.g., *Krasnoye Znamya* (Kharkiv), Jan. 17, 1976; and *Lvovskaya Pravda* (L'viv), Nov. 23, 1978. He attended a session in Zaporozh'ye and a Ukrainian CP Central Committee session in 1986. See *Pravda Ukrainy*, Apr. 15 and July 12, 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Numbers of High Soviet Officials Replaced Between 1982 and 1986[1]

Type of official	Nov. 1982–Mar. 1985	Mar. 1985–Mar. 1986	Nov. 1982–Mar. 1986
Deputy chairmen of USSR Council of Ministers	3 of 13	8 of 14	9 of 13
Other members of USSR Council of Ministers	25 of 82	30 of 82	48 of 82
First secretaries, republic party central committees	4 of 14	4 of 14	8 of 14
First secretaries, party oblast committees[2]	48 of 150	46 of 150	85 of 150
Commanders of military districts and groups	12 of 20	6 of 20	17 of 20
Voting members, republic party bureaus (removed)	37 of 164	47 of 163	76 of 164
Voting members, republic party bureaus (removed or changed job)	52 of 164	62 of 163	103 of 164

[1]Includes officials who died in their posts. If a personnel change occurred twice in a post (e.g., from 1982 to 1986), it is only counted as one change.
[2]This includes committees of oblasts, autonomous republics, and territories, but excludes those of autonomous oblasts.

had been secretary of the Stavropol' territorial party committee.[28]

The Moscow University contingent of appointees included Anatoliy Luk'yanov, the head of the Central Committee's General Department (the old *spetssektor,* once headed by Aleksandr Poskrebyshev under Stalin, that is in charge of all Central Committee communications);[29] Ivan Frolov, named chief editor of the Central Committee journal *Kommunist*;[30] and Valentin Chichin, editor of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*.

A third group of appointees close to Gorbachev were persons who had been Komsomol officials in the second half of the 1950's and first half of the 1960's. Indeed, Murakhovskiy, Shevardnadze, Vlasov, and—to a minor degree—Razumovskiy had such a background as well as being in the Caucasus group. A number of other appointees had top-level Komsomol experience during the late 1950's and early 1960's. These included Aleksey Lizichev, head of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy; Nikolay Kruchina, head of the business office (*upravlyayushchiy delami*) of the Central Committee; Vadim Loginov, deputy minister of foreign affairs in charge of East European matters; Yuriy Voronov, head of the Culture Department of the Central Committee; Aleksandr Aksenov, chairman of the State Committee for Television and Radio; Aleksandr Kamshalov, chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography; and Vasily Trushin, first deputy minister of internal affairs.[31]

As Table 1 indicates, Gorbachev was able to effect a really substantial turnover in personnel at high levels of the Soviet administrative system by the time of the 27th CPSU Congress. The turnover was at least as high at middle levels of the system. Only 52 percent of major officials among voting members of the republic central committees elected in 1981 were reelected in 1986, and only 34 percent were reelected while holding the same post (see Table 3). In Ukraine, 60 percent of the secretaries of oblast party committees and 88 percent of the secretaries of city and district party committees were

[29]Leonard Schapiro, "The General Department of the CC of the CPSU," *Survey* (London), Summer 1975, pp. 53–65.

[30]Werner Hahn has called Frolov, "the most controversial of reform-minded Soviet philosophers" in the 1960's and 1970's, with the exception perhaps of one other, much older, individual. See Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946-1953,* Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1982, pp. 169–81. See also Loren R. Graham, *Science and Philosophy in the Soviet Union,* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1972, pp. 253–56. Frolov made his name fighting Lysenkoism in genetics, but then began emphasizing more broadly the importance of factors other than class ones in human affairs. For some more information on his early life, see Jerry F. Hough, *Russia and the West: The Politics of Gorbachev's Reform,* New York, Simon and Schuster, forthcoming in 1988, Chap. 1.

[31]Loginov was second secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; Aksenev and Kamshalov were secretaries; Kruchina was chief of a department of the Komsomol Central Committee; Voronov was the editor of *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*; and Lizichev was a top Komsomol official in the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and a candidate member of the bureau of the Komsomol Central Committee. Murakhovskiy, Shevardnadze, Trushin, and Vlasov had been first secretaries of Komsomol regional organizations.

The Komsomol connection was beneficial largely to those who had dealt with Gorbachev himself. In the last few years, oblast party committee first secretaries are largely being selected from those born in the mid 1930's. This age group includes a considerable number of persons who served as oblast Komsomol committee first secretaries in the second half of the 1960's, i.e., when Gorbachev was already a party official. Komsomol first secretaries in the RSFSR in 1966 were born in 1936 on the average and those in 1971 were born in 1938; these individuals, now in their early fifties, would normally be expected to be considered for election as oblast party committee secretaries at this stage of their life. However, of the 102 RSFSR oblast Komsomol first secretaries identified for the 1966–71 period, only four have become oblast party committee first secretaries. Indeed, only 14 were in a post high enough to warrant selection as one of the 5,000 delegates to the 27th CPSU Congress.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

changed in the 1981–85 period, and in Armenia, this was true of 80.4 percent of the state farm directors and 85.4 percent of kolkhoz chairman between 1982 and 1986.[32] Both of these republics had relatively low levels of turnover in higher-ranking jobs (see Table 3).

Yet, the flood of personnel changes that took place before the 27th Congress created a political problem for Gorbachev as well as an opportunity. The Central Committee that had elected him retained its mandate until the 27th Congress, and it still had the power to remove him. Gorbachev had an incentive to have a maximum number of his own people on the Central Committee that would be elected at the conclusion of the 27th Congress, but the larger the number of old members he retired or demoted from major party or government responsibilities prior to the congress, the larger the number of CC members who might be personally disgruntled. By the time of the opening of the congress, fully 38 percent of the voting members of the Central Committee fell into this latter category.

Gorbachev had a series of responses to this problem. First, he went out among the population, creating the image of a leader on the move. He met foreign leaders such as President Mitterrand of France and President Ronald Reagan of the United States, winning praise for his performance. By the end of 1985, everyone was remarking on his new style. He raised significant hopes at home that the period of weak leadership was over, and the Central Committee had to fear that it would produce unrest if it tried to replace him.

Gorbachev was also careful not to provide members of the Central Committee with any one issue around which they could coalesce. He kept them off balance, as he did Western observers, by pledging new domestic programs without ever using the world "reform," the traditional signal for something as radical as the Hungarian experiment.[33]

The one man on the Politburo who posed any danger to Gorbachev was Gromyko. If Gromyko would have told the Central Committee that Gorbachev was acting like a naive fool in foreign policy, that would have been a true challenge. Consequently, Gorbachev handled Gromyko with real care. To be sure, Gorbachev did hint at a change in foreign policy in a number of esoteric ways (e.g., by downplaying in the press the German revanchism theme that had been the main justification for Gromyko's America-centered policy). He told the editors of *Time* that "foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy," thereby implying that the "grandiose" changes he had in mind for domestic policy might entail equally broad changes in foreign policy as well.[34] And, of course, the selection of Shevardnadze as foreign minister suggested that Gorbachev did not want someone with ties to old policies.

Nevertheless, the hints of change did not go beyond hints. Shevardnadze was a genial man, who seemed to favor negotiations with both the United States and Europe. In January 1985, the party newspaper *Zarya vostoka* in his base, Georgia, had treated the summit meeting of Gromyko and US Secretary of State George Shultz as a major and favorable event, while *Pravda Ukrainy* in Shcherbytskyi's Ukraine had been extremely cold toward it.[35] Even in his *Time* magazine interview, Gorbachev did not draw any conclusions, but ended with a teaser, leaving to the interviewers to guess precisely what international conditions the USSR needed for its domestic program.[36]

Moreover, with the exception of the Shevardnadze appointment, in 1985, Gorbachev made no personnel changes in the foreign policy realm that would have offended Gromyko, even though large numbers of officials in other ministries were being replaced. The 75-year-old minister of foreign trade, Nikolay Patolichev, was retired in November and replaced by Gromyko's deputy minister for Eastern Europe. A new deputy minister of foreign affairs for personnel was also appointed. But that was all. At the beginning of 1986, Andrey Aleksandrov-Agentov—the old foreign policy assistant of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko—remained in his post, as did the Central Committee secretary who headed the International Department (the 80-year-old Boris Ponomarev) and the Central Committee secretary who headed the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries (the 76-year-old Konstantin Rusakov). Even more surprising, none of the nine deputy heads of these two departments had been replaced.

As the 27th Congress approached and passed, Gorbachev's worries apparently lessened, and he began to move more confidently in changing foreign policy officials. At the end of January, Aleksandrov-Agentov retired, and then in February and March, Rusakov and Ponomarev were replaced as Central Committees sec-

[32] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Mar. 25, 1987; and *Kommunist* (Yerevan), Mar. 17, 1987.

[33] This was noted in Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "The Genesis of Gorbachev's World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), No. 3, 1986, p. 611.

[34] *Time* (New York), Sept. 9, 1985, p. 29. The Russian-language version, published in the Soviet newspapers on September 2, was marginally different from the English-language version. In Russian, for example, Gorbachev said that people "justly" (*spravedlivo*) say that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, while in *Time*, it is ambiguous whether he is associating himself with the generalization.

[35] *Pravda Ukrainy* and *Zarya Vostoka*, Jan. 10, 1985.

[36] Loc. cit.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retaries. Gromyko's two first deputy ministers of foreign affairs (Georgiy Korniyenko and Viktor Mal'tsev) were moved to lesser jobs. By August, only one of Gromyko's eight deputy ministers (Anatoliy Kovalev, the deputy minister for Europe, who had been deeply disappointed by his failure to rise to expected higher responsibilities in the mid-1970's[37]) remained, and nine new deputy ministers had been appointed.

The congress gave Gorbachev cause for confidence. The membership of the Central Committee was substantially renewed. Less than 55 percent of voting members of the Central Committee elected in 1981 were reelected in 1986. (11 percent had died and 34 percent had retired or been demoted). The proportion of old Central Committee members reelected was more or less in line with expectations, but the number of new voting members elected was considerably less than might have been expected (40 percent of the total). This was a reflection of the fact that the size of the Central Committee was reduced (from 319 to 307) instead of expanded (as had been the case at virtually every congress since the 1917 revolution). However, the General Secretary's position in the Central Committee looked extremely solid. He had, after all, won in the Central Committee a year earlier, and the 60 percent of the membership of the new CC who were reelected from the 1981 CC presumably was composed overwhelmingly of that 1985 majority.

Moreover, the occupational composition of the voting membership changed in a way that was quite promising for a general secretary who had to attack the powers of the central governmental machinery. In 1981, fully 22 percent of the voting members sat on the Council of Ministers, but in 1986, this figure fell to 18 percent. The natural opponents of the ministries—the regional party and government officials, plus the workers and peasants whom those officials had a dominant role in selecting—increased their representation in the Central Committee from 44 to 47 percent.[38]

In addition, a very interesting development occurred in the candidate membership of the Central Committee. In 1981, 151 candidate members had been elected, but this figure rose to 170 in 1986. Of the latter number, 69 percent were newly elected. Normally, candidate membership has been reserved for holders of posts of lower status than those elected full members, and this generally continued to be the case. Nevertheless, 35 of the new candidate members held jobs that had warranted voting membership in 1981, and many of these officials appeared to be natural Gorbachev supporters.

Although one could conclude that Gorbachev's failure to have his supporters given full membership in the Central Committee represented a defeat, the more likely explanation is that the General Secretary was concerned about his position at the end of the 1980's if he continued a relatively high rate of personnel turnover. By the end of the decade, the number of disgruntled Central Committee members might be quite high. The new Party Rules officially authorized the promotion of candidate members to full membership between congresses (it had occurred extra-legally before), and it is likely that Gorbachev was thinking of having a fairly large reserve of loyal candidate members who could be promoted to full membership as circumstances dictated. (In fact, by August 1987, some 11 percent of the voting members elected in March 1986 had already been retired or seriously demoted from the jobs they held upon their election to the CC.) That Gorbachev was thinking about the problem of lame-duck Central Committee members was also suggested by his later decision to hold a party conference in 1988 (see below).

The turnover in the membership of the Politburo and Secretariat by the end of the congress was even greater than in the Central Committee. The Politburo contained 10 voting members after Chernenko's death (a number that included Gorbachev himself). By the end of the congress, three of these 10 had been retired—Romanov in July 1985, Tikhonov in October 1985, and Grishin (Moscow city first secretary) in February 1986—and a fourth (Gromyko) had been moved to a ceremonial position. Four of the seven Central Committee secretaries other than Gorbachev had been removed.[39]

By the end of the congress, five new voting members had been added to the Politburo since Chernenko's death (Chebrikov, Ligachev, Ryzhkov, Shevardnadze, and—at the congress—Lev Zaykov). Five of the seven candidate members of the Politburo were newly elected: Yel'tsin, Slyun'kov, Yuriy Solov'yev, Sergey Sokolov, and Nikolay Talyzin.[40] The same was true of seven of the 10 Central Committee secretaries: Aleksandra Biryukova, Anatolyy Dobrynin, Vadim Medvedev, Viktor Nikonov, Razumovskiy, Yakovlev, and Zaykov. It was an unprecedented performance. By the end of the con-

[37]For a discussion of Kovalev in the early and mid-1970's, see Arkady N. Shevchenko. *Breaking with Moscow*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985, pp. 111, 129–30, 265–66.

[38]The list of Central Committee members was published at the end of the congress. See *Pravda*, Mar. 5, 1986. The occupations of nearly all members are found in the list of delegates published in the third volume of the stenographic report of the congress.

[39]These were Ivan Kapitonov, Ponomarev, Romanov, and Rusakov.

[40]The posts they occupied at that time were: Yel'tsin, first secretary of the Moscow city party committee; Slyun'kov, first secretary of the Belorussian Central Committee; Sokolov, Minister of Defense; Solov'yev, first secretary of the Leningrad oblast party committee; and Talyzin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of Gosplan. The other two candidate members were Petr Demichev, then Minister of Culture, and Vladimir Dolgikh, Central Committee secretary.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Numbers of High Soviet Officials Replaced Between 1982 and 1987

Type of official	Mar. 1986–Aug. 1987[1]	Mar. 1985–Aug. 1987	Nov. 1982–Aug. 1987
Deputy chairmen of USSR Council of Ministers	2 of 12	10 of 13	11 of 13
Other members of USSR Council of Ministers	23 of 81	56 of 85	69 of 83
First secretaries, republic party central committees	2 of 14	6 of 14	9 of 14
First secretaries, party oblast committees[2]	38 of 150	75 of 150	108 of 150
Commanders of military districts and groups	14 of 20	16 of 20	19 of 20
Voting members, republic party bureaus (removed)	41 of 183	84 of 163	103 of 164
Voting members, republic party bureaus (either removed or changed job)	51 of 183	101 of 163	128 of 164
All secretaries of party oblast committees	n.a.	almost 50%[3]	n.a.
Secretaries of city and district party committees	n.a.	almost 50%[3]	n.a.

[1]For some categories (notably commanders of military districts and members of party bureaus), changes that occurred in the summer of 1987 may not have been discovered and the turnover figures may be even higher.

[2]This includes committees of oblasts, autonomous republics, and territories, but excludes those of autonomous oblasts.

[3]These figures were given in a speech by Georgiy Razumovskiy on May 12, 1987, and covered "the last two years," i.e., did not include the summer of 1987. He reported that one-third of the chairmen of republic councils of ministers and of executive committees of oblast soviets had been replaced, but the actual figure is clearly higher in light of the changes in a number of chairman postings after the local elections in June 1987. Party officials have also changed in this period. See G. Razumovskiy, "Party Work to the Level [Required for] Restructuring," *Partiynaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), No. 12, June 1987, p. 12.

gress, Gorbachev had succeeded in building a solid core of support and was well on his way toward a full consolidation of power.

Post-Congress Consolidation

The speed of personnel change may have slowed since the congress, but it has not stopped. As noted, 11 percent of the voting members of the Central Committee have been retired or seriously demoted. The rates of change among top administrative and political officials remains at a high level (see Table 2).

The January 1987 CC Plenum brought still further changes at the highest levels. Another Politburo member (Dinmukhamed Kunayev) and another Central Committee secretary (Mikhail Zimyanin) were retired. In June, the former was expelled from the Central Committee in disgrace. Another Gorbachev supporter (Aleksandr Yakovlev) was named a candidate member of the Politburo, and two new Central Committee secretaries were elected—Anatoliy Luk'yanov and Slyun'kov.

In the midst of rumors of Gorbachev defeats (to be discussed in a moment), little attention was given to these changes, all the more so since Kunayev had been removed from his job as Kazakhstan first secretary in December and his removal from the Politburo was a foregone conclusion. This neglect by analysts was a serious mistake.

Yakovlev is said by knowledgeable insiders to have been the architect of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policy since the summer of 1985, and his promotion to the Politburo, if only to candidate membership, was an important step. Both Yakovlev and Zimyanin had been Central Committee secretaries dealing with ideological issues—Yakovlev supervising the Propaganda (really, the Media) Department and the Culture Department, and Zimyanin supervising the Science and Education Department. Zimyanin's unexpected survival at the 27th Congress was associated with the continuation of a conservative line in history and philosophy (and with the maintenance of conservative personnel in these spheres) at a time when the media and culture under Yakovlev's supervision were liberalizing rapidly. With Zimyanin's retirement, Yakovlev took over the Science and Education Department. It seemed clear that the social sciences were going to be swept by *glasnost'* and personnel change.

The elections of Luk'yanov and Slyun'kov to the Central Committee Secretariat were also important. Luk'yanov is a 1953 graduate of Moscow University with a law degree, and a man who criticized the Brezhnev "cult of the personality" openly in 1979.[41] He had been serving as the head of the General Department of the Central Committee, a crucial point for a general secretary to control if he is to know what is going on, and

[41]See the discussion of Luk'yanov in Alexander Rahr, "Gorbachev's Fellow Student Gets Top Post," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 97/87, Feb. 27, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Luk'yanov's background makes it clear that he is a Gorbachev man. At a minimum, his promotion into the Central Committee Secretariat gave Gorbachev one more voice there. The crucial fact about Luk'yanov's promotion, however, became known two weeks later: his elevation to Central Committee secretary also gave him responsibility for supervising the important Administrative Organs Department; this appointment provided Gorbachev a surrogate watchdog over the secret police and the military.[42]

Slyun'kov is former director of the Minsk Tractor Works and a former deputy chairman of the Gosplan, who had been elected party first secretary in Belorussia in one of Yuriy Andropov's first personnel moves. In Gosplan, Slyun'kov had coordinated planning for a number of machine-building industries, including agricultural machine-building, and he obviously had been dealing with Gorbachev at the time the latter was Central Committee secretary for agriculture.

As a Central Committee secretary, Slyun'kov assumed responsibility for the Economic Department (the old Planning and Financial Organs Department) that oversees the major coordinating economic institutions. A leading Soviet scholar stated privately in April that while Slyun'kov had his limitations, he was a more serious economic reformer than Ryzhkov, and after the June 1987 Plenum, Soviet economists were speaking of him as a man who had been instrumental in seeing that the reform document adopted at that plenum was more radical than other proposed variants.

From Gorbachev's point of view, another important aspect of Slyun'kov's election is that it created a vacancy in the leadership of the country's fifth most populous republic. Yefrem Sokolov, the first secretary of the Brest obkom, was named to replace him. Sokolov was not even on the bureau of the Belorussian party organization and ranked approximately 20th among the officials of the republic after four years of Slyun'kov's rule. Sokolov's speech at the 1986 republic party congress had attacked the leadership in the republic capital, Minsk,[43] and his elevation surely reflected central intervention. That he was the former head of the Agriculture Department of the Belorussian Central Committee clearly suggested that his patron was Gorbachev.

A number of other personnel changes also indicate that a Gorbachev consolidation of power occurred in the months immediately preceding or following the January Plenum. The removal of Kunayev as the Kazakh leader in early December was a foregone conclusion, but the selection of the Russian Gennadiy Kolbin as his replacement was an interesting decision. Kolbin had served as second secretary of the Georgian Central Committee from 1975 to 1983, and he must have had good relations with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze while there.[44]

In the first months of 1987, one of Gorbachev's personal assistants, Georgiy Smirnov, became director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, and another assistant (indeed, one with a Stavropol' background), Valeriy Boldin, became head of the General Department when Luk'yanov became Central Committee secretary.[45] Georgiy Shakhnazarov, a long-time proponent of democratization, replaced the conservative Oleg Rakhmanin as first deputy head of the Department for Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries of the Central Committee.[46] Sergey Manyakin, a former official in Stavropol', became chairman of the People's Control Committee, which acquired new importance in June, when Gorbachev advocated giving it all auditing responsibilities.[47]

Then, within six weeks of the January Plenum, a rapid change of personnel began in Ukraine. In mid-March

[42]The responsibilities of Central Committee secretaries are revealed in the meetings they attend and the obituaries they sign. Meeting after meeting left no doubt about Luk'yanov's supervision of the non-military institutions within the purview of the Administrative Organs Department: the Ministry of Internal Affairs (*Pravda*, Feb. 5, 1987); Aeroflot (ibid., Feb. 7, 1987); the Procuracy (ibid., Feb. 19, 1987); the Border Troops of the KGB (ibid., May 28, 1987); and the KGB as a whole (ibid., Sept. 11 1987). Luk'yanov attended relatively few military functions, but he did appear as the sole Secretariat representative at the trade union congress of defense industry workers (ibid., Feb. 4, 1987) and at an important defense meeting in July 1987 (*Krasnaya Zvezda* [Moscow], July 18, 1987). He was also the only Central Committee secretary without Politburo standing to sign the obituary of General Dmitriy Lelyushenko (ibid., July 22, 1987).

Central Committee secretaries not on the Politburo are supervised by secretaries on the Politburo, and Luk'yanov is under Zaykov. Zaykov's supervision is reflected in the background of the first deputy head of the Administrative Organs Department, Ivan Larin, who had been head of the Political Administration of the Leningrad Military District while Zaykov was party leader in Leningrad. See *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Jan. 15, 1986.

[43]*Sovetskaya Belorussiya* (Minsk), Jan. 31, 1986.

[44]There is another subtle sign of Kolbin's ties to Gorbachev. Sometimes the selection of the oblast from which a central official is elected a delegate to the party congress has political significance. For example, at the 27th Congress, Yuliy Vorontsov (then ambassador to France) was elected a delegate from Stavropol', while Yuriy Dubinin (then ambassador to Spain) was elected a delegate from Shevardnadze's Georgia. These circumstances foreshadowed their selections as first deputy minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to the United States respectively, and it would not surprise me if Vorontsov turned out to be the heir apparent to Shevardnadze. In the case of Kolbin. Georgiy Razumovskiy, Gorbachev's intimate for personnel selection, was elected a delegate from Ulyanovsk oblast, where Kolbin was then first secretary.

[45]Alexander Rahr, "Turnover in the Central Party Apparatus," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 256/87, July 9, 1987, p. 5. All Central Committee department heads are supervised by a Central Committee secretary unless, like Anatoliy Dobrynin, they are given the title of secretary themselves. Boldin almost surely is under Luk'yanov's direct supervision.

[46]See Archie Brown, "Gorbachev and Reform of the Soviet System," *The Political Quarterly* (Oxford), April-June 1987, p. 145.

[47]*Pravda*, Mar. 1 and June 26, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 3: Politburo Members, August 31, 1987

Member	Major position held
FULL MEMBERS	
Geydar Aliyev	First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers
Viktor Chebrikov	Chairman of the KGB
Mikhail Gorbachev	General Secretary, CC CPSU
Andrey Gromyko	Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet
Yegor Ligachev	Secretary, CC CPSU
Viktor Nikonov	Secretary, CC CPSU
Nikolay Ryzhkov	Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers
Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi	First Secretary, CP of Ukraine
Eduard Shevardnadze	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Nikolay Slyun'kov	Secretary, CC CPSU
Mikhail Solomentsev	Chairman, Party Control Committee
Vitaliy Vorotnikov	Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers
Aleksandr Yakovlev	Secretary, CC CPSU
Lev Zaykov	Secretary, CC CPSU
CANDIDATE MEMBERS	
Petr Demichev	Deputy Chairman, Presidium, USSR Supreme Soviet
Vladimir Dolgikh	Secretary, CC CPSU
Yuriy Solov'yev	First Secretary, Leningrad Oblast Party Committee
Nikolay Talyzin	First Deputy Chairman, USSR Council of Ministers; Chairman Gosplan
Dimitriy Yazov	Minister of Defense
Boris Yel'tsin	First Secretary, Moscow City Party Committee

the first secretaries of the Dnipropetrovsk and L'viv oblast committees were summarily dismissed, the former before a replacement could even be selected. Dnipropetrovsk oblast and the city of Dniprodzerzhinsk within it had been the original base of both Brezhnev and Shcherbytskyi, and the dismissed L'viv first secretary had originally been a party official in Dniprodzerzhinsk. Shcherbytskyi reported that a major factor in the Dnipropetrovsk change had been a "memorandum of the CPSU CC departments" (*zapiska otdelov TsK KPSS*) that presumably surveyed the work of the obkom. By early July, first secretaries had been changed in seven oblast committees and the one city committee (Kiev) that is independent of any oblast committee. In July, the chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers was retired, although with great honor.[48]

At the June 1987 Plenum, Gorbachev strengthened his control of the Politburo by adding three Central Committee secretaries as full voting members: Yakovlev, Slyun'kov, and the secretary for agriculture, Nikonov. As already noted, all three had held extraordinarily modest posts when Brezhnev died, and Gorbachev clearly was the patron of all three.

With the election of Nikonov, Slyun'kov, and Yakovlev to the Politburo, Gorbachev not only strengthened his personal position on that body, but also raised the status of the Central Committee Secretariat under his direct supervision. If one may be permitted real oversimplification, the Central Committee Secretariat and apparatus is a very rough equivalent of the White House staff—i.e., it constitutes the staff of the leader of the country. As such, there tends to be a natural rivalry between it and the officials of the cabinet—in the Soviet case, the Council of Ministers. The proportion of Central Committee and of Council of Ministers officials on the Politburo may serve as a rough indicator of the relative status of the two institutions at a given time. Today six of the 12 secretaries are voting members of the Politburo, and a seventh is a candidate member (see Tables 3 and 4). Especially with Aliyev and Shcherbytskyi being in a weak position and the KGB chairman and the foreign minister really subordinated to the General Secretary rather than to the chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Secretariat has come as close to replacing the Politburo as it ever has in Soviet history.

One other event that occurred at the January Plenum could be of extraordinary importance—and may even have been the cause of the postponement of the Plenum several times. This was the call for a party conference in 1988. Officially, this conference was to deal with the democratization proposals that Gorbachev had made, which would emerge in the press discussion after the Plenum. In fact, a conference is absolutely unnecessary to enact such reforms, and the only reason to hold one is to make changes in the membership of the Central Committee.

The new Party Rules, adopted at the 27th Congress, are silent on the powers of a party conference, but the last such gathering, held in 1941, did add full and candidate members to the Central Committee. A recent article in the Soviet press pointedly discussed the provisions in the old Rules that had permitted such changes in the past and suggested, by implication, that they still were in force.[49] A Soviet official asserted in March 1987 that the conference would, indeed, take personnel actions. He indicated that just as officials who are removed

[48] *Pravda Ukrainy*, Mar. 25 and July 11, 1987.

[49] *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Mar. 27, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 4: Central Committee Secretaries and Their Responsibilities

Secretary	Responsibilities
Mikhail Gorbachev	General Secretary (overall supervision)
Yegor Ligachev	De facto second secretary, with broad responsibilities and special responsibilities for cadres (directly supervising Razumovskiy)
Aleksandra Biryukova	Consumer goods industry, light industry, trade, and consumer services
Anatoliy Dobrynin	Chief, International Department (dealing with non-governmental foreign relations) and Cadres Abroad Department
Vladimir Dolgikh	Oversees Heavy Industry and Power Engineering Department (primarily dealing with coal, geology, metallurgy, and petroleum)
Anatoliy Luk'yanov	Oversees Administrative Organs Department, General Department, and possibly Administration of Affairs (deals with military, police, and intra-party communication)
Vadim Medvedev	Chief, Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries Department (oversees bloc relations)
Viktor Nikonov	Chief, Oversees Agriculture and Food Industry Department
Georgiy Razumovskiy	Chief, Organizational Party Work Department (supervises local party organs, soviets, Komsomol)
Nikolay Slyun'kov	Chief, Economic Department (oversees Gosplan and central coordinating economic organs); possibly oversees Construction Department
Aleksandr Yakovlev	Oversees domestic ideological affairs (the Culture, Propaganda, and Science and Education departments) and foreign relations (supervises Dobrynin and Medvedev)
Lev Zaykov	Oversees Chemical Industry, Defense Industry, and Machine-Building departments and supervises Luk'yanov

NOTE: There are two major mysteries about the Secretariat. The first is Ligachev's role. His direct administrative responsibilities have become quite narrow now that Nikonov and Yakovlev have become Politburo members. Given Razumovskiy's close ties with Gorbachev, Ligachev's supervision of him must be a formality. The question is whether Ligachev's range of responsibilities means that he is especially powerful or that he is a "vice president" with little real power. My guess is that he is undergoing a gradual transition to a domestic role analogous to Gromyko's in the foreign sphere.

The second question is the division of responsibilities among Dolgikh, Slyun'kov, and Zaykov, now that Slyun'kov has become a full member of the Politburo. Is Dolgikh supervised by one of the full members? Who oversees Biryukova? (Actually the answer may be Ligachev.) Who oversees the Construction Department and the Transport and Communications Department?

usually resign their responsibilities as Supreme Soviet deputies, so such officials might resign as Central Committee members or be replaced by candidate members.[50] The upcoming conference clearly could prove a valuable tool for Gorbachev in removing demoted and disgruntled members of the Central Committee sooner than at the next party congress, not due until 1991.

In sum, signs were multiplying in the spring of 1987 that Gorbachev was rapidly completing one of the most classic and rapid consolidations of power in Soviet history. He was, I think, as strong as Stalin was in 1928. Yet, at this very point, many American analysts began talking about growing opposition to Gorbachev and predicting his downfall in as little as one year, although some conceded he might survive as leader for two or three years.

Perceptions of opposition and predictions of defeat sprang from several sources. From within the Soviet Union came rumors of an impending showdown between Gorbachev and Shcherbytskyi, something putatively indicated by the repeated postponement of the Central Committee Plenum in the winter of 1986–87. Following the January Plenum, Gorbachev's "failure" to remove the Ukrainian party chief was rumored to represent defeat for the General Secretary.[51] Finally, there was a strong tendency among those American analysts who are firmly convinced that no change is possible in the Soviet Union to seize on possible opposition to Gorbachev as the guarantee that his evident desire to enact change would be stymied.[52]

---

[50]The post-Brezhnev period has seen a growing practice whereby Supreme Soviet deputies who are retired from their professional jobs resign from their deputyship (previously, they remained in the Supreme Soviet, with new deputies elected only to replace those of the 1,500-odd deputies who had died in office). At the July 1985 Supreme Soviet session, 12 deputies were reported to have died, and 13 new ones were elected; at the November 1985 session, the respective figures were 3 and 7; in June 1986, they were 0 and 27; in November 1986, they were 1 and 41; and in June 1987, they were 8 and 51.

In and of itself, this change has little significance, but if the precedent were to be followed in the case of Central Committee members (and a member did resign in China), this would be enormously important. Already, as Lev Zaykov revealed in a conversation in the United States in 1977, new officials who will normally be elected to the Central Committee at the next congress (such as himself, then the chairman of the Leningrad city soviet) are invited to attend the sessions of the CC because "it is important for their work." See Hough and Fainsod, op. cit., p. 455. In a showdown, however, the old official would have the legal right to vote; that would be changed by the official's resignation.

[51]*The New York Times*, Mar. 22, 1987.

[52]As Leslie Gelb reported at the end of the Chernenko year in office, the predominant American scholarly prognosis for the Soviet Union was for a "muddling down." Leslie H. Gelb, "What We Really Know About Russia," *The New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 28, 1984, pp. 82–83. There were, however, some different views among scholars Gelb did not contact. One notable exception was Archie Brown of Oxford University, author of an early analysis of the new regime in these pages; see "Gorbachev: New Man in the Kremlin," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1985, pp. 1–23.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 5: Proportion of Voting Members of 1981 Republic Central Committees Who Were *Reelected in 1986*

Republic	All members	Members who were officials[1]	Officials reelected and in same post
Armenia	68 of 121 (56%)	46 of 74 (62%)	30 of 74 (41%)
Azerbaydzhan	76 of 131 (58%)	43 of 64 (67%)	29 of 64 (45%)
Belorussia	60 of 157 (38%)	53 of 110 (48%)	37 of 110 (34%)
Estonia	79 of 131 (60%)	53 of 82 (65%)	34 of 82 (41%)
Georgia	76 of 147 (52%)	48 of 85 (56%)	32 of 85 (38%)
Kazakhstan	56 of 184 (30%)	49 of 126 (39%)	28 of 126 (22%)
Kirgiziya	50 of 137 (36%)	29 of 78 (37%)	18 of 78 (23%)
Latvia	68 of 141 (48%)	42 of 84 (50%)	22 of 84 (26%)
Lithuania	88 of 149 (59%)	58 of 82 (71%)	43 of 82 (52%)
Moldavia	67 of 125 (54%)	47 of 80 (59%)	36 of 80 (45%)
Tadzhikistan	58 of 139 (42%)	43 of 89 (48%)	24 of 89 (27%)
Turkmenia	65 of 155 (42%)	50 of 90 (56%)	33 of 90 (37%)
Ukraine	114 of 195 (58%)	88 of 135 (65%)	68 of 135 (50%)
Uzbekistan	30 of 177 (17%)	26 of 128 (20%)	8 of 125 (6%)

[1]Officials include government and party officials at the republic and oblast levels and in cities with more than 50,000 population; top officials of the Academy of Sciences, rectors of universities and colleges, and factory managers. Military and border troop officers were not included, however, because they are almost all rotated out as a matter of central policy.

SOURCE AND METHODOLOGY: The central committees were elected at the end of January 1981 and in early February 1986. Members were identified from the republic press. With a few exceptions (notably Kazakhstan, with 10 percent unidentified), it was possible to identify 96 to 99 percent of the 1981 members. Unidentified individuals (very few of whom were reelected) were assumed to be non-officials. If this assumption is wrong, the figures in columns 2 and 3 would be slightly lower.

However, one should be extraordinarily cautious about the stories of opposition to Gorbachev and of his alleged defeats, especially with respect to Shcherbytskyi. The press coverage of Shcherbytskyi and Ukraine during 1986 was quite different from the highly negative stories about Kazakhstan; and there was no indication of a large number of personnel changes in Ukraine such as occurred in Kazakhstan preceding the ouster of Kunayev (see Table 5). Thus, the Ukrainian leadership was not criticized for the Chernobyl' disaster, and the only change in the voting membership of the Ukrainian Party Bureau in 1985 and 1986 was occasioned by the death of the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in late 1984. It is extremely difficult to believe that Gorbachev would have risked a defeat on the removal of Shcherbytskyi at this time without more preparation.

Serious criticism of policies and persons in Ukraine began only in 1987, i.e., the rumors of Gorbachev's dissatisfaction were the *beginning* of the attack on Shcherbytskyi, not a sign of defeat. The first public criticism of the KGB and the acknowledgement of mistakes by its chairman, Viktor Chebrikov—an old Shcherbytskyi subordinate in Dnipropetrovsk—also seemed related to the attack, especially since the reported mistakes had occurred in Ukraine.[53] Just as Stalin began breaking his alliances with the Left Opposition and the Right Opposition subtly, so the events of early 1987 appeared to signal the end of Gorbachev's alliance with the Dnipropetrovsk wing of the Kirilenko machine.

The deliberate leaks of stories about opposition and even Gorbachev's statements on the subject served a number of functions. Historically, there have been occasions when vague rumors were floated through Moscow and abroad (often circulated by East Europeans) suggesting that the current Soviet leader was a liberal and for peace, and that he was under attack. In the past, the purpose primarily seemed to be to convince Westerners to support that leader. Even in the late 1940's, such rumors led President Truman to state publicly about Stalin that old Joe "is a decent fellow, but he's a prisoner of the Politburo. He would make certain agreements . . . but they won't let him keep them."[54]

In recent years, the Soviet leaders have become much more sophisticated in leaking "information" about Politburo politics. The main conveyor of rumors was Roy Medvedev, a semi-dissident who was allowed unlimited access to news correspondents and who was permitted to publish abroad without punishment so that he could perform the desired function. In addition, correspondents developed their own "sources," who might seek them out with stories about the Politburo. (In the Brezh-

[53]*Pravda*, Nov. 29, 1986, and Jan. 4 and 8, 1987.
[54]*The New York Times*, June 12, 1948.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nev era, many "sources" worked in Novosti, then headed by Lev Tolkunov, an old Andropov assistant.) The KGB (in the person of "Uncle Sasha," the main contact for convicted US Marine spy Sergeant Clayton Lonetree) even met with three successive heads of the domestic politics section of the American embassy, directly passing on information about Politburo politics.[55]

The purpose of all this activity was not simply to keep the American people informed, or even primarily to get the West to support Gorbachev. The primary audience was now a Soviet one. The dissidents in the Soviet Union and Poland had learned in the 1970's that if they passed information to foreign correspondents, it would soon be broadcast back to the homeland by foreign radio, thus enabling them to get their message around the censorship. Andropov, as KGB chairman, realized that he could use the same technique to reach the Soviet educated population with "news" that could not be printed in Soviet newspapers. The rumor mill could be counted on to diffuse it quickly through the country.

Andropov's main purpose was to discredit first his chief rival, Chernenko, and, second, Romanov, who was the chief rival of Andropov's ally Gorbachev.[56] Gorbachev himself has had multiple purposes. The rumors about Shcherbytskyi are probably, first of all, a warning to the Ukrainian leader; many detailed rumors of middle-level shifts are probably trial balloons. But, most of all, the recurrent talk about the powerful opposition to Gorbachev helps to persuade liberals and dissidents to restrain their opposition, and even to enlist them in his consolidation of power.

Undoubtedly, the Politburo does contain men of different views. Regardless of Gorbachev's power, he is not likely to wish to eliminate a diversity of views among his lieutenants. Even an absolute dictator does not surround himself exclusively with yes-men unless he is an absolute fool. He is careful to select lieutenants both to the left and to the right of himself, both in order to receive different advice and to have "no-men" or "bad cops" among his lieutenants to blame for unpopular policies or failures. Stalin's top three subordinates at the end of his life were Nikita Khrushchev and Georgiy Malenkov, both of whom were much more moderate than the dictator, and Lavrentiy Beriya, who seems as bad as advertised. This did not show that Stalin was an embattled dictator, only a sophisticated one.

We should be very cautious about the assumption that differences of opinion or emphasis denote political opposition to Gorbachev. Shcherbytskyi did, for example, tell visiting American Congressmen that he had doubts about the election of plant managers, but he added that if he doesn't like the policy, he is always free to resign. The evidence cited to show that Ligachev is in opposition is quite ambiguous. Gorbachev himself would disagree with none of the conservative statements Ligachev has made, and the latter is serving as an extremely useful lightning rod whom the intellectuals can blame instead of the "Tsar" himself. If Ligachev were to die unexpectedly, Gorbachev would be wise to invent someone else like him.

Society and Reform

Ultimately, of course, any really substantial reform in the Soviet Union does not depend solely on a general secretary's consolidation of power within the Politburo and the Central Committee. He must persuade ordinary officials to work with a sense of enthusiasm and professionalism; he must persuade students and young intellectuals not to go into the streets in a large-scale and threatening way; he must persuade workers not to riot in the face of higher prices, greater discipline, and demands for other sacrifices. He must accomplish this with respect to both Russians and non-Russians, whose interests and demands can be quite contradictory.

One's judgment about Gorbachev's "power" and his chance of success in consolidating it rests, implicitly or explicitly, on one's evaluation of his short-term and long-term skill in handling the conflicting political and social forces with which he is faced. This judgment in turn rests on one's opinion both of Gorbachev's own political skill and of the tractability of the problems he faces.

Certainly, everyone who has met Gorbachev is impressed by him as a natural politician who instinctively seems to know how to say the right thing and make the right gesture. The speed of his rise both before and after Brezhnev's death is further testimony to his political skill. The General Secretary plays his role in the esoteric communications and symbolism part of the Soviet political

[55] *The Washington Post*, Aug. 19, 1987.

[56] The rumors about Romanov (well summarized in Doder, op. cit.) included his breaking of Catherine the Great's china at a wedding reception, as well as his drunkenness and lack of sophistication. An article in a Leningrad journal that obliquely attacked Brezhnev was called to reporters' attention. Two emigrants from Leningrad who were generally quite critical of the USSR but who had some knowledge of Romanov wrote that he was being unfairly smeared. See Vladimir Solovyov and Elena Klepikova, *Yuri Andropov: A Secret Passage into the Kremlin*, New York, Macmillan, 1983, pp. 80, 165–68.

Rumors continually treated Chernenko as incompetent, but the most subtle attempt to undermine him focused on the alleged efforts of KGB Deputy Chairman Semen Tsvigun to arrest a close friend of Brezhnev's daughter. Brezhnev had had three first deputy KGB chairmen as part of his system of checks and balances: one (Georgiy Tsinev) who had been a crony from Dnipropetrovsk in the 1930's; one (Chebrikov) who had come from Dnipropetrovsk in the 1940's and was associated with Kirilenko and Shcherbytskyi; and one (Tsvigun) who had come from Moldavia and was associated with Chernenko.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

game very well. Given this performance, it is hard to believe that he is going to make elementary political mistakes in introducing reform.[57]

The balance of social and political forces in the Soviet Union is, by contrast, a very controversial subject. Some see a virtually united phalanx of forces opposed to Gorbachev: the bureaucrats, the party apparatus, the military, the workers, the Russians (who fear decentralization), and the non-Russians (who hate continued central control)—everyone but the intelligentsia. If this picture is accurate, then Gorbachev has a monumental and probably insuperable problem.

Yet this unidimensional listing surely overdraws the picture. Policies that produce unhappiness in one group produce some countervailing positive attitudes in other groups. If the workers are unhappy about being disciplined, the bureaucrats should be delighted to have increased power to discipline them. If the industrial ministries do not like losing the power to appoint plant managers, the local party organs should be pleased at the prospect of controlling such appointments as they do the "election" of collective farm chairmen. And so it goes from group to group. It is, indeed, wrong to see the Soviet Union divided between supporters and opponents of reform. Instead, virtually everyone in the Soviet Union has both excellent reasons to favor reform and excellent reasons to fear reform.

For example, the bureaucrats are a far more ambivalent group than all the talk about "bureaucratic opposition" suggests. The institutional interests of the bureaucrats, as everywhere, are against significant change in the way that work is organized. Institutional interests are, however, not the whole story. Age should have an impact on attitudes. Older bureaucrats must generally have a well-founded fear that they cannot function in a new environment and would be swept away. But by the same token, younger bureaucrats know that someone will have to be promoted to replace the old-timers. Many must then see in reform a personal opportunity as well as a danger.

The change in social policy entailed by reform introduces a second ambivalence into bureaucratic attitudes. To put the point in oversimplified terms: reform of the economy involves a deemphasis of social welfare traditionally defined (subsidized prices, egalitarian wages, and protection from unemployment) in order to promote economic growth. The middle class in the United States and Great Britain has preferred the kind of change in social policy that Gorbachev is introducing, and the Soviet middle class should be no different.

"Bureaucrats" also have leisure-time interests. As has already been discussed, the bureaucratic class has been growing enormously in size, and it is very underprivileged in comparison with its counterparts in Western Europe. Its newspapers have been incredibly dull, its culture severely limited, its consumer services terrible, and its freedom to travel extremely restricted. We have observed the youth of Russia since the mid-1950's, and they have yearned for Western clothes, popular music, films, and travel. Indeed, one of the most sophisticated Western observers of the 1950's, Edward Crankshaw, noted that the younger administrative class of the time was quite unlike the Brezhnev generation:

Nothing in this world is more depressing to contemplate than the average Soviet official of high or low degree at present between the ages of forty and sixty [i.e., born between 1900 and 1920] . . . . Those who started their rise in their thirties during the great purges of twenty years ago . . . are incomparably the worst . . . . The Soviet Union's greatest hope lies in the young—those under thirty-five [i.e., born after 1924] . . . . In a dozen professions in which Party control is particularly rigid—in the Foreign Service, in the Law, in journalism, in economics, in the higher civil service with its many branches, in the armed forces, in the universities' faculties, you will meet well-turned-out young men in their thirties, usually Party members, relaxed and easy in manner, often with a pleasantly ironical approach to life, and very much in touch with realities of every kind . . . . Until the last decade, young men of comparable ability would not have dreamt of this sort of career.[58]

Those in their twenties and thirties in the 1950's are the bureaucrats of the 1980's, and we should not think that their attitudes have changed that radically. When Gorbachev talks about Europe as "our common home" or about overcoming the "schism" (*raskol*) of Europe,[59] he is not just making a foreign policy statement. He is appealling to a deep-seated desire of the bureaucrats under 60 to open the country more to the West.

Gorbachev is essentially offering a deal to the middle class. The new law on foreign investment in joint ventures was published on the same day that the Central Committee plenum on "democratization" opened.[60]

[57]My own judgment has been that, in fact, Gorbachev has had a very conscious and sophisticated political and economic strategy from the beginning and is "a truly world-class chess player who delights in complex combinations and knows how to make them." See Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1985, p. 38. For an elaboration, see Jerry F. Hough, *The Soviet Attack on Protectionism*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, forthcoming in 1987; and my *Russia and the West* . . . .

[58]Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev's Russia*, Baltimore, Penguin Books, 1959, pp. 90–91. I am grateful to Professor Sheila Fitzpatrick of the University of Texas for this reference.

[59]*Pravda*, Apr. 22, 1986.

[60]Ibid., Jan. 27, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Members of a youth fashion theater in Frunze demonstrate their talents and tastes in a street in the capital of the Soviet republic of Kirgiziya.

—Sovfoto.

The juxtaposition explicitly linked a society more open to Western ideas with a society open to the sting of foreign competition. If the bureaucrats sabotage economic reform, they will also be destroying the partial relaxation of the dictatorship that they crave.

Other groups have similar ambivalences. As a group, the workers have the most to lose from reform, but working-class youths have also been attracted to rock-and-roll music and must like the more lively television of the Gorbachev era. Moreover, a reform that begins with the legalization of the second economy minimizes the early costs to all industrial workers, at the same time that the most ambitious of them are given the opportunity to enrich themselves, perhaps dramatically, which would tend to split them off from the opponents of reform. Regional party officials hate to lose their detailed control over agricultural administration, but they generally find any decentralization of power from the Moscow ministries to the localities highly beneficial. The military cannot want limitations on military spending, but are presumably not averse to reforms that could force the defense industry and its suppliers to improve their performance.[61]

Major conservative opposition to reform is really impossible, for the conservatives have no viable alterna-

[61] In his military appointments, Gorbachev has chosen a group of top commanders with close ties to one another and (in one case) to Gorbachev himself. As noted in fn. 27 above, Defense Minister Yazov, First Deputy Defense Minister Lushev, and Commander of the Moscow Military District Arkhipov were linked in the Central Asian Military District. Vladimir Lobov, now first deputy chief of the General Staff, served under Yazov there and replaced him. The Commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Yuriy Maksimov, was commander of the Southern Theater beginning in 1983, and the new deputy minister who is the Inspector-General, Mikhail Sorokin, was almost surely a top, if not the top commander of troops in Afghanistan. The new deputy minister for Air Defense, Ivan Tret'yak, was extremely close to Yazov in the past, while the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Valeriy Belikov, was commander of troops in the North Caucasus when Gorbachev was in Stavropol'. Yazov's promotion to defense minister when he was not even full member of the Central Committee and, therefore not within the top 20 officers, surely reflected Gorbachev's hand and power. (For an analysis of the implications of the Yazov appointment, see Dale Herspring, "On *Perestroyka:* Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military," elsewhere in this issue—**Eds.**)

Presumably, the tight-knit nature of so much of the defense leadership means that Gorbachev thinks he has found a group of generals who are committed to the need to raise the level of Soviet technology at all costs (as Nikolay Ogarkov argued was necessary) and who will stick together in facing down any opposition within the military.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tive, as Gorbachev himself has emphasized.[62] Autarchy, centralized state ownership and planning, and repression meant the creation of monopolistic ministries, total protection of the industrialists from foreign competition, and severe restraints on the development of the computer and information revolution. As a result, the Soviet Union has been falling behind countries such as South Korea in its ability to produce high-quality exportable manufactured goods, and that is as intolerable for the conservatives as for the liberals.

With the conservative opposition essentially powerless, Gorbachev's real problem is the liberals. Industrialization has proved to be very corrosive to right-wing dictatorships, and events in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Poland in 1980 show that left-wing dictatorships are not exempt from the pressure for revolution. In a very real sense, the opposition that concerns Gorbachev is not the bureaucracy (it is the strongest support for the within-system reform he wants) or even the workers (except on short-term questions such as price increases), but the intellectuals. They presently see themselves as supporting Gorbachev, but already they are inclined to say that nothing much is happening. To date, they have attributed the problem to Ligachev or the bureaucrats, but gradually they will turn against Gorbachev as they realize that he does not plan to go as far as they would like.

As Gorbachev loosens controls, his problem is how to restrain those who want to go further, without at the same time instituting a repression that destroys the reform. Probably his biggest "ally" is the multi-national character of the Soviet Union, which appears to be a stabilizing rather than destabilizing factor. Russian liberals, who may want real democratization for themselves, are afraid that free elections in Kazakhstan and Ukraine will produce nationalist and even separatist victories. But the non-Russians also have reason for caution. They know that they are divided among themselves, and they have to fear that large demonstrations in favor of freer elections and greater autonomy will simply produce repression as it did in Kazakhstan in 1986. Since reform expands the sphere of their de facto autonomy, the in-

[62]"Both in the Politburo and in the government, we have more than once asked ourselves . . . . Is there any reasonable alternative to *perestroyka*? Are there other proposals in this respect? No!" *Pravda*, May 14, 1987.



Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev meets with US President Ronald Reagan at Geneva, Switzerland, in November 1985.

—UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terest of the non-Russians, too, is to support gradualism for a number of years.

Finally, Gorbachev can appeal to both Russians and non-Russians in terms of Soviet national pride and the needs of national defense in the face of American technological superiority and Chinese modernization. Again and again, Gorbachev has linked his reconstruction (*perestroyka*) with the Soviet Union's ability to remain a world power into the 21st century. A page-long Central Committee appeal to the population dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the revolution was infused with such themes:

The country has begun to move. It has acquired new breath. But . . . the basic work is in front of us . . . . The Central Committee calls on the Soviet people to be imbued with a . . . feeling of responsibility for the future character of the country, for the fate of socialism. The Central Committee appeals to the labor ethic, to the professional pride of the working people, to the patriotism of the Soviet people . . . . The Central Committee appeals to the courage of the Soviet people.[63]

[63]Ibid., Mar. 14, 1987.

Obviously Gorbachev will face many political tests in the future, and some will be more severe than any he has encountered to date. He will continue to need great political skill. Nevertheless, as time passes, his control of the mechanisms of control will be even stronger than they are now. Just as he dismissed top military officers for the failure of Soviet air defense, so he will be able to blame difficulties in the reform on his lieutenants in the domestic sphere and dismiss them as well. Ryzhkov is the obvious scapegoat if things go wrong there.

As we think about Gorbachev, his power, and his program, the most important thing is to be clear about the implicit question that we are asking. If we are asking whether Gorbachev's reform will make Soviet technology remotely competitive with Western technology by the end of the century, then we have every reason to be extremely skeptical.

If, however, we are asking whether Gorbachev can control Soviet social forces and remain in power until the end of the century, that is a very different question, and so is the probable answer, as long as the General Secretary remains healthy. It is too soon to forget the old lessons we once learned about the power of the general secretary in the Soviet political system.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Polish Intellectuals in Opposition

Jakub Karpiński

The terms "dissent" and "dissidents," which evoke images of a small network of isolated individuals working in an indifferent or even hostile environment, seem to be particularly inadequate for describing intellectual and other opposition in Poland. A hallmark of contemporary Polish reality is the existence of a civil society, that is, of extensive groups and networks organized independently of the authorities, despite the strivings by Poland's rulers to impose their own, totalitarian, model of social organization.

The intellectuals are not alone in promoting an alternative way of thinking and a different model of social organization. Religion forms another enclave and an exception. The Catholic Church, the strongest confession, maintains 15,000 church buildings and has more than 22,000 priests who celebrate the liturgy and preach the independent word. Although the private sector of the economy is not large, many individuals are involved in it. More than 76 percent of Poland's arable land is cultivated by private farmers on nearly four million plots.[1]

There is, of course, the other side. Although the communist system was imposed from the Soviet Union, by now it also has indigenous support in Poland. That is to say, there are institutions prepared to act in defense of the system, such as the police, the army, and the party apparatus. Their readiness to defend the system was demonstrated during the period of martial law from December 13, 1981, to July 21, 1983. Less active support for the existing system comes from individuals who join mass organizations like the communist party or the official trade unions. These rank-and-file members usually are neither ardent supporters nor strong opponents of the system. Rather, they have decided to reap the privileges that come with belonging to these mass organizations. The communist party membership slightly exceeds 2.1 million. The state-sponsored trade unions claim to have a membership of 5 million.[2]

This article will describe the varieties of oppositional activity in Poland since the lifting of martial law. In order to do so adequately, it seems necessary to me to sketch the setting in which oppositional activity emerged. An important part of this setting consists of the perceptions and evaluations of past Polish interactions with Russia and Bolshevism.

Initial Encounters with Communism

The inimical nature of the historical relations between Poland and Russia helped to immunize Poles against communism of the Leninist variety. This was true not only of the conservative segments of Polish society but of the socially radical segments as well. When the Polish state was partitioned at the end of the 18th century among Austria, Prussia, and Russia, the portion of Poland that went to Russia was the largest. In the course of the 19th century, political and cultural liberties were most restricted in this portion. An official policy of Russification followed—Russian was the language of instruction in the high schools, Polish universities were closed down, etc. Under these circumstances it is understandable that the Polish Socialist Party, formed in 1892, had a strongly patriotic—and therefore anti-Russian and anti-

Jakub Karpiński was a faculty member at Warsaw University and a leader of the 1968 demonstrations there, for which he was imprisoned from 1968 to 1971. A sociologist, he has written numerous works on Polish affairs, including Countdown: The Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980 . . . *(1982). He has been teaching in the United States and Europe since leaving Poland in 1979.*

[1]The data given are for 1985. See *Rocznik Statystyczny 1986* (Statistical Yearbook), Warsaw, Główny Urząd Statystyczny, 1986, pp. 37, 284, 291.
[2]Ibid., pp. 34, 36.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tsarist—flavor, although the party also included members of an internationalist persuasion.[3]

When Józef Piłsudski became the leader of the Revolutionary Faction of the Polish Socialist Party in 1906, his party directed its activity toward securing national independence for Poland. In 1914, with the outbreak of World War I, Piłsudski formed the Polish Legions which fought for the restoration of Poland's independence. In 1918, after the three partitioning empires had collapsed, Piłsudski became head of the reestablished Polish state and commander-in-chief of the army. During the Polish-Bolshevik war, when the Bolshevik armies were approaching Warsaw in 1920, the Polish Government of National Unity was headed by leaders of parties usually defined as radical: the Socialist and Peasant parties. As they did two decades later during the war with Finland in 1940, the Soviets in 1920 predicted a pro-Soviet uprising of Polish workers and peasants. Nothing of the kind happened; on the contrary, Poles of all social strata saw the defense of the country as a national duty.

When the Red Army brought along a "Revolutionary Committee" as an embryonic communist government for Poland, Stefan Żeromski, a Polish writer who was sometimes described as progressive by Marxist literary critics, equated support for this body and indeed support for communism with treason. This view was shared by workers and peasants—volunteers in the Polish army.[4]

Largely due to the 1920 war, Soviet communism was widely seen as a threat to Polish independence. This perception was reinforced when the Comintern—in disregard of the Riga treaty of 1921, which ended the war, defined the Polish-Soviet border, and established diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union—authorized the formation in eastern Poland of two overtly separatist parties: the Communist Party of Western Ukraine and the Communist Party of Western Belorussia. From the Polish perspective, this organizational arrangement meant that according to the Soviets the Polish frontiers agreed upon in the Riga treaty were not inviolable.

Although the communist party was technically illegal in interwar Poland, communist publications appeared and communists held a few seats in parliament, but without acknowledging openly their communist affiliation. It was not the Polish government but Stalin who destroyed the Communist Party in Poland. Its leaders were called to the Soviet Union in the late 1930's, where many were murdered during the purges and others were sent to labor camps.[5] The Communist Party of Poland was dissolved in 1938 on orders of the Comintern.

The reaction to communism by Polish intellectuals can be found in both historical and literary works of the interwar period. The historian Jan Kucharzewski, for example, wrote a seven-volume history of modern Russia entitled "From the White to the Red Tsardom."[6] He argued that the Russian tradition of absolute power and revolutionary nihilism formed the roots of Soviet communism. His interpretation can be seen as a rebuttal of the view (now articulated most eloquently by Alexander Solzhenitsyn) that communism is alien to the Russian tradition. At the Research Institute on Eastern Europe in Vilnius, researchers studied the economy, law, and history of the Soviet Union.[7] For the scholars in that institute—and for many other Poles—Eastern Europe in the 1930's meant the USSR. Poland was in the West. This perception and terminological usage would be changed as a result of World War II.

Writers belonging to the so-called catastrophic current in interwar Polish literature expressed in their works an apprehension of totalitarianism (including communism), which they saw as a danger to existing culture and civilization. Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz's novels, dramas, and philosophical essays were replete with premonitions of invasion and internal takeovers by nihilist forces.[8] In one of his novels, Witkiewicz

[3]On the history of Polish socialism, see Adam Ciołkosz and Lidia Ciołkoszowa, *Zarys dziejów socjalizmu polskiego* (An Outline of the History of Polish Socialism), London, Gryf, Vol. I, 1966; Vol. II, 1972; Adam Ciołkosz, *Ludzie PPS* (The People in the Polish Socialist Party), London, Central Committee of the Polish Socialist Party, 1967, and 1981.

[4]On the Polish-Soviet War, see Norman Davies, *White Eagle—Red Star, the Polish-Soviet War, 1919–20*, London, Macdonald, 1972. On Józef Piłsudski, see Wacław Jędrzejewicz, *Kronika życia Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1867–1935* (Biography of Józef Piłsudski), 2 vols., London, Polish Cultural Foundation, 1977.

[5]On the Communist Party of Poland, see Jan Alfred Reguła, *Historia KPP w swietle faktów i dokumentów* (History of the Communist Party of Poland in Light of Facts and Documents) Warsaw, n.p., 1934; M.K. Dziewanowski, *The Communist Party of Poland*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1959; Al. An. Myszkowski, "Słownik biograficzny komunistów polskich represjonowanych w ZSRR" (A Biographical Dictionary of Polish Communists Repressed in the USSR), *Zeszyty Historyczne* (Paris) Vol. 69, 1984.

[6]Kucharzewski's complete work has not survived. The manuscript of the three last volumes was destroyed during the Warsaw uprising of 1944. An abbreviated version of his work exists in English under the title *The Origins of Modern Russia*, New York, Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences, 1949.

[7]See, e.g., Wiktor Sukiennicki, *Ewolucja ustroju Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich* (The Evolution of the Political System in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Vilnius, Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Europy Wschodniej, 1938. See also Stanisław Swianiewicz, *Lenin jako ekonomista* (Lenin as an Economist), Vilnius, Instytut Naukowo-Badawczy Europy Wschodniej, 1930. Swianiewicz was the only survivor of the Katyń massacre. See his *W cieniu Katynia* (In the Shadow of Katyn), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1976. On the killing of Polish internees by the Soviets in April and May 1940 at Katyń, see Janusz K. Zawodny, *Death in the Forest*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1962.

[8]Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, *Insatiability: A Novel in Two Parts*, trans. by Louis Irribarne, Champaign, IL, University of Illinois Press, 1977. See also Daniel Gerould, *Witkacy: Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz as an Imaginative Writer*, Seattle, WA, University of Washington Press, 1981.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

describes a Poland dominated by a totalitarian party called PZP (only one letter—"R"—has to be added to form the acronym for today's Polish communist party). Witkiewicz committed suicide when the Soviet army invaded Poland in September 1939.

For millions of Poles, World War II meant not only six years of direct experience of National Socialism and Hitler's occupation forces, but also direct experience of the Soviet system. Poles in large numbers had the opportunity to see the Soviet Union from within—as prisoners in its labor camps, as workers in its factories and rural cooperatives from Kazakhstan to Siberia, and as soldiers in one of three armies, with which some of them eventually left the Soviet Union. One army was Polish, another was the Red Army, and the third was Polish under Soviet command. This experience gave Poles an entirely different view of Soviet reality than that obtained by travellers or even by diplomats in the Soviet Union. For example, the first maps of the Soviet labor camps, to be published by American labor unions, were based on testimony supplied by Poles.[9] Thus, thanks to the war, Poles of various strata acquired a first-hand knowledge of communism. Acquiring this knowledge did not require much scholarly sophistication, but simply the ability to observe, collect, and remember facts. This Polish experience of Soviet communism did not cease to be valid when the communist system was installed in Poland in 1944 and began tightening its grip on Polish society.

Against Politico-Cultural Conformity

After the start of the Nazi-Soviet war in 1941, the Comintern decided to reestablish a communist party for Poland. This party was called the "Polish Workers' Party" and it used a somewhat different terminology than in the interwar period. Words like "communism" or "revolution," not to speak of "Bolshevism," were avoided in party publications. The party described itself as Polish, progressive, and democratic. The new, Soviet-backed government for Poland, created in July 1944 in Moscow, was named the "Polish National Liberation Committee." A communist-sponsored mass organization founded in the Soviet Union was called the "Union of Polish Patriots." In the first years of the new regime even the words "socialism" and "socialist" (terms by which ruling communist regimes often define themselves) were avoided. This was the pattern of communist takeovers in Eastern Europe—as it was later to be in Asia and elsewhere. Poland was no exception. At the time, however, Poland appeared to be different from the rest of Eastern Europe in having a strong anti-communist resistance movement.

Systematic study of the underground movement in the immediate postwar period has barely been begun and so a complete picture of it is not yet available. The movement comprised many separate organizations, some of which were armed insurgencies. Dozens of underground newspapers were published. But the vitality of the anticommunist opposition was exhausted in a short time. The years of close contact with two totalitarianisms had proved to be costly. They had brought the death of six million human beings, mass deportations, and the destruction of national wealth. The surviving Poles were tired. In such conditions, illusions flourish. The supporters of the oppositional Polish Peasant Party were trying to take advantage of the Yalta Agreement, as they chose to interpret it, and thought of winning in free elections. Yet, there were no free elections in Poland in 1947—indeed, there have been none until this day. The officials of the new government and communist party were quite open in saying that the cause of revolution and progress was too precious to be risked in electoral gambles. In 1947, the only legal opposition, the Polish Peasant Party, was destroyed, and the remaining political and military underground was effectively disarmed by early 1948.[10]

But a few avenues of opposition or resistance were not completely cut off. Unlike churches in other communist-ruled countries (like the Soviet Union, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia), the Catholic Church in Poland was not subordinated or destroyed. Even though some bishops and priests were imprisoned in the early 1950's, the Church as an institution survived, as did some of the Catholic publications. Despite heavy censorship, a few Catholic periodicals remained independent of the government and the party line.

The Polish government has always maintained veto power over publishing. Official (meaning legal) publication of anything could be prohibited. However, the authorities were not always able to assert a positive power: in a few cases, they could not compel a journal to print what the editors did not want published. A notable demonstration of this occurred in 1953 after Stalin's death

[9]Sylwester Mora and Piotr Zwierniak, *Sprawiedliwość sowiecka* (Soviet Justice), Rome, 1945; the book was translated into French and also published in 1945 in Rome by Magi-Spinetti Editeurs.

[10]On the 1940's, see Marek Łatyński, *Nie paść na kolana. Szkice o opozycji lat czterdziestych* (Not to Genuflect. Essays on the Opposition in the 1940's), London, Polonia, 1985; Krystyna Kersten, *Narodziny systemu władzy: Polska 1943–1948* (The Birth of the Power System. Poland 1943–1948), Warsaw, Krąg, 1985, republished under the same title by Libella, Paris, 1986; John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds, *Poland 1939–1947*, Leicester University Press, 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), a noted philosopher, whose works on phenomenology were banned in Poland in the Stalinist period because they were labeled "bourgeois."

—Photo from Roman Ingarden, *Dzieła filozoficzne, Studia z estetyki* (Philosophical Works, Studies in Aesthetics), Warsaw, PWN, Vol. 1, 1957.

when the Catholic weekly, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, refused to print the dictator's obituary. In retaliation, the authorities handed the weekly over to the pro-communist Catholic group Pax. But three years later, in changed political circumstances, the weekly was reestablished under its former editorial board. It has preserved its freedom of refusal until today.[11]

Communism in its unalloyed form functioned in Poland for six years, between 1949 and 1954. The period before 1949 was one of preparation when the authorities engaged in the semantic maneuvers mentioned earlier that were intended to obscure their aims and the nature of their rule. They resorted to such conceptual formulations as "people's democracy" and the institutional arrangements that went with it. After 1954, the rulers engaged in oscillations during the process of building "real existing socialism." The process was slowed when the local rulers were apprehensive of popular resistance or revolt; at other times, the authorities tried to follow Soviet prescriptions and to keep up with the ordained stages of socialist development,apparently in response to prodding from the Soviet Union.

During the years of mature communism, Marxism-Leninism was proclaimed by its adherents to be the ideology, science, and social technique with universal applicability—to everyday life, to politics, and to culture, including the humanities and literature. The application of Marxism-Leninism did not call for much mental exertion. In essence it meant mastering the party line and implementing it, repeating slogans and quoting approved ideological texts, preferably Lenin and Stalin.

In those times, intellectual opposition consisted of refusing to follow the communist rituals, to repeat what was expected, or to affirm that the official ideology provided the only possible answer to every conceivable question. Even such limited opposition could be personally costly. Professors and students were expelled from universities if they rejected Marxism or showed indifference toward it. A campaign was launched against what was labelled bourgeois idealism, namely, analytical philosophy, neopositivism, Tomism, phenomenology, as well as "bourgeois" sociology, science, and "objectivism," the last being charged with disregarding the progressive and trying to look at the world without taking the class struggle into account.[12]

Some of the professors who were expelled from universities for expounding "bourgeois" scholarship were nevertheless allowed to work on translating ancient philosophers or to write on 18th-century architecture (like the historian of philosophy Władysław Tatarkiewicz).[13] Others continued to work on their own in isolation, ignoring the ideological climate of the time (like the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden who continued his studies of formal ontology).[14] Still others made Marxism the object

[11]On the Catholic groupings, see Andrzej Micewski, *Współrządzić czy nie kłamać? Pax i Znak w Polsce, 1945–1976* (Co-Govern or not to Lie? Pax and Znak in Poland, 1945–1976), Paris, Libella, 1978; also Jacek Zakowski, *Anatomia smaku czyli o losach Tygodnika Powszechnego, 1953–1956* (Anatomy of Taste or the Fate of Tygodnik Powszechny 1953–1956), Lublin, Biblioteka Informatora, 1986.

[12]Zbigniew A. Jordan, *Philosophy and Ideology: The Development of Philosophy and Marxism-Leninism in Poland Since the Second World War*, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1963; Adam Tern, "Marxism in Action: Philosophy, Social Sciences, and Marxism in Poland," *Aneks* (London), No. 2, 1973; Jan Woleński, Filozoficzna szkoła lwowsko-warszawska (The Lviv-Warsaw Philosophical School), Warsaw, PWN, 1985.

[13]Tatarkiewicz's three volume *History of Aesthetics* has been published in English by Mouton Press, 1971–1974, as has his *Analysis of Happiness*, Martinus Nijhof, Kluwer Academic, 1976, and *History of Six Ideas; An Essay in Aesthetics*, Kluwer Academic, 1980.

[14]Ingarden's *Spór o istnienie świata* (Controversy over the Existence of the World) published in Polish in 1947 and 1948, has been translated into German; see Roman Ingarden, *Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt*, vol. 1:

(fn. continued on p. 48)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of detached research, with no expectation of having their works published in their lifetime (like the sociologist Stanisław Ossowski who analyzed how class structure has been perceived throughout history).[15] There were artists and writers who did not observe the principles of socialist realism, painters who did not exhibit their works (like Tadeusz Kantor),[16] and poets who did not try to publish (like Zbigniew Herbert).[17] In short, a host of people created their work without an audience rather than accept the tenets of the official, controlled, ideological life of the time.

The Stalinist years, in the popular perception, were years of terror. Peasants, who then constituted a majority of the population learned how easy it was to be imprisoned—for example, for failing to deliver the specified quota of products to the state. But during these same years, the peasants also migrated to the towns that were being rebuilt, served in the army, became employed in new factories or in the proliferating state administrative institutions. For many of them, as well as for other Poles, this period was also a time of opportunity. The massive reconstruction of the country created a climate where there was a degree of collaboration with the authorities on the part of specialists like engineers or doctors, who tried to reconstruct the country but to avoid an ideological or political commitment to the system.

In the late 1940's and early 1950's, practically the only voice audible in Poland was that of the communist minority and its fellow travellers. Journals and books were full of praise for the new order. Dissenting voices could be heard only in private, or sometimes from church pulpits—with differences from the official view being stressed more by what was left unsaid than by what was actually said.

A few years later, the behavior of intellectuals in the Stalinist period would be questioned by the younger generation, whose members did not understand it and asked why intellectuals then had praised Marxism, communism, and the Soviet Union, and had tried to eradicate the influence of the West, of the Church, and of non-partisan science and culture.[18] So far, no really convincing explanation has been forthcoming.

Political Realism and Personal Integrity

Postwar Poland—though it was moved politically and culturally to the East—has been moved geographically to the West. The Soviet guarantee of the new Polish western and northern territories was used by the authorities to legitimize themselves; this so-called geopolitical argument was persuasive to a certain degree. But after the Federal Republic of Germany recognized—albeit with some reservations—Poland's right to the formerly German territories in two treaties (with the Soviet Union and Poland) in August and December 1970,[19] this argument lost much of its persuasiveness.

In the aftermath of World War II, Poles were trying to be realistic, cautious, to not risk too much, but at the same time to maintain their moral and political integrity. Children were often told different truths at home than in school. Even teachers frequently did not follow the prescribed curriculum and abstained from inculcating their pupils with official propaganda. Although the communist party's membership was growing until 1980, belonging to it was seen by many as a morally dangerous subordination and a betrayal of traditional values.

The attitude displayed toward the government by the late Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, the primate of the Catholic Church in Poland, became an example for the extent to which concessions could be made. The Church acceded to many demands of the communist government in an agreement signed in April 1950, but Cardinal Wyszyński did not remain silent when he saw vital principles being undermined by the authorities. He was arrested for speaking out in September 1953 and was not released until more than three years later, during the course of the events of October 1956,[20] which brought Władysław Gomułka to power.

Existentialontologie; vol. 2: *Formalontologie*; vol. 3: *Über die kausale Struktur der realen Welt*, all published by Niemeyer, Tübingen in 1964, 1965, and 1974, respectively. An abbreviated English translation also appeared, see Roman Ingarden, *Time and Modes of Being*, trans. by Helen R. Michejda, New York, C.C. Thomas, 1964. See also Roman Ingarden, *Selected Papers in Aesthetics*, Philadelphia, Philosophia Resources Library, 1985.

[15]Six volumes of Ossowski's *Dzieła* (Works) have been published in Warsaw, PWN, 1966–1970. His *Struktura klasowa w społecznej świadomości* (Class Structure in the Social Consciousness), published in Polish in 1957, was published in English by Free Press, New York, 1963.

[16]On socialist realism in art, see Wojciech Włodarczyk, *Socrealizm: Sztuka polska w latach 1950–54* (Socialist Realism: Polish Art in the Years 1950–54), Paris, Libella, 1986.

[17]Herbert's poetry has been translated into English; see Zbigniew Herbert, *Selected Poems*, trans. by Czesław Miłosz and Peter Dale Scott, London, Penguin Books, 1968; Zbigniew Herbert, *Selected Poems*, trans. by John and Bogdana Carpenter, Oxford University Press, 1977; Zbigniew Herbert, *Report from the Besieged City and Other Poems*, trans. by John and Bogdana Carpenter, New York, The Ecco Press, 1985.

[18]A recent effort to throw some light on the behavior of Polish intellectuals during the Stalinist years was undertaken by Jacek Trznadel in a series of interviews; see Jacek Trznadel, *Hańba domowa: Rozmowy z pisarzami* (Domestic Shame: Conversations with Writers), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1986. See also Barbara Fijałkowska, *Polityka i twórcy (1948–1959)* (Politics and Artists), Warsaw, PWN, 1985.

[19]See W.W. Kulski, *Germany and Poland: From War To Peaceful Relations*, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1976.

[20]For Cardinal Wyszyński's biography, see Andrzej Micewski, *Kardynał Wyszyński, Prymas i mąż stanu* (Cardinal Wyszyński, Primate and Statesman), Paris, Editions du Dialogue, 1982.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

After Stalin's death, a current of semi-oppositional thinking, called revisionism by the official specialists on ideology, emerged. Revisionists were those communist party members who tried to civilize communism from the inside. They advocated a more pluralist and decentralized economy, a dose of democracy in the party and even in the state, as well as freedom of expression, at least for communist intellectuals. Revisionists had their own points of historical and axiological reference: they wanted to return to what they called true communism, true socialism, Leninist principles, and to old Engels or young Marx (usually this meant that they wanted a less radical and more tolerant course than the one being followed by the party at the time). The revisionists were criticized by party apparatchiks who were intolerant of even minimal desiderata and demands. In a confrontation between a communist intellectual and a party apparatchik, the bureaucrat usually has the best of it even if he was previously or is later to become an intellectual. An apparatchik not only has power, but he also has at his service some expert on ideology who will discover useful anti-revisionist quotations.

In 1957, two publications were banned, the revisionist and partially oppositional weekly *Po prostu*, and *Europa*, a cultural review whose aim was to broaden intellectual horizons. A few issues of *Europa* were prepared, but the review was banned before it ever appeared. Some intellectuals left the party as a result, while others were expelled. Subsequently, similar party restrictions brought similar consequences. In time, the notion of a party intellectual proved to be an oxymoron.

In any case, the debates about true Leninism, Marxist humanism, or Rosa Luxemburg's intellectual heritage were not noticeably fascinating to a wider audience. Frictions between revisionists and party apparatchiks remained for most non-members the internal affair of the party.[21] Moreover, the heritage of *Po prostu* is mixed. Some of the journalists whose careers began in that weekly became advisers to, or spokesmen for, the authorities in the 1970's and 1980's, while others were similarly involved in the opposition.[22]

After the mid-1950's, Marxism held a defensive but privileged position: an outright critique of it was not tolerated but the doctrine could be ignored. Gradually, those philosophers and sociologists (Roman Ingarden, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz,[23] Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Stanisław Ossowski), whose works were not published in the Stalinist period, could publish officially. Marxism ceased being an object of adulation; it could be discussed as one of many 19th-century currents of thought and programs of action. The universities, scientific institutions, and publishing houses gained increasing independence, and many thinkers succeeded in steering clear of the official doctrine. The Marxists, however, remained a privileged group, their adherence to the official ideology facilitating their careers and the publication of their works—though this was not always true of those who were branded as Marxist revisionists.

Since the late 1950's, playing games with censorship has become a widely known and practiced art: the use of transparent metaphors, veiled references, portrayals of particular instances that lent themselves to generalizations, topics alien and far away in time and space instead of ones familiar and domestic, a picture of the here and now presented in ancient settings and costumes—became widespread. Words acquired additional connotations as authors mocked the official language while seemingly using it as intended by the authorities.

In the 1960's and 1970's, as poets discovered and exposed the role of language in official reality, playing on words became a principal preoccupation of linguistic poetry (the elaborate games with words and idioms in which Stanisław Barańczak excels).[24] Metaphors could be set aside in public discourse on sensitive matters only in church sermons, in funeral orations, and in the pleas of defendants in political trials.[25] Another situation in which Poles were learning to speak plainly was during protest demonstrations.

In 1968, university students engaged in protests against censorship, lawlessness, and party attempts to limit academic freedoms. The authorities expelled

[21]One of the best books on the history of Marxism has been written by the former Marxist and revisionist Leszek Kołakowski, see *Główne nurty marksizmu: Powstanie–Rozwój–Rozkład* (Main Currents of Marxism: Origins—Development—Disintegration), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1976, 1977, 1978. A three volume English translation was published by Oxford University Press in 1980 under the title of *Main Currents of Marxism*.

[22]Walery Namiotkiewicz served as personal secretary to Władysław Gomułka, the communist party leader, until 1970; Jerzy Urban has been the government's spokesman since 1981; Jan Józef Lipski was a founding member of KOR (Workers' Defense Committee) and is the author of a book on KOR. See Jan Józef Lipski, *KOR: A History of the Workers' Defense Committee in Poland 1976–1981*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1986. Jan Olszewski was counsel for the defense in many political trials and represented the interests of Reverend Jerzy Popieluszko's family during the trial of his murderers (December 1984–February 1985).

[23]Ajdukiewicz published important philosophical texts in the journal *Erkenntnis* (Vienna) in the 1930's which were strongly criticized by Polish Marxists in the early 1950's. Later, however, two volumes of his works on philosophy and logic appeared in Warsaw. See *Język i poznanie* (Language and Understanding), Warsaw, PWN, 1960, 1965. In English, selections of his work appeared under the title, *The Scientific World–Perspective and Other Essays, 1931–1963*, edited by Jerzy Giedymin, Dordrecht, D. Reidel, 1978.

[24]Some of Barańczak's poems are available in English; see Stanisław Barańczak, *Under My Own Roof*, trans. by Frank Kujawiński, Mr. Cogito Press, n.d.

[25]Political trials of the late 1960's and the early 1970's are described in *Sąd orzekł. . .* (In the Name of Justice), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1972.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Some of the books on Soviet and East European topics published by the unofficial publishing concerns in Poland.

—Photo by the author.

some students and dismissed some professors from the universities. Among the dismissed professors were former Stalinists and former revisionists whom the official press now attacked for their eagerness to implement party orders in the past. The authorities launched a sweeping campaign against students, intellectuals, and "Zionists." This campaign was fully supported by pro-government Catholics (from the Pax group); however, another legal Catholic group, Znak, distanced itself from the party policy in 1968 (for this, as well as for its lack of support for other government initiatives, the group was harrassed by the authorities).

Workers' Resistance and Intellectual Opposition

In December 1970 and January 1971, a wave of workers' strikes swept through Poland in reaction to the price increases announced in December 1970. These strikes first brought changes in the composition of the ruling group; for example, Władysław Gomułka was replaced by Edward Gierek. The new leadership later withdrew the price increases and softened the government's economic policies. In the mid-1970's, however, the authorities once again aroused protests, mostly from the intelligentsia, when they decided to bestow the stamp of legality on some of the fundamental practices of the system. They proceeded to regularize the nomenklatura rules,[26] to unify youth organizations, and to try to enshrine in the constitution vague but ominous slogans like the "leading role" of the party, and "friendship" with the Soviet Union.[27]

[26]On the Polish nomenklatura, see the appendix in Thomas Lowit, "Are There States in Eastern Europe?" *Revue Française de Sociologie* (Paris), vol. 20, No. 2, 1974.

[27]Marek Tarniewski, *Płonie komitet, grudzień 1970—czerwiec 1976* (The Committee Aflame, December 1970–June 1976), Paris, Instytut Literacki, 1982.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The regime's desire to institutionalize its practices not only caused protests but also led to a clearer understanding of the way in which the socio-political system was functioning. The critical intelligentsia began to analyze the system in earnest. A given individual's attitude toward the system often affected his theoretical interpretation; some stressed the regularity with which conflicts and policies recurred, others pointed to unpredictability and personal factors (as opposed to sociological interpretations).[28] As a result of heightened sensitivity to political issues, bonds were forged among the critical intelligentsia that helped it to coordinate its activities after the 1976 worker protests in Radom and Ursus.

[28]At stake was whether communist systems function like Western democracies where personal factors, ideological inclinations, and the followers of specific political personalities are important, or whether communist systems are shaped by impersonal institutions (like the police and the party apparatus) in which the functionaries perform their assigned roles without strongly imprinting on them their beliefs and/or personality traits. See Marek Tarniewski, "A Treatise on Factions," *Kultura* (Paris), 1984, No. 6, pp. 75–80.

Samizdat emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1960's; in Poland similar uncensored expression arose on a larger scale after the worker protests of June 1976. Independent journals, publishing houses, and groups proliferated. Although officially considered illegal, these activities—fortunately for the participants—were repressed with uneven degrees of insistence. Informational journals dealing with human rights appeared first, but they quickly extended their coverage to politics, history, literature, and economics. Later came books: reprints of Polish émigré publications, translations of Western and other East European works, as well as original works written specifically for the underground publishers. The political police organized hunts for printing presses and jailed printers and other participants, but it did not succeed in stopping the movement. Despite the restraints imposed by the police, uncensored publications were spreading widely. The creation of uncensored publications was not only in itself a sign of opposition but it also stimulated more oppositional writing. The extent and quality of the network of contemporary Polish

A selection of newspapers published by the underground in Poland.

—Photo by the author.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

uncensored publications is without precedent in any country under communism. This network, the widely accessible émigré publications, and the Catholic Church offer the principal opportunities for expression not controlled by officialdom.

The repeated outbreaks of worker resistance strengthened the intellectual opposition. The authorities seemed to observe a rule that Lenin would have approved of—they avoided simultaneous struggles on too many fronts and against too many enemies. After the worker unrests in 1956, 1970, and 1980,[29] the authorities—at least for a time—eased the restrictions imposed on the universities, the Catholic Church, and even on the official press, allowing the latter some freedom to criticize government policies if the critique was deemed "constructive." Even under martial law, Poles exercised more freedom of expression than did any other East Europeans (although Hungary is in this respect not far behind Poland).

In the 16 months of Solidarity's legal existence,[30] some of the main oppositional ideas, such as the concepts of social entities independent of the government and of self-organization, were incorporated into Solidarity's program.[31] Its goal was to influence and limit totalitarian party-state policies by developing public life not subjected to official control. In 1980–81, Solidarity tried to have influence on new legislation—such as the laws on state enterprises, employees' self-management, or the bill on universities. An initiative was launched to create an independent Council on the National Economy, for the purpose of at least gathering reliable information about it so as to be able to influence policies. In economic matters, some discord manifested itself early within the opposition—for example, about the role of self-management versus labor unions, or about the desirable size of the private sector.

Political Discussions Since Martial Law

The imposition on December 13, 1981, of the state of war—and the accompanying sudden limitation of freedom, including the freedom of movement—caused a shock and created controversies within the opposition. Questions were raised, inside and outside Solidarity, whether Solidarity had gone too far (perhaps by its very existence) or whether it had not gone far enough (by not anticipating martial law and not being prepared for it). But the immediate question was what to do in the face of martial law. To organize a general strike and compel the authorities to negotiate—according to the pattern of August 1980—seemed the obvious response. Another possibility was to prepare for a long period of resistance and to build (without official permission) as durable a form of independent societal life as possible. The second strategy was ultimately adopted.

Resistance during the state of war involved the development of independent culture, education, and information. Solidarity's Temporary Coordinating Commission, in existence since April 1982, is a body composed of activists in hiding or not revealing their identity. Solidarity turned into a decentralized confederation of groups and committees at the plant and regional level, with which other groupings were loosely affiliated if at all. Among the independent organizations that began their activities after December 1981 are the following: Zespół Oświaty Niezależnej (Committee for Independent Education) and Rada Edukacji Narodowej (Council for National Education),[32] Komitet Kultury Niezależnej (Committee for Independent Culture),[33] Komitet Helsiński (Helsinki Committee),[34] Społeczny Komitet Nauki (Social Committee for Science and Academic Re-

[29]Jakub Karpiński, "Workers vs Party-State in Poland," *Freedom at Issue*, No. 58, November–December 1980; Jakub Karpiński, *Countdown: The Polish Upheavals of 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980*, New York, Karc-Cohl, 1982; Jarosław Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowiczowa, Eds., *Poznański czerwiec 1956* (June 1956 in Poznan), Poznań, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1981; Roman Laba, "Worker Roots of Solidarity", *Problems of Communism*, (Washington, DC), July–August 1986; *Grudzień 1970* (December 1970), Paris, Editions Spotkania, 1986; *Zapis rozmów gdańskich: Sierpień 1980* (Minutes of the Gdansk Negotiations, August 1980), Paris, Editions Spotkania, 1986.

[30]For the history of the legal period of Solidarity, see Jerzy Holzer, *Solidarność 1980–81: geneza i historia* (Solidarity 1980–81: Genesis and History), Warsaw, Krąg, 1983 (underground publication), reissued in Paris by Instytut Literacki, 1984. See also Timothy Garton Ash, *The Polish Revolution: Solidarity 1980–82*, London, Jonathan Cape, 1983.

[31]See the special issue of *World Affairs*, "Solidarity. A Documentary History," Washington, DC, vol. 145, no. 1, Summer 1982.

[32]Several underground publications focus on education, including *Tu Teraz* (Here Now) and two journals called *Solidarność Nauczycielska* (Teacher's Solidarity) one of which appears in Wrocław and the other in Lublin. A separate series—*Zeszyty Edukacji Narodowej* (Notebooks on National Education)—publishes works on history, economics, philosophy, and other subjects.

[33]Since August 1984, the Committee for Independent Culture publishes a monthly *Kultura Niezależna* (Independent Culture). Twenty-nine issues had appeared by March 1987. Underground periodicals dealing with art and culture have been published since shortly after the imposition of the state of war: in 1982 *Wezwanie* (Call) and *Nowy Zapis* (New Inscription) were issued; since 1983 the "independent literary review" *Obecność* (Presence, Wrocław) as well as *Arka* (Ark, Kraków) have appeared regularly.

[34]The Helsinki Committee in Poland has published a series of comprehensive reports, several of them translated into English: *1984 Violations of Human Rights in Poland*, published by the Committee in Support of Solidarity (New York), and Information Centre for Polish Affairs (London), 1985; *Violations of Human Rights in Poland 1984–1985* (Fourth Report), English edition by the Committee in Support of Solidarity (New York), 1985; *Human Rights Violations in Poland 1983–1986*, trans. from Polish by the Information Centre for Polish Affairs, 1986; *Report on Torture and the Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officials in the Polish People's Republic, 1945–1985*, New York, Committee in Support of Solidarity. 1986. Human rights and the uses and abuses of the law by the authorities are the concern of underground publications like *Praworządność* (Legality, Warsaw), *Homo Homini* (Małopolska), *Paragraf* (Clause, Kraków).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Examples of the various independent journals appearing in Poland today.

—Photo by the author.

search), Społeczna Komisja Zdrowia (Social Committee on Health), Wolność i Pokój (Freedom and Peace).[35]

The desirable balance between coordination and decentralization did not cease to be an issue of dispute for the opposition, but in practice decentralization has predominated.[36] The dividing line between trade union and non-union activities has in any case never been very clear. Journals and books are published without censorship, experts write and publish their independent opinions, non-official art exhibits and theater performances are organized, alongside the production of audio- and video-casettes. There are plenty of loosely connected groups with or without names, in which people act together and try make their ideas known to a wider public while hiding their activities from the police; uncensored publications proliferate despite some arrests of activists and confiscations of printing presses. An independent political life has been developed, and political discussions continue.

There are roughly speaking two main currents of opinion that can be characterized as radical or fundamentalist on the one hand and moderate or pragmatist on the other. In interpreting existing reality, the first stresses constant factors in communist policies, that is, the drive to implement the communist social project; the second current attaches more importance to the already existing limitations on state violence, coercion, and intolerance, which, according to the pragmatist view, can be strengthened and extended.

[35]The underground bi-weekly *Kos* (121 issues had been published by June 1987) has published columns contributed by the Helsinki Committee, the Social Committee for Science and Academic Research (SKN), and by Freedom and Peace. The SKN publishes *Serwis Informacyjny* (Information Service)—51 issues had come out by June 1987). Freedom and Peace activists have tried repeatedly to convince Western pacifists that peace is (or, at least, is also) endangered by the East. One of the Freedom and Peace activists signed a protest against American policy towards Nicaragua (balanced by some words against Soviet policy in Afghanistan). This attitude is far from common. When a *Kos* columnist condemned the American military action in Grenada, many readers returned copies of the paper.

[36]See "Underground Society 1987," an interview with Wiktor Kulerski in *Kultura* (Paris) 1987, No. 4 (475). For an English translation see Committee in Support of Solidarity, *Special Reports* (New York), July 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Radicals opt for a more forceful opposition but, so far, they have not gone beyond disseminating ideas in their publications. Moderates look for contacts with the authorities and try to convince them that both sides would be better off if the authorities made a few concessions. While both radicals and moderates do not seek the authorities' permission for their activities, the moderates are mindful that official tolerance is usually contingent on one's behavior. Taken as a whole, Solidarity's known current and prospective leaders are less anti-Soviet and less anti-communist in their pronouncements than are political commentators and editors identified only by pen names.

The opposition is in agreement about the problems in Poland and their magnitude, even if it does not always agree on how to resolve them. Indeed, there are many serious problems warranting attention and action. The economy is in a state of permanent crisis and decomposition, and the ecological situation is deteriorating. The opposition groups raise the alarm and try to mobilize people to compel the authorities to do something about a problem. Their efforts are not too successful, but the authorities' negligence does not diminish the opposition's wish to improve the state of the economy,[37] the ecological situation of the country,[38] housing,[39] the state of national health,[40] or education.[41] In today's Poland, the hardships of everyday life are sufficiently great to occupy most of the people's attention. The situation of the retired is deplorable. Peasants feel insecure because of recurring threats of collectivization. Inflation grows.

The opposition reflects the dilemmas existing in Polish society as a whole, namely, the simultaneous adherence to values that are not always mutually compatible. Thus, although people subscribe to multiple values such as freedom, social welfare, social security, national interest and national solidarity, and they agree that these are often imperiled by the government, when these values come in conflict "liberals" choose to defend freedom, "socialists" choose social welfare and social security, and "nationalists" opt for national interest and national solidarity. In the polemics among members of the opposition, those who have socialist inclinations see a threat in attitudes that they describe as nationalist. Others see a threat in egalitarian attitudes and in state omnipotence, which, in their opinion, leads to dependence and a lack of individual responsibility, especially in economic matters.

Many political writers agree that these controversies are difficult to place on a right-left continuum but, if faced with a choice, those on the right would like to see more market mechanisms and more private enterprises, while those on the left would opt for economic democracy defined mainly as self-management in state-owned enterprises.

The role of the underground is also a subject of dispute. For some, its independence ranks among the highest achievements of today's Poland (together with the strength of the Catholic Church and with private agriculture); others would like to act legally, to receive at least tacit official assent, to enlarge oppositional possibilities by being active in official scientific associations, in Church-supported organizations, or in self-governing bodies in industry or the universities. Those who subscribe to the latter view, see avenues for social action other than underground opposition or complete subordination. Despite the existing constraints, these people are trying to act as they wish but in ways that meet with official acceptance or toleration.[42]

[37]Controversies over the extent of desirable privatizing are revealed already in the annexes to the Solidarity Program. See also *Polska 5 lat po sierpniu* (Poland 5 Years after August), Warsaw, Międzyzakładowa Struktura Solidarności, 1985, part 2: "Gospodarka w kryzysie" (Economy in Crisis), republished in London by Aneks, 1986; *Polska 1985, Spojrzenie na gospodarkę* (Poland 1985, A Look at the Economy), Paris, Editions Spotkania, 1985.

[38]On the ecological situation and other problems of postwar Poland, see *40 lat władzy komunistycznej w Polsce* (40 Years of Communist Power in Poland), London, Polonia, 1986. See also *Polska lat osiemdziesiątych: Stan środowiska przyrodniczego* (Poland in the 1980's: The State of the Natural Environment), Warsaw, Przedświt, 1984, in the series *Zeszyty Edukacji Narodowej*.

[39]Building of housing does not seem to be one of the government's priorities. The average wait for an apartment in state-sponsored cooperatives is more than a dozen years. An initiative to help supplement the government's efforts by private investment and construction has been launched, and it represents one of the ways in which Poles are rediscovering the positive side of capitalism. The monthly *Murator* (Mason), published with official permission, tries to instruct private investors and builders of family dwellings how to surmount technical and bureaucratic obstacles.

[40]One of the measures of independent activity in the field of hea th care is the richness of underground periodicals dealing with problems of the medical professions. Among them are: *Samarytanka* (Samaritan, Wrocław), *Biuletyn Niezależnej Służby Zdrowia* (Bulletin of the Independent Health Service, Kraków), *Głos Medyka* (Physician's Voice, Warsaw), *Zeszyty Niezależnej Myśli Lekarskiej* (Notebooks of Independent Medical Opinion) published by the underground Social Committee on Health (Społeczna Komisja Zdrowia).

[41]The penultimate version of the law on higher education dates from May 1982. The government considered this version—enforcing state and party control over the universities—to be insufficient. The last version of July 1985 went even farther in limiting academic independence and self-government. Widespread protests by the academic community were of no avail. See *A Report on the State of Higher Education, Academic Research, and Science in Poland*, prepared by the Social Committee for Science and Academic Research (Społeczny Komitet Nauki), trans. by the Committee in Support of Solidarity, New York, 1986. See also *Społeczność Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego wobec projektu nowelizacji ustawy z dnia 4 maja 1982 r. o szkolnictwie wyższym* (The Warsaw University Community on the Project of Amendments to the Law on Higher Education of 4 May 1982), 2 vols., Warsaw, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1985.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The August 1980 negotiations still influence perceptions about the goals of the opposition. During the state of war, several Solidarity activists hoped for a dialogue with the authorities. The authorities did a lot to limit Solidarity's organizational possibilities (by delegalizing it and other organizations) and they refrained from engaging in dialogue with Solidarity as such. They preferred to talk with individuals of their own choosing who did not have the backing of independent organizations behind them. Nevertheless, the anticipation of dialogue influenced the language of oppositional writers and activists. Some were ready to concede that socialism was a good thing or to attack American policy toward Poland, and in this way to send signals of their willingness to talk with the authorities. Other groups objected to such unclear symbolic gestures and felt that they had to be counterbalanced. A few, more politically oriented underground organizations have emerged alongside Solidarity–for example, Fighting Solidarity (which publishes bulletins in a few towns),[43] and socialist[44] and liberal-democratic groupings[45] whose main activity is to spread their ideas, and to publish current information, political programs, and commentary on the recent history of Poland.

The interest among Poles in modern history has been profound, especially after the establishment of Solidarity enlarged the possibilities for independent publications and discussions. The causes leading to the loss of Polish independence, the triumphs and tribulations of idealist and realist policies and politicians, evaluations of the 19th-century uprisings—are all subjects for books, essays, and commentaries. Books on officially forgotten aspects of Polish modern history are often written by Poland's best historians and published underground.[46] The two underground publications that were probably most in demand in 1984/85 were books based on interviews: one with the party leaders of Stalinist Poland and the other with Solidarity's underground leaders.[47] Solidarity Archives, a document series on Solidarity's legal existence, was started after the state of war was lifted.[48] A major task of the underground continues to lie in providing current information, often in the form of well researched articles on economic, ecological, legal, or educational matters.[49]

Contemporary Polish literature now and again removes itself from the surrounding reality and finds its subject in ancient values and civilizations, in personal experience, discussions of other writers, or in science-fiction about other planets where dangerous totalitarian

[42]The release of political prisoners in September 1986 enlivened disputes over open versus hidden activities. Most Solidarity leaders remaining in hiding until September/October 1986 decided to come into the open. The Temporary Solidarity Council was created at the end of September 1986, and in the course of October several regional bodies were created and their composition was made public. Still, there were activists who, without actually being in hiding, did not advertise their activism to the authorities. The relationship between disclosed and undisclosed leaders, organizations, and activities is far from clear. One can suppose that the police were interested in tracing contacts between disclosed leaders and undisclosed activists, especially the ones involved in the printing network or in the financing of oppositional activities.

[43]Solidarność Walcząca (Fighting Solidarity) started in 1982 in Lower Silesia (Wrocław region). Among its publications is an informational weekly, *Solidarność Walcząca*, appearing in different versions in Wrocław, Poznań, Lublin, and Gdańsk; *Biuletyn Informacyjny Solidarności Walczącej* (Information Bulletin of Fighting Solidarity, Wrocław); *Biuletyn Dolnośląski* (Lower Silesian Bulletin); *Wiadomości Bieżące* (Current News); *Replika* (Copy, Lower Silesia); *Podziemny Informator Katowicki* (Underground Katowice Bulletin); *Wolni i Solidarni* (Free and United, Katowice); *Gryf* (Gryphon, Western Pomerania); *Galicja* (Galicia, Rzeszów); and *Czas* (Time, Poznań). There are Fighting Solidarity publications in languages other than Polish, for example, the bulletin *Nazory* (Opinions) in Czech, and leaflets in Russian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian.

[44]Socialist views have been expressed in an independent political quarterly, *Krytyka* (Critique, Warsaw), No. 4, pp. 86–90, of the London re-edition by Aneks. *Krytyka* has appeared since 1978; 22 issues, often over 200 pages long, have been published so far.

[45]To the liberal-democratic groupings belong the Liberal Democratic Party "Independence" (Liberalno-Demokratyczna Partia "Niepodległość") or groups connected with such underground periodicals as *13* and *Stańczyk*. The writers of "Niepodległość" have often criticized views that they consider socialist and conciliatory. There have been polemics in the underground press over whether democracy or freedom is easier to realize. The point has been made that a greater degree of freedom (especially in the economy) is more compatible with communism than a greater degree of democracy (especially in politics). See the interview with Piotr Wierzbicki in *Obecność* (Presence, Wrocław) 1986, No. 14, pp. 61–72. See also Józef Darski, Ed., *Niepodległość, miesięcznik polityczny: Wybór z pierwszych 28 numerów* (Independence, Political Monthly: A Selection from the First 28 Issues), London, Polonia, 1985.

[46]For example, Leopold Jerzewski, *Dzieje sprawy Katynia* (The History of the Katyn Affair), Warsaw, Głos, 1980 and 1981, and Antoni Jałowiecki, *Kalendarz historyczny* (Historical Calender—a History of Poland), Warsaw, Głos, 1986—two books written pseudonymously by the late Jerzy Łojek; Andrzej Albert, *Najnowsza historia Polski* (A History of Modern Poland), Vol. 1: 1918–1939, Vol. 2: 1939–1945, Warsaw, Krąg, 1983; Vol. 3: 1945–1956, Warsaw, Pokolenie, 1986; Łukasz Socha, *Te pokolenia żałobami czarne. Skazani na śmierć i ich sędziowie, 1944–1954* (The Generation in Deep Mourning. Those Condemned to Death and their Judges, 1944–1954), Warsaw, Nowa, 1986.

[47]See Maciej Łopiński, Marcin Moskit, and Mariusz Wilk, *Konspira* (Conspiracy), Warsaw, Przedświt, 1984; and Teresa Torańska, *Oni* (They), Warsaw, Przedświt, 1985.

[48]An example from the series is a 300-page book on the last session of Solidarity's National Commission: *Komisja Krajowa NSZZ "Solidarność", Posiedzenie w dniach 11–12 grudnia 1981* (National Commission of Solidarity, the Session of 11–12 December 1981), Warsaw, Nowa, 1986.

[49]According to the information available to *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, there were 404 different underground newspapers appearing at the end of 1985, of which 210 had been appearing at least since the end of 1983. Among the best informational weeklies one can list the following (the number indicates the last issue to have reached the author by June 1987): *Wola* (Will, but also the name of a Warsaw quarter, 226), *Tygodnik Mazowsze* (Mazovian Weekly, 215), *CDN, Głos Wolnego Robotnika* (To Be Continued, Voice of the Free Worker, 200), *Przegląd Wiadomości Agencyjnych* (Review of Agency News, 105)—all in Warsaw; *Z dnia na dzień* (From Day to Day, Wrocław 443), *Mało Polska* (Little Poland, Kraków, 204) *Informator* (Report, Lublin 131). Several informational newspapers appear in specific plants, for example, the bi-weekly *Hutnik* (Metallurgist) in Kraków (139), *Grot* (Arrow-Head) in Świdnik (111).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

regimes expand their control over the inhabitants.[50] However, owing partly to the possibility of being published by independent presses (underground or émigré), the contemporary reality is palpably present in the Polish literature of the 1970's and 1980's (as in Tomasz Staliński's and Tadeusz Konwicki's novels or in Marek Nowakowski's short stories).[51]

With respect to the Catholic Church, the authorities still do not fully recognize its legal status, and diplomatic relations with the Vatican have not yet been reestablished. But the Church seems to be stronger now than ever: new churches are being built; there are more practicing Catholics; vocations are numerous; and even Church access to the mass media, though still limited, is better than before. Since the early 1980's several dioceses and religious orders have received permission to publish their own periodicals. They are heavily censored but independent, and deal with matters not strictly confessional.[52] The Church does not refuse to be engaged in public life, even in economic matters, though the endeavors to establish an agricultural foundation under the auspices of the Church have been blocked by the government.[53] Under the protection of the Church, lectures and artistic performances are organized which give artists and writers the possibility to show their work to audiences desperately looking for the truth, including truth in art (however difficult it might be to determine what truth in art is).[54]



Jerzy Giedroyc, editor for 40 years of the Paris-based Polish monthly Kultura, *has had a major influence on the thinking of the critical intelligentsia in Poland.*

—Photo from *Quarantième anniversaire de* Kultura, *1946–1986* (The 40th Anniversary of *Kultura*, 1946-1986), Paris, Les Amis de Kultura, 1986.

Independence (national independence)—the goal of political efforts and the subject matter of Polish literature for more than a hundred years prior to World War I—has become, once again, a reference point of artistic symbols, and a goal for action. It is generally accepted—as it was in the 19th century—that different ways can be chosen to reach this goal. The ominous and pervasive Soviet presence in Poland inclines those aspiring to independence to choose rather roundabout ways to preserve their assets, and to bide their time. It is easier (however necessary it may be) to talk and write about the need for independence than to predict the date of its realization. Polish opposition groups under-

[50]Stanisław Lem, a prolific author of science fiction novels and essays with a sociological and philosophical background, is probably the most translated contemporary Polish author.

[51]Between 1967 and 1976, Stefan Kisielewski has had published in Paris by Instytut Literacki five novels on contemporary Poland under the pen name Tomasz Staliński (in 1980 he disclosed his identity). Three of Tadeusz Konwicki's books became special issues of the independent literary quarterly *Zapis* (Nos. 3, 10, 21, in 1977, 1979, and 1982, respectively); see also Tadeusz Konwicki, *The Polish Complex*, trans. by Richard Lourie, New York, Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1982. From 1982 until 1986, Instytut Literacki has published five volumes of Marek Nowakowski's short stories, several of them dealing with martial law. See also Marek Nowakowski, *The Canary and Other Tales of Martial Law*, trans. by Krystyna Bronkowska, London, Harvill Press, 1983.

[52]Among the renewed publications one can list the Jesuits' monthly *Przegląd Powszechny* (Universal Weekly), founded in 1884, renewed in 1982; the Michaelites' bi-weekly for youth *Powściągliwość i Praca* (Restraint and Work) first published in 1898, renewed in 1983; and the Warsaw archdiocese's weekly *Przegląd Katolicki* (Catholic Review) established in 1863, renewed in 1984.

[53]Negotiations between the organizational committee of the agricultural foundation and the government's representatives ended in September 1986 after four years because of the government's insistence to have a decisive voice regarding the foundation's projects. In a parallel effort, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund have been approaching the government in Poland with projects aimed at the development of large-scale food processing plants for export production since 1982. The orientation of the agricultural foundation under the auspices of the Church was different; its principal concern was to develop the private sector and to improve consumption in Poland.

[54]On independent art since the state of war, see *Polska 5 lat po sierpniu*, part 4: "Oświata, nauka, kultura" (Education, Science, Culture), Warsaw, Międzyzakładowa struktura "Solidarności," 1985, published also in London by Aneks in 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stand very well that if the Poles themselves forget about their independence, no one else will remind them of it. Ongoing discussions about particular political actions being premature or too late, too fast or too slow, are often implicitly connected to the aim of independence. The opposition is trying to built conditions for national independence, and this is the distant aim of many oppositional—and not only oppositional—activities.

The goal of Polish independence has also been nurtured abroad by émigré institutions—including political and cultural ones—which have retained links to what is happening in Poland. Polish politicians and soldiers who found themselves in the West as a result of World War II preserved the state's institutions, including political parties and cultural associations, first in France and later in Great Britain. But in the foreground of socio-cultural émigré efforts is the publishing center (Instytut Literacki) and the monthly, *Kultura*, published in Paris since 1947.[55] The review's publisher and editor for 40 years, Jerzy Giedroyc, chose to foster opposition to communism on several levels, including deeper ones than the purely political. In the 1950's, the monthly published two Polish writers who now are well-known in the West, the poet Czesław Miłosz and the prose writer Witold Gombrowicz. Their writings, on anthropological, cultural, even historiosophical issues, have had a marked influence on intellectual life in Poland.[56]

Some socio-political ideas propounded long ago by *Kultura* became widely accepted by the opposition in the 1970's. For example, *Kultura* has long stressed the need for an alliance between intellectuals and workers; it also advocated improving relations between Poles and their neighbors—above all the Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, whose existence in contemporary Poland has been officially forgotten except when it is convenient to use them in the official propaganda as scarecrows and scapegoats.[57]

Conclusion

Some features of the Polish opposition resemble those found in other East European countries. Marxist revisionism existed in the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and even in East Germany, for example. But the variety and durability of officially tolerated non-Marxist currents of thought, as well as the strength and role of the Catholic Church, seem to be specific to Poland. What is also specific to Poland so far is common action by a mass movement and independent intellectuals for the purpose of influencing the country's future. A key word often used by the opposition is the word *struktura* (structure), meaning the loose alliances, committees, groupings, or networks formed by people who generally are not in hiding but who act together and screen their activities from the authorities, who strive to destroy these structures and repress their members. In the Soviet bloc, efforts abound to isolate countries, social groups, and individuals from each other. Overcoming this isolation has been the major achievement of Poland's intellectual opposition.

[55]By June 1987, 477 issues of the monthly have been published, and Biblioteka Kultury (Kultura's Library) has put out 429 books, including 80 issues of the quarterly *Zeszyty Historyczne* and 50 volumes in the series *Dokumenty* (Documents).

[56]Several of Gombrowicz's novels have been translated into English: *Ferdydurke* in 1961, *Pornografia* in 1961, and *Cosmos* in 1967. Many of Milosz's works exist in translations: *The Captive Mind* (1953), *The Seizure of Power* (1955), *Native Realm: A Search for Self-Definition* (1968), *History of Polish Literature* (1969), *Emperor of the Earth: Modes of Eccentric Vision* (1977), *Bells in Winter* (1978), *The Issa Valley* (1981), *Visions from San Francisco Bay* (1982), *Separate Notebook* (1984).

[57]For a comprehensive description of contemporary relations between Poles and neighboring nations to the east, see the book of Kazimierz Podlaski, *Białorusini–Litwini– Ukraińcy. Nasi wrogowie czy bracia?* (Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians. Our Enemies or Brethren?), second corrected and extended edition, Warsaw, Przedświt 1984, republished in London, Puls, 1985. A Ukrainian translation was published by Vidnova, Munich, 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo

Michael Radu

The African National Congress (ANC) has long sought to portray itself as the South African government's only major opponent, the sole legitimate alternative to apartheid. Yet, it is only recently that this claim has been taken more seriously in the West, as is indicated by such things as the meeting between Oliver Tambo and US Secretary of State George Shultz in February 1987. This change in Western perception of the ANC and its role is due in large measure to the ANC's own successful propaganda campaign abroad coupled with the renewed international preoccupation with the situation in South Africa.

The growing attention being focused on the ANC calls for a critical assessment of the nature of this organization, its infrastructure and activities, its membership, and its degree of popular support within the country. Is it a democratic spokesman for the legitimate national interests of the majority Black population? Is it a purveyor of violent revolution? Is it unwittingly a pawn of the numerous members of the South African Communist Party (SACP) who have infiltrated it? Are these even the right questions?[1] Answers are not easy to come by, in large part because the ANC has been outlawed inside South Africa since 1960 (the Communist Party has been outlawed even longer, since 1950).[2] At least in part as a response to this status, it has developed a highly secretive and compartmentalized structure of decision-making in its political and military branches. The latter, Umkhonto we Siswe ("Spear of the Nation" in Zulu), is largely known by the acronym "MK." The number of actual decision-makers within the ANC is small, consisting mainly of members of its National Executive Council (NEC). Yet, not all NEC members are equal in importance, perform similar tasks, or (claims to the contrary notwithstanding) have identical loyalties. Some are first and foremost ANC cadres; others are cadres of the SACP specializing in front organizations, indoctrination, and propaganda. Members of both groups have allegedly been heavily involved in the conduct of military-terrorist operations.

Despite their organizational secrecy, both the ANC and the SACP have issued numerous public statements through ad hoc documents, speeches, and pamphlets, as well as through regular publications, including the ANC's *Sechaba* and the SACP's *The African Communist*.[3] In addition, interviews and testimony provided by past and present members of the two organizations reveal much about the intertwined histories of the two organizations.[4] The issue is not whether the SACP has

Michael Radu is a Research Associate of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (Philadelphia) and a contributing editor of Orbis. *A specialist in African and Latin American revolutionary movements and governments, he is author of numerous articles and books and editor of* Africa in the Post-Decolonization Era *(1984).*

[1]Coverage of the ANC ranges from the sympathetic treatment by the TransAfrica group or Thomas Karis (as typified in his recent "South African Liberation: the Communist Factor," *Foreign Affairs* [New York], Winter 1986/87) to the critical views of Black radicals close to the Pan Africanist Congress and of the South African government itself.

[2]Until 1950 (when the party formally dissolved itself in the face of an impending government ban), it was known as the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). The party was reconstituted underground under its present name, SACP, in 1953.

[3]Both are printed in East Berlin and widely available in the West. Less easy to find is the South African Communist Party's *Umbesenzi*, published clandestinely inside South Africa.

[4]The most important sources are the two massive volumes resulting from the 1982 US Senate hearings on Southern Africa; see *The Role of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and East Germany in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa*, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, March 1982, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1982, Vols. 1-2 (hereafter cited as *Hearings*). These hearings include mostly eye-witness testimonies from former members of the ANC, MK, and SACP. Additional important data, unchallenged by the ANC or the SACP, also appeared in the brief pamphlet *Talking with the ANC*, published by the South African Government's Bureau for Information,

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The 1985 funeral of assassinated United Democratic Front lawyer, Victoria Mxenge, in King Williamstown brought an attack by black mourners on a police car and the beating and burning of a policeman in a nearby field.

—Ian Berry/Magnum.

subverted or controls the ANC. Rather, what emerges is a picture of the ANC's own evolution over the years from a decentralized, voluntary, and loose organization, with an ethnically homogeneous Black membership, to a highly centralized, undemocratic, multiracial umbrella group, largely dominated by non-Blacks. It has changed from a semi-nationalist organization dedicated to the pursuit of civil and political rights for South Africa's Blacks, to a "vanguard" type of organization with strong Marxist-Leninist elements, operating on the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism," and pursuing anti-capitalist, "anti-imperialist" goals that are congruent with Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Pretoria, June 1986. Still another important source is Keith Campbell, *ANC—A Soviet Task Force?* London, Institute for the Study of Terrorism, 1986; despite its title and tone, this small publication provides a wealth of information based on original sources.

The author also conducted his own interviews with the ANC and with members of its front organizations in Zimbabwe (1985) and in South Africa (1984 and 1986), as well as with South African scholars, military personnel, and police. For obvious reasons, some of these sources did not want to be identified.

Origins and Evolution

The unique nature of South Africa on the African continent has shaped the peculiar characteristics of both the ANC and the SACP. The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 as a British dominion, making it the third oldest independent state on the continent, and one long associated with the West (through Commonwealth membership—until 1962—and through its participation on the Allied side in both world wars and contribution of forces to the UN peace-keeping mission in the Korean war). This plus the relatively developed nature of South Africa's politics (for all races) and economic structure help explain the fact that the ANC is by far the oldest "national liberation" movement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Long before "natives" in colonial Africa were allowed to vote, directly or otherwise, in matters affecting their lives, Blacks and Coloreds in the Cape Province enjoyed a qualified franchise. At the time of the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910, one in every seven voters on the Cape's common roll was Black or Colored. In

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1936, however, Blacks were removed from the common roll on the Cape and instead allowed to elect three white MP's. Blacks in the rest of the country, never on the common roll, were allowed to elected four white senators. Coloreds remained on the Cape Province's common voters' roll until 1956.

The ANC was founded as the South African Native National Congress on January 8, 1912, in Bloemfontein, at the initiative of a graduate of Columbia and Oxford universities, Pixley ka I. Seme, and other similarly well-educated Blacks (the Congress adopted its present name in 1925). It was intended as a mutual aid and political pressure group for Blacks and until at least 1928 remained a small, elitist, and conservative Christian organization devoted to promoting traditional African values. The early Congress was mostly interested in broad nation-building among all South African black peoples, although its founders, including Seme, were mostly Zulus (as we shall see, younger and more radical Xhosas largely replaced the Zulus during the 1940's).

The ANC took a generally pro-business posture and sought to elicit economic and political concessions from the government by means of petitions and peaceful demonstrations. It grew increasingly clear, however, that such tactics were not going to prevent further weakening of the Blacks' political position in the country, as demonstrated by their removal in 1936 from the common electoral roll even in the liberal Cape Province.[5]

From early on, there were deviations from the basically conservative orientation of the ANC. For example, in 1927, ANC President Josiah Gumede traveled to Moscow to participate in the 10th-anniversary observance of the Bolshevik Revolution. The delegation of which he was a member first stopped in Brussels for a meeting of the League Against Imperialism. Gumede was heavily influenced by the trip and stated upon returning: "I have seen the new world to come, where it has already begun,"[6] a view that hardly represented the predominant outlook of the ANC at the time. For such attitudes, among other reasons, Gumede was voted out of office in 1930. He was replaced first by Seme and then, in 1940, by Alfred Xuma, a more pragmatic but still basically conservative leader. Although Gumede was forced out of the ANC, his attitudes were not necessarily atypical for members of the ANC leadership, who have, over the years, demonstrated a penchant for having differing ideological aims, for pursuing different agendas, and for being active in outside organizations.

The first overt signs of cooperation between the ANC and the Communist Party of South Africa surfaced in 1928, when ANC Secretary General E. J. Khaile was also elected to the CPSA Central Committee.[7] This development came perhaps not coincidentally in the wake of a 1927 Comintern-imposed decision to shift CPSA strategy toward seeking a "Black Republic." The Comintern decision was putatively taken by Nikolay Bukharin after his meeting with CPSA Central Committee Member James La Guma, a South African Colored and one of the first non-whites to become prominent in the CPSA. La Guma had traveled to Moscow as part of the same delegation that included Gumede. In response to the Comintern decision, the CPSA also expanded its Black membership. From having few, if any non-white members in 1924, the CPSA by 1928 dutifully claimed 1,600 Blacks among its total membership of 1,750, although leadership still largely remained in white hands.[8]

The somewhat halting cooperation between the ANC and the SACP took on new life after 1941. With Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the CPSA became a fervent supporter of an all-out anti-Nazi war effort (having previously urged non-whites not to enlist in what it had termed an "inter-imperialist" war).[9] In response, the Liberal government of Jan Christiaan Smuts lifted most of the previous restrictions on the CPSA, allowing it to organize and mobilize under the guise of anti-fascism. It became increasingly clear, particularly after 1943, that the CPSA was taking advantage of the war coalition to pursue its own goals, including seeking and getting election or appointment to politically sensitive positions. This fact only strengthened Afrikaner opposition to the Liberal Smuts government, and as the latter progressively lost ground to all-out Afrikaner nationalists and racialists, the CPSA's clear advantage over the ANC in funding, mobilization, organization, and

[5]See Campbell, op. cit., p. 44.

[6]Both the SACP and the ANC have recently endorsed this early statement. See *Umbesenzi*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1986, p. 19; and interview with ANC President Oliver Tambo in *Africa Report* (New Brunswick, NJ), September-October 1981, p. 21. Tambo stated: "Official contact between the ANC and the Soviet Union goes back as far as 1927. Practical experience has shown our people and the ANC that President Gumede was not wrong in his assessment of 55 years ago . . . ."

[7]Henry R. Pike, *A History of Communism in South Africa*, Pretoria, Sigma Press for Christian Mission International of South Africa, p. 239. This overlapping worked both ways, with CPSA leaders like J. B. Marks becoming ANC general secretary in 1936.

It is essential to underline the clear distinction between the presidency and secretary generalship of the ANC, two offices which seem to have been occupied by persons of different party and/or ideological commitments since Khaile. Most of the time, the presidency has been occupied by persons (always Black) without known association with the SACP; the secretariat, on the other hand, has often been led by SACP members or SACP sympathizers.

[8]Pike, op. cit., p. 168; the same figures are given in *African Communist*, No. 65, 2nd Quarter 1975, reproduced in *Hearings*, Vol. 1, p. 409.

[9]See Jordan K. Ngubane, *An African Explains Apartheid*, New York, Praeger, 1963, p. 162. Two of the most vocal antiwar activists before 1941 had been Moses Kotane, a Black, and Yussuf Dadoo, an Indian. On Dadoo's role, see Richard Gibson, *African Liberation Movements*, New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1972. p. 42.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Nelson Mandela (left) and Walter Sisulu photographed at Robben Island prison in 1966.

—Gamma-Liaison.

propaganda gave it increasing influence within the ANC, which was headed at the time by the relatively ineffective Xuma.

At the same time, the ANC began to show signs of intense internal ideological struggle. In 1944, under the leadership of a dynamic activist, Anton Lembede, a group of very young Black professionals discontented with the ineffectiveness of the traditional ANC established the ANC Youth League (ANCYL), aimed at promoting African interests without cooperating with the "system." Among the most prominent members of the group were Walter Sisulu, Jordan Ngubane, Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo, Peter Tsele, and Duma Nokwe. Their original goal was to find an "African" ideology unspoiled by either pro-Soviet elements or the conservatism of the ANC old-timers.[10] From the start, however, the ANCYL project ran into serious problems. Lembede and his natural heir, Peter Mda, both died early (in 1947 and 1948), and the ANCYL was soon riven by factionalism.[11]

Nevertheless, the ANCYL scored an initial success in 1949, when Xuma was voted out of office and replaced by the more liberal (or pliable) Dr. James Moroka as ANC president, and ANCYL's Walter Sisulu defeated CPSA figure Daniel Tloome in a close contest for ANC secretary general. However, ANCYL's victory was limited by the fact that at the same time, veteran CPSA leader Moses Kotane, by then already a graduate of the Lenin School in Moscow (like J. B. Marks before him), and Tloome were elected to the ANC's National Executive Committee.

By the late 1940's, strong leftist, i.e., pro-communist, credentials were clearly not an impediment to attaining office in the ANC, at least below the level of the presidency. This was demonstrated by the narrowness of Sisulu's victory over Tloome. Not only did a known CPSA leader almost make it to the top of the ANC, but Sisulu himself soon demonstrated a growing dependence

[10]Campbell, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
[11]Pike, op. cit., pp. 281–82.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

upon the communists. This leftist tendency has grown with time. According to 1982 testimony of Bartholomew Hlapane, a one-time member of the SACP Central Committee, there were seven SACP members on the ANC "executive" (i.e., National Executive Committee). According to Hlapane, "all policy-making in the ANC was first discussed by the [SACP] Central Committee."[12]

"Entryism" at Work

In the postwar period, several sharp setbacks drove the CPSA to seek closer involvement in the ANC. The CPSA-sponsored miners' strike of 1946 was unsuccessful, and by June 1950, a new Nationalist government passed the Suppression of Communism Act, banning the party. The CPSA tried unsuccesfully to fend off the worst effects of the Act by declaring the party "dismantled" four days prior to the law's adoption.[13] The banning of the CPSA had the consequence, certainly unintended by the government, of driving party cadres into the ranks of still-legal organizations, first and foremost the ANC. What until 1950 had been a mildly successful effort by the party to influence the ANC, became a classic case of "entryism"—the start of the communist party's efforts to infiltrate and dominate all anti-apartheid groups, but principally the ANC.

With the weak Dr. Moroka as its leader, the ANC was influenced by the ANCYL, particularly its left-wing members (Mandela, Sisulu, and Nokwe), to engage in a massive campaign of civil disobedience—the Defiance Campaign—to protest the first apartheid laws, promulgated in 1951. This campaign was organized by a Joint Planning Committee, composed of Moroka, Marks, Sisulu, Yusuf Dadoo, and Y. A. Cachalia, of whom Cachalia, Dadoo, and Marks had been members of the "disbanded"-banned CPSA.[14] The committee met in Johannesburg, seat of the Transvaal ANC branch, the most powerful in the movement; at the time ex-Comintern agent Marks was president of the Transvaal ANC branch, and "ex"-CPSA member David Bopape was Transvaal ANC secretary general.[15] In a highly significant move, the Transvaal ANCYL branch conceded equal representation in the leadership of the Defiance Campaign to the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), a leftist-oriented group founded in the early 1900's with the merger of three Indian groups (the oldest being the Natal Indian Congress, founded by Gandhi in 1884) and led in the 1950's by Dadoo.[16]

Reginald September, a member of the South African Communist Party, active in the affairs of the Colored People's Congress and a member of the politico-military committee of the African National Congress.

—Camera Press.

Although the campaign was planned as one of peaceful demonstrations of civil disobedience, there were enough isolated cases of violence, including the mob killing of a nun, to provide the government with justification for the extensive use of force and mass arrests (among those arrested were Marks, Kotane, Dadoo, and Tloome). By the end of 1952, the campaign was called off, not, however, before providing the ANC a greatly expanded public following.[17]

In this period, the illegal communist party worked to set up or manipulate other "legal" front organizations in order to carry on its activities. In September 1953, the

[12]Ibid., p. 242.

[13]This was a futile attempt to allow party members and fellow travelers to maintain their legal positions, including membership in the Parliament and in local or provincial government bodies.

[14]Pike, op. cit., p. 280.

[15]Campbell, op. cit., p. 47.

[16]Ngubane, op. cit., p. 163.

[17]At the start of the campaign, Moroka called for 10,000 volunteers but only got some 8,500. By the end, the ANC membership had risen to 100,000. See Mary Benson, *The Struggle for a Birthright*, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1966, p. 160.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Colored People's Organization was established; it was later renamed the Colored People's Congress (CPC). The CPC soon came under the control of the SACP through leaders like Reginald September. In October of the same year, the Congress of Democrats (COD) was established, led by Bram Fischer (who would later serve as chairman of the SACP), Joe and Ruth Slovo, and Leonel Bernstein. Finally, in March 1955, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was founded; it soon affiliated with the Moscow-dominated World Conference of Trade Unions, and was controlled from its inception by SACP cadres like Stephen Dhlamini, Vuyisile Mini (hanged for MK terrorism in 1964), and Leon and Norman Levy. SACTU was led from the outset by Black Communists Moses Mabhida (later a SACP president) and Dhlamini, but unlike the other front organizations, it openly claimed multiracial membership. That at least SAIC, CPC, and SACTU were party fronts was implicitly admitted by *The African Communist* years later, when it quoted from a statement by the SACP Central Committee that, following the founding of the MK in December 1961, *"it was decided that the SAIC, CPC and SACTU should not do anything to jeopardize their legality by an open commitment to armed struggle."*[18]

The failure of the Defiance Campaign to change the situation of Blacks in South Africa pushed some former ANCYL leaders further left. In 1953, with financial support from COD, a delegation including Sisulu and Nokwe visited Eastern Europe and the USSR. That visit, and the clear dependence of the ANC radicals upon the COD and "former" Communists in their own ranks for financial and organizational support, signaled the beginning of the end of the ANC's already shaky organizational independence.

Other events, too, helped to destroy the ANC's original identity and drive genuine "Africanists" from its ranks. The foremost of these factors was, ironically, the 1952 election of Chief Albert Luthuli as ANC president. A true pacifist, Luthuli was the closest any ANC leader has ever been to a Martin Luther King. Through sheer charisma, Luthuli might conceivably have maintained some balance between his own pacifism and the more aggressive tactics of a Sisulu or Mandela, and between the competing Communist and Africanist undercurrents in the ANC. Unfortunately, however, he was banned to rural Natal almost from the start by the Nationalist government. Communists and radicals in the ANC ranks refused to move the organization's headquarters from Johannesburg (where they controlled the Transvaal branch) to Durban, only 48 miles away from Luthuli's place of banishment. The result was that Luthuli was never more than a figurehead for the ANC, poorly or never informed of decisions taken in his name and out of touch with the developments within the organization.[19]



Albert Luthuli, elected president of the African National Congress in the 1952.

—Camera Press.

Taking maximum advantage of the precedent established by the ANCYL in 1952 of allowing equal participation of non-ANC groups in the planning of the Defiance Campaign, the CPSA remnants successfully pushed for the establishment in 1955 of the Congress Alliance, which included the ANC (by then effectively led by Walter Sisulu, due to Luthuli's banning), SAIC, COD, CPC, and SACTU. The formation of the Alliance meant the combination of an already heavily Communist-infiltrated organization (the ANC) with four Communists fronts, all having equal standing in the coordinating committees of the umbrella organization.[20]

[18]"The Enemy Hidden under the Same Colour," Statement of the CC of the SACP, in *African Communist*, No. 65, 2nd quarter 1975, loc. cit. (emphasis in original text).

[19]Ngubane, op. cit., pp. 583-85; and Campbell, op. cit., p. 47.
[20]See Gibson, op. cit., p. 51; and Campbell, op. cit., p. 46.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The same organizational principle governed membership on the committee formed to draft a "Freedom Charter" for the Alliance, a document that till this day remains the fundamental statement of the ANC outlook. Drafting of the Charter was undertaken very "discreetly," (even though all Alliance member organizations were legal at the time), and Luthuli himself did not even see the text until after it was publicly adopted.[21] A majority of the drafting committee was non-Black or non-ANC; the most prominent of the drafters were Bernstein and Joe Slovo of the COD, Dadoo, Tloome, and Dhlamini—people for whom strictly African affairs were less vital than were ideological and internationalist considerations. This may explain the fact noted by observers on both the left and right that the Freedom Charter had a strong "European" flavor. Indeed, the language was a departure from traditional ANC concerns with political representation and economic opportunity for Blacks, but was similar to communist documents elsewhere. The document did not even mention the principles of "one man, one vote," Pan Africanism, or African decolonization. Such concerns were only to become part of the standard ANC language a few years later.[22]

The tactics evident in the drafting of the Charter were also observable in the procedures utilized to achieve adoption of the Charter at a "Congress of the People," held at Kliptown, near Johannesburg, June 25-26, 1955. Luthuli, the ANC president, was neither present, nor consulted; some 1,000 of the 3,000 participants were non-Black,[23] and one may assume that the bulk of the Blacks who attended were from SACTU. There was no debate, and the Charter was "approved" by acclamation. Moreover, when in April 1956, the document was submitted for ratification by the ANC as an official document, the Charter's supporters ensured its ratification by packing the meeting hall with non-ANC members, who were allowed to vote. As a participant described matters:

The check on members was only done during the Sunday afternoon session. The Charter had been adopted on Saturday evening. Everybody present in the hall participated in the voting. It was impossible to distinguish members from non-members of the African National Congress.[24]

With the formation of the Congress Alliance and the tactics used for the drafting, adoption, and ratification of the Freedom Charter, the ANC permanently lost its political innocence. It in effect adopted the ideas and tactics of its members from the former CPSA. This process, which was consummated in the period 1953-56 and clearly—at least in retrospect—was part of a carefully planned strategy on the part of the CPSA remnants, alienated many of the young Black nationalists in the ANC ranks, most of whom left in 1959 to found the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC).

The banning of the ANC itself in 1960 only helped to consolidate the transformation of the organization. While retaining its venerable name, the ANC had for all practical purposes become, and remains to this day, a Leninist organization in its internal structure, a Marxist one in its political goals, and an ally of the USSR in its geopolitical aims. Let us now examine each of these attributes in more current detail.

The Structure of the ANC

The ANC today comprises three components: (1) a sophisticated system of successive concentric layers of legal fronts and/or sympathetic organizations and a separate, independent and highly compartmentalized, if small, MK infrastructure inside South Africa; (2) a tightly-knit external organization, based in Lusaka, Zambia, which reflects in its composition the overlapping of the SACP and the Congress Alliance of the mid-1950's; and (3) the MK, the overwhelming majority of which is based in Angolan camps, with small numbers of operatives within South Africa. Although the putative apex of all these elements is the National Conference, in fact, the apex is the National Executive Committee with its 30 members, and, above it, the Revolutionary Council (since its 1983 "disbandment" known as the politico-military committee).[25] The NEC and Revolutionary constitute a largely self-perpetuating group within the ANC with exclusive decision-making power.

[21]See Campbell, op. cit., p. 47. This is in line with the general treatment of Luthuli by his ANC "subordinates"—Moses Kotane actually only informed Luthuli at the last moment that the latter was also supposed to go to Bandung on the ANC delegation to the Afro-Asian Conference of April 1955. Ngubane, op. cit., p. 164. The banning of Luthuli was applied and lifted sporadically throughout the last 15 years of his life.

[22]For a text of the Freedom Charter, see Aquino de Braganca and Immanuel Wallerstein, Eds., *The African Liberation Reader*, London, Zed Press, 1982, Vol. 2, pp. 81-84.

[23]Gibson, op. cit., p. 53. According to this account, Dr. Wilson Conco, Luthuli's deputy in the ANC, presided over the Kliptown meeting where the ANC ratified the Charter, but afterwards he admitted that he had first seen the document only at the meeting; in addition, Luthuli never knew who drafted it.

[24]Peter Tsele, in *Bantu World*, Apr. 28, 1956, cited in Edward Feit, *South Africa, the Dynamics of the African National Congress*, London, Oxford University Press, 1962. p. 17.

[25]Alfred Nzo has characterized the Revolutionary Council as "the helm of the politico-military wing of our movement"; not coincidentally, Dadoo (whose nickname among friends was Mota) was vice-chairman of that

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

African National Congress (ANC) leader Oliver Tambo (left) and South African Communist Party leader and long-time ANC activist Joe Slovo pictured on October 29, 1986, in Maputo at the funeral of Mozambican President Samora Machel.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

The National Conference has been convened only three times since the banning of the ANC in 1960—at Lobatse, Botswana, in 1962; at Morogoro, Tanzania, in 1969; and at Kabwe, Zambia, in 1985. An SACP account of the Morogoro gathering sheds particularly clear light on the authoritarian nature of ANC decision-making. At that conference, the non-African members admitted to the ANC at the time were appointed by the ANC executive and were "neither singly nor collectively consulted on the composition of the new executive." Indeed, the NEC had previously mandated acting President-General Tambo, "assisted" by SACP stalwarts Kotane and Marks, to reconstitute the executive (selections that were ratified pro forma by the conference).[26]

By the time of the Kabwe conference, rank-and-file dissatisfaction with the secretive and "democratic centralist" authoritarian nature of ANC decision-making forced some modest concessions. It was decided that national conferences should be held at least once every five years.[27] In addition, a slightly more "democratic" face was shown by the naming of a list of 40 candidates to fill the 30 slots on an expanded NEC. Still, all candidates were hand-picked by the NEC, and the voting procedure was equally telling: delegates voted by blocs rather than individually. These blocs included groups that had been part of the Congress Alliance (SAIC, SACTU, CPC, SACP, COD); the MK; the ANCYL; the Angola-based party school (under MK leadership); the

body from the start until his death in 1983. See Alfred Nzo, "Mota Our Example," speech on the occasion of Dadoo's 70th birthday, in *Sechaba*, November 1979, p. 17.

The Revolutionary Council was "dismantled" as a show of democratization, but the decision was taken without the formality of a National Conference, which had not been held for 14 years.

[26]"The Enemy Hidden under the Same Colour," p. 30.

[27]Tom Lodge, "The African National Congress: Kabwe and After," The South African Institute of International Affairs, *International Affairs Bulletin* (Braamfontain), No. 2, 1986, p. 8.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Angola-based training camps (also under the MK); the Lusaka headquarters officials; the women's league; and representatives of the South African domestic front —presumably the United Democratic Front (see below).[28] The built-in advantage for SACP-controlled groups is evident.

The NEC, the Revolutionary Council (or successor politico-military commission), and the command-and-control hierarchy of the MK all constitute the decision-making structure of the ANC External Mission, headquartered in Lusaka. The leaders in Lusaka consist of persons who have lived outside South Africa since at least 1977, many of them since the early 1960's. Actual decisions are taken by a restricted, largely self-perpetuating group within the NEC, which includes two types of leaders: chiefs of major departments and the largely autonomous MK leadership.

The NEC has a number of subordinate departments, which vary in importance according to their role as well as to their leader's overall standing within the ANC leadership. Johnny Makhatini, officially the head of the International Department, is probably less influential than Francis Meli, the editor of *Sechaba*, at least in part because the former is a Zulu within an organization whose Black leaders are now overwhelmingly Xhosa.[29] The head of the Information and Propaganda Department, Thabo Mbeki, some of whose duties overlap with those of Makhatini's, is far more influential—both because of the natural importance of his task for an exile organization and because of his personal charisma and the appeal of his name (his father, an old SACP hand, has shared the same prisons with Nelson Mandela since the early 1960's). The heads of the Administration (Simon Makana), Education (Henry Makgothi), Research (Dr. Pallo Jordan), Youth (Joe Nhlanhla), and Women (Gertrude Shope) departments enjoy various degrees of influence largely due to their personal ties with top leaders like Tambo, Nzo, Modise, and Maharaj, rather than as a result of their function. A very important (and misleadingly labelled) "department" is that of Internal Reconstruction and Development, led by Maharaj. This department is in fact the internal intelligence and counter-intelligence body of the ANC, tasked with preventing infiltration and enforcing internal discipline and control over the rank and file. Equally important, Maharaj is also responsible for control over and coordination with legal ANC fronts inside South Africa, such as the United Democratic Front (see below).[30]

Although the Congress Alliance rubric disappeared in the 1960's,[31] the ANC remains an umbrella organization under which the Alliance's former "components" are still quite influential. The ANCYL is a department, and leaders of the CPC, SAIC, SACP, and SACTU remain prominent under various guises, particularly within the MK. September is in charge of internal discipline and counter-intelligence of the MK, Slovo of the SACP was (until 1987) MK chief of staff and responsible for its urban operations, SACTU's John Nkadimeng and Dhlamini maintain links with the legal trade unions inside South Africa, and the CPC's James Stuart appears to be the MK's ideological chief. Joe Modise, a former colleague of Mandela in the ANCYL, is commander of the MK and in direct charge of its rural operations, while Chris Hani, a "veteran" of the 1976 Soweto riots, is the political commissar. Hani, Modise, Slovo, Maharaj (and possibly Stuart), as well as Tambo, Nzo, and possibly a few others form the politico-military commission linking the ANC and the MK under the strictly nominal chairmanship of Tambo.[32]

ANC Activities Abroad

The vital activities of the ANC take place mostly outside of South Africa. They include propaganda/diplomacy, fundraising, and military and cadres training. The most prominent individual player in these activities is ANC President Oliver Tambo, a tireless world traveler. Tambo works both to isolate the Pretoria government in world opinion and to delegitimate the ANC's anti-apartheid rivals within South Africa, such as Chief Mangosuthu Gatcha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement among the Zulus, Bishop Isaac Mokoena's United Christian Conciliation Party, liberal white opposition groups, and independent Indian and Colored organizations. The ANC attitude toward the Pan African Congress is rather ambiguous. From time to time, some ANC leaders attack the PAC for its racist outlook, but as a rule, the ANC does not even mention its rival; on occasion—outside of South Africa—the ANC offers the PAC cooperation and

[28] *Africa Confidential* (London), Dec. 10, 1986, p. 2.

[29] Young and educated Xhosas have largely replaced the older, often Zulu leaders of the ANC. Rapid industrialization since the 1950's brought far larger numbers of Xhosas than Zulus to the urban areas, which are the major areas of support for the ANC. The development and growth of Inkatha during the 1970's provided most Zulus with an alternative to the ANC and further reduced the role of Zulus in it.

[30] On the ANC departments and leaders, see, e.g., "South Africa: The ANC," in *Africa Confidential*, Dec. 10, 1986, pp. 1–4; and *Talking with the ANC*.

[31] The Congress became practically defunct when its major component, the ANC, was banned in 1960.

[32] See fn. 30 supra. That the (Black) Tambo is not altogether master of his own house was suggested by Modise's call for anti-white attacks at the very time that Tambo was in the United States. See *The Sunday Mail* (Harare), June 22, 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At left, African National Congress President Oliver Tambo with US Black leader Jesse Jackson in London on November 3, 1985, for a march sponsored by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement seeking full sanctions against South Africa for failure to grant independence to Namibia and dismantle apartheid; at right, Tambo with Soviet Communist Party leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow on November 4, 1986.

—Magnum and TASS from Sovfoto.

fair competition for the allegiance of the people of South Africa. Inside the country, however, the competition between the fronts and their sympathizers is fierce, public, and occasionally violent.

The main centers of the ANC's propaganda/diplomatic efforts are London, New York, Moscow, East Berlin, Lusaka, and New Delhi. The oldest and most active of these is the London mission, set up following the banning of the CPSA in 1950 and greatly strengthened after the outlawing of the ANC itself in April 1960. Both *Sechaba* and *The African Communist* were initially published there (although they are now printed in East Berlin), and the London office has also been an important conduit for funds from Western sympathizers. Members of this office have become members of the NEC—most notably former office chiefs Aziz Pahad and Reginald September. It is interesting to note that from the outset, the majority of the staff has been non-Black.[33]

The ANC offices in New Delhi have usually been led by a member of SAIC, and have traditionally served as a link with the Non-Aligned Movement. Most of the ANC activities in the United States are undertaken at the United Nations or at least under the nominal leadership of the organization's mission there, formally led by Johnny Makhatini's office. ANC leaders and spokesmen have been free to travel in the US and even to use US platforms to advocate the murder of political rivals back in South Africa.[34]

The ANC and its auxiliary organizations maintain open ties with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with its major party or front organizations—*The World Marxist Review*, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Peace Congress, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the International Union of Students, the International Organization of Journalists, and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Most members of the NEC are also members of at least one of these Soviet international front organizations.

Links with the Soviet bloc ensure ANC funding, military supplies, training, and world-wide propaganda resources. The importance of these ANC-Soviet ties was highlighted recently by Tambo when he stated that the Soviet-bloc countries:

[33]This reflects the overwhelming preponderance of non-Blacks among former South Africans living in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the SACP has long had intimate ties with the British and the Irish communist parties. E.g., Francis X. Clines, in "Communists Claim Comradeship with Rebels," *The New York Times*, Aug. 1, 1986, mentions the joint participation of the SACP's Slovo; Gordon McLennan, General Secretary of the Communist Party Great Britain; and James Stewart, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Ireland at the SACP's 65th anniversary.

Among the essential players in establishment of the London office of the ANC were Maharaj, himself a former member and leader of the British party, and September.

[34]Appearing on a California campus on October 10, 1985, ANC spokesman Alosi Moloi, speaking about "collaborators" with the movement's enemies, stated: "You have to eliminate one to save hundreds . . . ." At the same gathering ANC spokesman Tim Ngubane stated: "We want to make the death of a collaborator so grotesque that people will never think of it [i.e., being one]." See Campbell, op. cit., p. 35.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have shown themselves to be allies we can always rely upon, a ***secure rear base*** *without which our struggle would be even more difficult and protracted . . . . As a movement, we need to . . . protect our friendship and cooperation with the socialist community of nations very jealously.*[35]

Practical cooperation between countries of the Soviet bloc and the ANC started in the mid-1950's and took on a new character just prior to the formation of Umkhonto we Siswe in December 1961. Already in the early 1960's, MK cadres were undergoing training under Cuban supervision in Algeria and later in Tanzania. A significant portion of the NEC received military training in the Soviet Union.[36] Weapons deployed by or captured from the MK in South Africa are uniformly Soviet-made—from grenades, to limpet mines, to rifles. They come via Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, while all major training camps for ordinary MK cadres are located in Angola.[37]

The enormous costs of the massive ANC propaganda campaign throughout the world, although covered by considerable funds from sources in Scandinavia and elsewhere in the West are presumably also covered by substantial Soviet funds flowing to the ANC through its ties with international communist fronts. These fronts promote the ANC's cause in their slogans and campaigns.

Domestic Activities

Although the ANC is still infinitely more effective abroad than in South Africa, it has found somewhat more room for its internal activities during recent years, particularly as a result of changes in the political atmosphere and relaxation of apartheid legislation. This favorable setting, however, disappeared with the more rigid government attitudes that brought the June 12, 1986, declaration of a state of emergency. The ANC activity now consists of recruitment for and the conduct of terrorist operations by the MK, and various political operations through a variety of legal fronts.

MK activities. The Umkhonto we Siswe organization, despite being officially active for almost three decades, is still ineffective and numerically small. Its two operational branches, rural and urban, are both deeply infiltrated by the South African police and intelligence (as, apparently, is the ANC political structure abroad). This was most recently demonstrated on July 9, 1987, when NEC member Cassius Make was tracked down and killed in Swaziland, apparently by South African agents, as a result of information provided by a middle-level ANC cadre who was actually a police agent.[38]

According to South African police sources, the MK is structured into three separate functional branches: suppliers of materiel, who infiltrate the country and establish ammunition, weapons, and explosives caches; middlemen, who supervise the transfer of supplies to the actual operatives; and the operatives, who tend to concentrate in urban areas. The first group is clearly the most effective, as demonstrated by the capture by the authorities of large caches, some in the immediate vicinity of Johannesburg. One such cache, including 880 pounds of explosives, was captured in that area in the spring of 1986.[39] The operations section of the MK is by far the weakest, as has been demonstrated by the high frequency of police penetration of the section, police captures of members, self-inflicted casualties, and generally inept selection of targets.

Almost without exception, MK weapons are of Soviet-bloc origin. The consistent use of Soviet-made limpet mines for urban terrorist bombings is identical to practices of the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, pointing toward identical sources of supplies, places of training, and mentality.

The majority of rank-and-file MK cadres are young Blacks from the townships around the Johannesburg-Pretoria-Vereeniging "Vaal Triangle," Port Elisabeth, and Capetown. Unemployed and unskilled, these youths are often lured by promises of education abroad into leaving South Africa, most often via Botswana. In most instances, they are sent to training camps in Tanzania and, particularly, Angola; the largest ANC camp is located at Viana, Angola. The total MK membership is difficult to assess—figures range from a high of 8,000-10,000 cadres abroad and 1,000 inside South Africa,[40] to this author's more conservative estimate of less than half that number, with no more than 300-400 cadres inside the country.[41]

---

[35]Oliver Tambo, "Storm over South Africa," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), January 1986, p. 87, emphasis added.

[36]Campbell, op. cit., p. 49. That author cites Stuart, Cassius Make, Mzwandise Piliso, Hani, Maharaj, and Francis Meli as those thus trained. It is difficult to imagine that ex-MK Chief of Staff Slovo also had not been so trained. Odessa and Perebelnaya are most frequently reported as training locations.

[37]See eyewitness testimonies of Delphine Kave, Jeffrey Bosigo, and Ephraim Mfalapitsa, in *Hearings*, Vol. 1, pp. 350-87, 454-529.

[38]Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Africa (Sub-Saharan)* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-AFR*), July 7, 1987. p. D/3; ibid., July 21, 1987, p. D/1.

[39]*The Wall Street Journal* (New York), May 21, 1986.

[40]*Africa Confidential*, Dec. 10, 1986, p. 1.

[41]An assessment based upon listings of casualties, numbers of incidents, and weapons captured, and well as information conveyed to the author in private.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is little evidence that the dramatic increase in violence in the townships beginning in 1984, which brought on the imposition of a state of emergency in June 1986, was initiated by the MK and even less that it was led by it; on the contrary, all indications are that "necklacing" and burning of houses, although encouraged and condoned by the ANC, its internal fronts and fellow travelers, and the MK, were largely the result of spontaneous, uncoordinated rage by roving gangs of youths—the "comrades." On the other hand, the ANC and MK have not been averse to boasting of the leading role of radicals within South Africa, especially in the townships. The MK has engaged in a variety of actions including bombings and executions of political foes, but in the process has suffered increasing casualties. It has not yet posed a significant threat to the government.[42]

Fronts and infiltration. The most important successes of the ANC within South Africa have come through the operation of legal fronts and infiltration of other existing legal institutions. In fact, the renewed ability of the ANC in the mid-1980's to use legal fronts within South Africa may be the most important development in the history of the organization since the founding of the MK in 1961.

The key legal front organization for the ANC has been the United Democratic Front (UDF), established in Johannesburg on January 1983. It is formally co-chaired by Albertina Sisulu (Walter's wife), and "former" ANC leader Archie Gumede. Among the other members of the UDF Executive Committee are Publicity Secretary "Terror" Lekota, National Treasurer Azhar Cachalia, and General Secretary Popo Molefe. The organization claims to be independent of the outlawed ANC,[43] a claim that the South African government did not explicitly contest until recently (see below).

The impetus for the formation of the UDF was opposition to President P. W. Botha's new Constitution, which established a tricameral parliament with segregated houses for whites, Indians, and Coloreds—and nothing for Blacks. The fact that the constitutional changes also resulted in a significant lessening of government restrictions on Black organizations, a result of years of reforms and domestic relaxation of political tensions, played a significant role in allowing the UDF to exist and expand.

Azhar Cachalia (left) and Albertina Sisulu, leaders of the United Democratic Front (UDF), hold a press conference on October 9, 1986, in Johannesburg announcing plans to fight in the courts a government order blocking access of the UDF to foreign funds.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

The UDF claims to represent a loose unity of some 700–800 individual groups. Originally, many of these groups were formed to press local demands, such as improvement in education and housing, but gradually the UDF came to unite these groups in opposition to apartheid.[44] Many of the groups have overlapping membership; some have only a handful of supporters. Among the UDF's most prominent supporters are some of the religious leaders of South Africa, including Anglican bishop Desmond Tutu (Black); Allan Boesak (Colored), president of the World Alliance of Reform Churches and one of the initiators of the UDF; and Afrikaner clergyman Beyers Naude.

Domestic financial support is quite weak, as was revealed after the government's October 1986 decision to declare the UDF an "affected organization"—i.e., to forbid it to receive funds from abroad. This was a severe blow, for as Cachalia himself admitted, over half of the UDF funds came from abroad, mostly from ANC supporters in Scandinavia, Western Europe, and the United States.[45] In recent months, the UDF has been further weakened by the detention and police interrogation of a

[42]For a summary and evaluation of MK actions in recent years, see Steven Mufson, "The War for South Africa," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 14, 1986, pp. H/1-2.

[43]It is impossible to verify the claim of Gumede and other UDF leaders that they have left the ANC, particularly since nothing in their statements or attitudes indicates any ideological change on their part.

Oliver Tambo has referred to the UDF in glowing terms: ". . . the ANC was pleased, to say the least, when the United Democratic Front was formed in South Africa. The UDF, that outstanding example of the political maturity of our people, is a product of the years that our country's forces of progress have spent . . . ." See "Storm over Africa," loc. cit., p. 88.

[44]Steven Mufson, "End of the Beginning in South Africa: The Fall of the Front," *The New Republic* (Washington, DC), Mar. 23, 1987, pp. 17-19.

[45]*Africa Confidential*, Jan. 21, 1987, p. 5.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A banner of the United Democratic Front, declaring "People Power" is seen at a February 19, 1986, demonstration in Attidgeville on the occasion of the funeral of a victim of an anti-government riot in that Black township.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

large portion of its leadership.[46]

The UDF openly supports the Freedom Charter and campaigns for the legalization of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela.[47] UDF members have been implicated in the "necklacing" of supporters of anti-ANC organizations such as Inkatha and AZAPO and in attempts to discredit or intimidate the leaders of the newly founded United Christian Conciliation Party. Although some elements of the UDF, particularly its "street committees," which the ANC sees as an important part of its "people's war" strategy, continue to operate in the townships, attempts by the organization to intimidate the Lebowa homeland authorities into making Lebowa become an ANC outpost failed. The "street committees," originally intended to initiate the establishment of "liberated areas," seem to be collapsing even in townships like Alexandra (located between Pretoria and Johannesburg). New housing is being built, parents are again insisting on sending their children to school, and police are back on the streets. AZAPO, Inkatha, and local vigilante groups of moderate Blacks have all begun to resist UDF-sponsored intimidation and violence openly and forcefully.[48]

Indians figure prominently in the UDF, despite the front's claim to be a multiracial organization. This is re-

[46]Lekota and Molefe have both been arrested and stand accused of treason; Cachalia is now the acting UDF leader, together with Albertina Sisulu. The replacements for Molefe and Lekota—Mohammed Valli and Murphy Morobe respectively—were themselves arrested in July, prompting Cachalia to admit that "This is a very severe blow . . . . The rest of the officials of the [United Democratic] Front are either in detention or hiding to evade detention." See *FBIS-AFR*, July 23, 1987, p. D/3.

[47]Zwelakhe Sisulu, Walter Sisulu's son, a committed Marxist trained as a journalist in the United States and an active UDF leader acknowledges that "rightly or wrongly, the UDF is seen as being in alliance with the ANC," and recognizes that "identification" with the Freedom Charter and Nelson Mandela is identification with the ANC. See interview in *Leadership* (Pretoria), No. 4, 1986, p. 38. The presence of Archie Gumede at the March 1986 funeral of Moses Mabhida (late president of the SACP and a long-standing member of the ANC's National Executive Committee) in Maputo symbolizes such identification. See The Economist, *Foreign Report* (London), July 31, 1986, p. 6.

[48]For a sympathetic but accurate description of the decline of the UDF and loss of support because of its use of violence, see Mufson, "The Fall of the Front."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portedly resented by some Black members; radical white supporters of the organization retain their own autonomy within the Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee.[49] The UDF's present evolution appears to reflect the mid-1950's developments within the ANC itself, with a few better-organized, better-trained, and politically astute non-Black members playing a disproportionately large role, at least behind the scenes (e.g., Maharaj is the member of the ANC's National Executive Committee charged with coordinating front organizations inside South Africa). Even more than in the 1950's, domestic legal, semi-legal, and underground activities are a more natural domain for non-Blacks, who enjoy greater freedom of movement and access to liberal or "progressive" political and religious circles. This has favored Slovo's urban MK operations, with their mixed racial staffing, as compared with Modise's predominantly Black rural activities. However, the abolition of influx control legislation in 1985 may facilitate the movement of Blacks into positions of greater influence in UDF and MK operations.

The second most important legal organization through which the ANC maintains a presence—albeit less direct and explicit—in South Africa are certain unions, particularly members of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The word "presence" here is important, for many COSATU leaders are not formally associated with the ANC as members, and COSATU retains functional autonomy from the ANC in practice as well as ideology. However, since the ANC and SACP accept the virtual demise of SACTU, they have looked to COSATU as the "progressive" voice of politicized labor.[50] COSATU is openly and vocally anti-capitalist, Marxist, and pro-ANC, and is prepared to use its industrial muscle for strictly political purposes. Leaders of COSATU made a highly publicized visit to ANC headquarters in Lusaka in 1986 to demonstrate that the unions were not subservient to the political wishes of the powers that be inside South Africa.

In July 1987, COSATU held a national convention at the University of Witwatersrand in downtown Johannesburg, where the group unanimously endorsed the Freedom Charter and called for closer ties with the UDF.[51] COSATU President Elijah Barayi stated: "There can be no freedom in this country unless the African National Congress is involved." UDF Publicity Secretary Murphy Morobe, sought by the police since the imposition of a state of emergency on June 12, 1986, told the conventioneers that the trade unions had become the most powerful antiapartheid force in South Africa.[52]

The nature and goals of COSATU are best defined by the congress's resolutions, adopted on July 17, 1987. Besides subscribing to the ANC's "Freedom Charter," it approved resolutions including: "A decision to forge links with worker organizations in Africa, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Angola, and Mozambique." The justification was that, in the words of Jay Naidoo, COSATU's newly reelected general secretary, "Workers throughout the world are victims of US-government-sponsored terrorism . . . in this country we are also victims of that kind of imperialism."[53] Barayi, reelected president of COSATU, stated: "We demand the right to share the wealth we produce . . . . We don't want all of it, only 50 percent. The rest we will take later."[54]

Unlike SACTU, COSATU is a non-white organization. It has personal and ideological ties to the ANC and shares similar aims and interests at least in the short term. Former SACTU bosses and SACP members Dhlamini and Nkadimeng appear to be the members of the ANC's NEC in charge of relations with this labor group.

ANC Ideology

Throughout the debate over the nature of the apartheid regime in Pretoria, or even over the "number of communists" in the ANC, there has been little scrutiny of the latter's ideology. One thing is certain: the ANC is emphatically not anti-communist. When Ambrose and Tennyson Makiwane were expelled from the ANC in 1975, together with six others, the NEC labelled them as "a clique based on the slogans of racialism, anti-ANC and anti-Communist."[55] It is ironical how the ANC's attempt to provide a multiracial image of itself has turned to the

[49] *Africa Confidential*, Jan. 21, 1987, p. 7.

[50] Joe Slovo has stated, "We are at one with Jay Naidoo, General Secretary of COSATU, when he said: 'Organized workers (in the trade union movement) are not representative of the working class as a whole, but they constitute its most powerful weapon.' The representative of the working class as a whole is a *political vanguard* which we claim to be." This seems to be tacit acknowledgement that the attitudes and aims of COSATU are compatible with the Leninist interpretations embodied by the SACP and its front, SACTU. See Slovo, "South Africa: In the Frontline of National Liberation Struggle," in *Information Bulletin* (London), November 1986, p. 19.

[51] *The Wall Street Journal*, July 22, 1987.

[52] See William Claiborne, "Union Chief Vows End to Apartheid," *The Washington Post*, July 16, 1987.

[53] *FBIS-AFR*, July 20, 1987, p. D/6.

[54] *Time* (New York), July 27, 1987, p. 49.

[55] See *Sechaba*, 2nd Quarter 1976, p. 41. At least two prominent ANC defectors who protested against SACP influence in the Congress were murdered in South Africa. Tennyson Makiwane was murdered five years after his 1975 expulsion (see Kave, loc. cit., p. 368), and Bartholomew Hlapane, a former member of the SACP Central Committee and star witness of the US Senate hearings, was killed with most of his family in Soweto in December 1982 (see *Congressional Record* [Washington, DC], Proceedings and Debates of the 97th Congress, Second Session, Dec. 21, 1982, p. 154; and *The Sunday Times* [Johannesburg], Dec. 19, 1982, p. 3).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

General Secretary of the Congress of South African Trade Unions Jay Naidoo (second from right) at a February 4, 1987, press conference announcing plans to support workers engaged in the country's longest retail trade strike.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

advantage of the SACP members in its ranks, most of whom are non-Black: to object to the communist influence is to automatically make oneself vulnerable to accusations of "racialism."[56]

The ANC has come to advocate a multiracial, democratic South Africa governed by the principle of "One man, one vote, majority rule." This tended to distinguish it from its Black "nationalist" rivals, such as the PAC and various ANC dissident factions (Lawrence Makhubu's in the 1960's, and the Makiwanes' in the following decade),[57] and may also have reflected the large non-Black composition of ANC leadership.[58] As the Freedom Charter put it, ". . . South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white. . . ."[59] To be sure, at his trial in 1964, Mandela saw as a "vital distinction" between the ANC and the SACP the former's policy of admitting only Africans (i.e., Blacks) and its commitment to "win unity and full political rights for them" contrasting with the SACP's "main goal . . . to remove the capitalists and to replace them with a working-class government."[60] But, five

[56]Even to object to Soviet policies was often interpreted as "racialism" as early as the late 1960's. See Omar Banjee, Amin Cajee, Hoosain Jacobs, and Maurice Mthombeni, "Why We Left Umkhonto we Siswe," quoted in Gibson, op. cit., p. 71.

[57]PAC's position is explicit; to it, "Azania" is made up of two distinct nations: ". . . one, an indigenous African nation and the other, an illegal white settler regime parasitically imposed on it." See *Azania News* (Dar es-Salaam, the official organ of PAC), April 1984, p. 13.

[58]According to ibid., p. 8, CPSA leader Rebecca Bunting, wife of party founder Sidney Bunting, went so far as to ask the Comintern about guarantees for minorities (i.e., whites) in the event a Black republic were to be established in South Africa.

[59]See Charter text, loc. cit.

[60]See Mandela, "I Am Not a Communist," in de Braganca and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 92.

Even in Mandela's days, the ANC bent its rules against admitting non-Blacks. An example was J. B. Marks, an old Comintern hand, a Colored, and a prominent figure in the CPSA-SACP. On the career of Marks, see Milorad Drachkovitch, *Biographical Dictionary of the Comintern*, Stanford, CA, The Hoover Institution Press, 1986, pp. 303-04.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

years later, with Mandela still de jure president and Tambo acting president, the differences had basically disappeared; the ANC in exile showed a much more clear Marxist-Leninist approach in stating that its struggle, while still "national," was taking place:

in a new kind of world—a world which is no longer monopolized by the imperialist world system; a world in which the existence of the powerful socialist system has altered the balance of forces; a world in which the horizons liberated from foreign oppression extend beyond mere formal political control and encompass the element which makes such control meaningful—economic emancipation. ***In the last resort it is only the success of the national democratic revolution which—by destroying the existing social and economic relationships—will bring with it a correction of the historical injustices perpetrated against the indigenous majority and thus lay the basis for a new—and deeper internationalist—approach.***[61]

Not only was Mandela's declared belief in Western democracy gone, but it had clearly been replaced with the traditional Soviet-style strategy of a two-stage revolution—"a national democratic" one, to be followed by a "socialist" one. The language of the ANC and SACP have come quite close to one another on this issue. Where the SACP's late leader Moses Mabhida quoted Lenin to the effect that "the national liberation movement is a necessary ally of the proletarian revolution,"[62] a recent statement by the ANC reads:

The national revolution . . . is the special province of the oppressed nationalities; the socialist revolution takes the form of class struggle led by the working class of all national groups. The two revolutions co-exist . . . . They interact. . . . They are as closely knit as Siamese twins. To separate them would need a surgical operation which might kill or cripple both.[63]

With such a unity of views, it is fruitless even to be concerned about whether personal ties link the ANC and the SACP.

By 1969, it was clear from a pamphlet prepared for the Morogoro conference that the rather vague language of the Freedom Charter on economic matters had come to mean the total destruction of capitalism, even of small

1985 Nobel Peace Prize winner Archbishop Desmond Tutu pictured during a visit to African National Congress Leader Oliver Tambo in Lusaka on March 22, 1987, during which Tutu urged the ANC to consider renouncing violence in South Africa.

—Reuters/Bettmann Newsphotos.

private property.[64] Attacks against "big" companies indicate hostility toward private property; indeed, the rhetoric of the ANC, SACP, and COSATU sounds similar to that of the pre-1979 Sandinistas, the pre-1975 FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), or the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and many other Marxist-Leninist revolutionary groups throughout the world. Moreover, the largest "company" by far in South Africa is the government itself. Control over it would mean control over 865,385 people directly employed, as well as 163,195 employees of non-independent homelands,[65] and their families. The known ANC admiration for FRELIMO, Robert Mugabe's regime in Zimbabwe, and the MPLA in Angola, suggests what the Freedom Charter's proposed "mixed economic system" would look like. Furthermore, the main ideologue of the ANC, Pallo Jordan, considers free-market economics "a hodge-podge of classical bourgeois economic theory and latter-day Japanese managerial practice" which he sees as "associated with the Thatcherite-Reaganite right wing in English-speaking Western countries."[66]

Moreover, the rejection in the same 1969 pamphlet of the notion that "our nationalism (should) be confused

[61]"Who Are the Liberation Forces?" pamphlet published around the time of the ANC's 1969 Morogoro conference. Text in de Braganca and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 85 (emphasis in original).

[62]In *African Communist,* No. 87, 1981, p. 16.

[63]*Sechaba,* June 1985, p. 8.

[64]See "Who Are the Liberation Forces?"

[65]*The Citizen* (Johannesburg), July 3, 1987.

[66]*The Weekly Mail* (Johannesburg), July 17–23, 1987. Jordan also expressed amusement at the naïveté manifested by the Afrikaner liberals who met with the ANC in Dakar the same month when they opined "You guys [the ANC] are far too smart to nationalize everything in the post-apartheid era."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with chauvinism or narrow nationalism of a previous epoch" was a direct attack against the PAC, a veiled one against Mandela's "ANC for blacks" idea, and a natural theoretical basis for the decision that very year to admit non-Blacks into ANC membership. Thus, by the time of the Morogoro conference, the ANC had practically ceased to be a "Black nationalist" organization and had openly sworn allegiance to "internationalism" in the Leninist sense of class alliance across national boundaries.[67] It is in this context that ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo states: ". . . the (ANC) and the oppressed and exploited peoples of South Africa are an important detachment, a vital and integral part of the anti-imperialist movement . . . ."[68]

Such internationalism entails not only "solidarity," i.e., support for all Soviet-aided groups throughout the world, but also consistent attacks against actions of the United States. On topics ranging from El Salvador and Nicaragua to the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, from demilitarization of the Indian Ocean to the issue of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the ANC has been as consistently loyal to Moscow's policy line as any Warsaw Pact regime. The ANC condemned US "aggression" in Korea in the early 1950's, and praised the Stalinist policies of the 1930's; moreover, it took Moscow's side in the Sino-Soviet dispute.[69]

The ANC has been transformed into a Marxist-Leninist organization in which SACP members fit naturally. This is probably the best interpretation of Oliver Tambo's 1981 characterization of relations between the two:

The relationship with the SACP is not an accident of history—the SACP has been an integral part of the struggle of the African people . . . . Ours is not merely a paper alliance . . . it is a living organism that has grown out of the struggle.[70]

Given the rare "positive alignment between the forces of class struggle and national liberation" pointed out by the late SACP Secretary General Moses Mabhida,[71] distinctions between SACP and non-SACP members in the ANC's leadership become largely meaningless.[72]

Conclusion

While claiming to be a "national liberation movement" like the Zimbabwe African National Union and Zimbabwe African People's Union in Zimbabwe, the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria, or the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the African National Congress is actually a revolutionary movement directed against an independent and sovereign government.

The evolution of the ANC has been unique. Launched as a "nationalist" movement aimed at the political liberation of Blacks and the forging of a national consciousness out of the disparate ethnic allegiances of South Africa's majority race, the ANC remained until the 1950's a largely semi-nationalist organization, enjoying an ethnically homogeneous membership and clear political goals. This is the ANC that is still supported by significant numbers of Blacks in South Africa, by many African countries, and by non-radical Western sympathizers. It is also an organization that no longer exists.

The recent excitement about alleged SACP "control" over the ANC is a sterile exercise. The crucial point is that the ANC itself has become a Marxist-Leninist organization. Communist penetration of the ANC proper is six decades old, and infiltration of the MK has been the case since its creation. Until the mid-1970's, when the last non-Marxists were purged, one could make a reasonable case for the existence of internal tensions within the ANC between Marxists and non-Marxists. Today, the only internal tensions are between the "orthodox"

[67]The pamphlet "Who Are the Liberation Forces?" used the term "internationalism."

[68]"Our Anti-imperialist Commitment," in *ANC Speaks*, Documents and Statements of the African National Congress, quoted in Campbell, op. cit., p. 27. In his Political Report to the Kabwe Conference, Oliver Tambo claimed that "the democratic, anti-feudal, and anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan has been saved with the support of the Soviet Union" (ibid., p. 28).

[69]Despite having received some help from China, the ANC unflinchingly supported the Soviet position in Moscow's disputes with the Chinese in the early 1960's. The collapse of the short-lived united front between the ANC and the PAC in the early 1960's probably reflected the Sino-Soviet quarrel. See Gibson, op. cit., pp. 59, 74-75. Gibson, himself a radical, notes that "the anti-China line adopted by the ANC was itself motivated from external sources and probably was the counterpart to continuing or increased Soviet material assistance."

[70]*African Communist*, No. 87, 1981, pp. 22-23.

[71]See "Unite under the Leadership of the ANC to End Apartheid! Statement of the South African Communist Party on the State of Emergency," *Information Bulletin*, August 1986, p. 41.

[72]Tambo told *Time* magazine that the ANC is "a body that is not the Communist Party but which has always had CP members since the 1920's. They have always behaved as 100 percent ANC men." See "We Are Nobody's Puppets," Interview in *Time* (New York), Oct. 27, 1986, p. 54.

The late Moses Kotane, former SACP secretary general and ANC treasurer general, made similarly implausible claims: "The fact that I am a Communist has never changed or interfered with my representation on behalf of the ANC. When I have been charged with a mission by the ANC National Executive, I have protected and promoted the interests of the ANC . . . . Likewise, when I have been charged with a mission by the Communist Party, I have stuck to the terms of my mandate and defended the interests of the Party. In the formulation of policy I never think of two organizations." From an interview in *Sechaba*, August 1968, reproduced in Braganca and Wallerstein, op. cit., p. 96.

It is difficult to imagine that a long-established Leninist party with credentials like those of the SACP would actually allow its presidents, secretaries general, or chairmen to receive orders from and act upon the interests of a "national liberation" movement.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(pro-Moscow) cadres of the SACP and the other "independent" Marxist-Leninists within the NEC. Both share the same general ideological premises and engage in similar practices regarding internal discipline and decision-making. Where they might differ (and the available evidence is insufficient to prove that they do) is over the racial factor in establishing leadership credentials—i.e., whether an ANC-controlled "Azania" should have a Black or a multiracial Marxist-Leninist leadership.

Given this evolution, the distinction made by some observers between "nationalists" and "communists" among the ANC leadership is really meaningless. Neither group seems committed to a true multiracial democracy in South Africa that would include all races in a power-sharing system guaranteeing both minority rights and property rights for all. Such a system is clearly incompatible with ANC rule, a fact that must be weighed in contemplating the movement's role in South Africa's political future.

The actual strength of the ANC inside South Africa, whether in terms of numbers or sympathies, is well nigh impossible to assess with any precision, particularly in light of the fragmented nature of South Africa's population. For instance, a significant sample of Blacks, when asked to express a preference for a leader of the country were divided between Nelson Mandela (9.7 percent), P. W. Botha (7.5 percent), Desmond Tutu (3.2 percent), and Chief Buthelezi (2.4 percent), and others, while 23.2 percent expressed no favorite.[73] Sympathy for Nelson Mandela runs high across ethnic, political, and age lines. Yet P. W. Botha personally and the "system" also receive high and very significant support among Blacks of all ages and religions, including persons in such symbolic places of Black victimization by apartheid as Sharpeville.

Of the Black movements, Inkatha claims at least one million dues-paying members, has a well-structured organization reaching most of the country, and includes at least some token non-Zulu members. Other new parties, mostly Black in constituency, that have been established recently, e.g., Bishop Mokoena's group and the still newer Federal Independent Democratic Alliance (FIDA) led by businessman John Gogotya, may in time coalesce anti-Marxist, middle-class Blacks of non-Zulu origin. Support for the ANC among Coloreds and Indians—except for a few prominent radicals—is probably lower even than among whites. As for the latter, repeated attempts by liberal or "progressive" elements to establish a dialogue with the ANC have found no echo among the whites as a group and have only strengthened opposition to the ANC.

The mostly teenage Blacks in the urban areas who spontaneously used violence in the name of, but not under the control of the ANC, now seem in retreat. What is left, the hard-core ANC support inside South Africa, is mostly a group of educated, often prominent upper and middle-class Blacks, some self-appointed "student leaders" of all races in elite universities like Witwatersrand, and union bosses of the COSATU type. The overwhelming majority of South Africans, and particularly that country's Black citizens, are still waiting for both solutions and leaders.

As things currently stand, the prospects for the ANC's coming to power are exceedingly slim. The struggle for the townships goes on, with more bombings and executions, but the overwhelming power of the South African state seems sufficient to crush the activities of the MK or UDF. Whether the shift of focus in recent months to activism by COSATU and its member unions marks a significant escalation in the political struggle remains to be seen.

[73]D. J. van Vuuren et al., Eds., *South Africa: A Plural Society in Transition*, Durban, Butherworths, 1985, pp., 346–47.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On *Perestroyka:* The Role of Workplace Participation

Russell Bova

DEMOCRATIZATION has been a central theme of Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign to reinvigorate the Soviet system, and his calls for increased "democracy" have extended to the Soviet workplace. The idea of worker participation in the management of production occupies an important place in the new law on state enterprises adopted in June 1987, which goes so far as to provide for the election of managerial personnel by the members of the labor collective.

Whether moves toward greater worker participation reflect a radical new departure in worker-management relations in the USSR or just a repackaging of existing practices is the central question to be addressed here. Since the Gorbachev regime's increased attention to workplace participation is simply one aspect of a much broader campaign for democratization and openness throughout the Soviet system, an examination of the current round of workplace reforms will help to shed some light on the character, significance, and functions of that broader campaign as well. Below, I shall first survey the theory and practice of worker participation under Leonid Brezhnev as a background against which to examine Gorbachev's reforms in this area.

Models of Workplace Participation

Before examining practices and prospects regarding worker participation in the Soviet Union, it is useful to remember that the philosophical assumptions about worker participation as well as the institutional structures through which such participation is channeled in the USSR have differed markedly from those prevailing in other countries, from capitalist America to socialist Yugoslavia.

The model of worker participation observed in the United States is a pluralist one. It assumes that society is heterogeneous and is composed of individuals and groups with differing interests and values which have their roots in such objective cleavages as class, occupation, race, religion, and ethnic background. The pluralist participatory model not only recognizes these differences, but politicizes them. The function of such a participatory system is, as one individual has noted, "to meet the demands that individuals, as maximizing consumers, actually have and are able to express."[1] Consequently, it is accepted and, indeed, expected that individuals and groups will articulate those demands and act on the basis of them in the hope of shaping public policy to conform to their particular interests. Elmer Schattsschneider has aptly termed this activity the "mobilization of bias."[2] In the process of that mobilization there inevitably are collisions of individuals and groups attempting to promote opposing interests.

The classic form of pluralist participation is interest-group politics, where one interest group competes with other groups in an effort to shape public policy. At the level of the workplace, pluralist participation is reflected in the collective-bargaining activity of trade unions. With its adversarial framework and unabashed pursuit of self-interest, the collective-bargaining process is a perfect illustration of pluralist politics. It is not, however, the only manifestation of pluralism related to the workplace. Union lobbying of government decision-makers, worker

Russell Bova is Assistant Professor of Political Science and Coordinator of the Russian and Soviet Area Studies Program at Dickinson College (Carlisle, PA). His research into Soviet and comparative politics has focused on issues of participation and of military attitudes toward economic reform in the USSR.

[1]C. B. Macpherson, "Pluralism, Individualism, and Participation," *Economic and Industrial Democracy* (London), February 1980, p. 24.
[2]Elmer E. Schattsschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People,* New York, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960, p. 30.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or union representation on company boards, and the activities of shop stewards aimed at protecting workers' interests all fall into this pluralist model.

The Yugoslav self-management model of workplace participation is fundamentally different from the pluralist model described above. Although the pluralist model accepts as natural an adversarial relationship among participants, the self-management model assumes—although not necessarily correctly—an essentially consensual relationship among participants. Conflict is viewed as a pathological deviation stemming from the system's immaturity rather than as an intrinsic part of the participatory system.[3] Once its shortcomings are overcome, it is assumed that society will become increasingly depoliticized. This having been achieved, participation is to be valued no longer for instrumental reasons but as an end in itself, contributing to individual self-development and satisfaction, and decreasing alienation.[4]

Given this assumption of social harmony, the role of worker participation is not to provide workers the opportunity to articulate their interests in competition with the interests of other groups, but to elevate workers, acting through the institution of the workers' council, to the position of the sole and ultimate legal authority in the economic enterprise. Their legal authority is comparable to that given in most Western nations to the owners of capital and that given in most communist states to the representatives of the state apparatus. To the extent that a scientific and technical staff is still required for the efficient operation of the enterprise or that managerial personnel must be appointed to look after the day-to-day affairs of the enterprise, they are subordinated to the self-governing workers.[5]

Industrial Democracy Soviet Style

In the Soviet Union, the system of workplace participation inherited from the Brezhnev period is based upon an explicit rejection of both the pluralist and the self-management models. On the one hand, Soviet theorists have traditionally rejected the notion that the pluralist idea of conflicting values and interests is equally applicable to socialist society. One scholar noted:

Socialist society has a much higher degree of oneness than capitalist society. It is an ***economic*** *oneness stemming from the unchallenged domination of public ownership of the means of production. It is a* ***social*** *oneness due to the absence of antagonistic classes and of relations of exploitation and competition. It is, lastly, an* ***ideological and political*** *oneness because in socialist society there are no parties pursuing diametrically opposite class objectives, because all its manpower and resources are directed toward achieving common socially useful objectives.*[6]

At the same time, Soviet theorists have also rejected the idea, inherent in the self-management model, that participatory politics in socialist society develops at the expense of the state apparatus. Although the Marxian notion of the withering away of the state remains a part of Soviet orthodoxy, the state, according to these Soviet theorists, does not wither away in the institutional sense that is suggested by the ideology of Yugoslav self-management. As one orthodox commentator has argued:

One can hardly accept the view that the withering away of the state is a process in which state functions are transformed into public functions, a process in which the state is, so to speak, absorbed by social self-administration. In this way public self-administration is unwittingly counterposed as a higher and more progressive type of social organization to the state organization as the lower, less-developed type. Understood in this way, public self-administration emerges somewhere away from the state and develops at its expense. It appears to draw on the moribund state organism for its vitality, gradually taking over more and more of its functions. I believe it is wrong to counterpose the state apparatus to people's self-administration.[7]

Instead, the withering away of the state is interpreted as a withering away of its political functions. The state apparatus continues to exist and to function in the role of the "value-free" manager of socialist society.

Given the nature of Soviet objections to the assumptions underlying both the pluralist and the self-

[3]Nagdan Pasic, "The Idea of Direct Self-Managing Democracy and Socialization of Policy-Making," in Branko Horvat et al., Eds., *Self-Governing Socialism,* White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1975, Vol. 2.

[4]Evidence on the actual operation of the self-management system suggests that conflicts of interest have not been eliminated in practice. The best evidence of this is the persistence of strikes among workers who believe the self-management system is insufficient to defend their interests. See, for example, Goldie Shabad, "Strikes in Yugoslavia: Implications for Industrial Democracy," *British Journal of Industrial Relations* (London), July 1980, pp. 293–315.

[5]Again, theory and practice do not coincide here. Most of the evidence assembled over the years suggests that the actual authority of managers and technical staff in Yugoslav enterprises is far beyond that granted by the law. See, for example, Josip Obradovic, "Workers' Participation: Who Participates?" *Industrial Relations* (Berkeley, CA), February 1975; Veljko Rus, "Influence Structure in Yugoslav Enterprises," ibid., February 1970.

[6]Viktor Afanas'yev, "The Scientific Management of Society and Socialist Democracy," *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), November 1974, p. 84, emphasis in the original.

[7]"Political System of Developed Socialism," ibid., June 1979, p. 35.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

management models of participation, it is easy to delineate the contours of Soviet-style or "collectivist" participation. Collectivist participation is, first of all, based upon the same assumption of a fundamental harmony of interests in socialist society that is reflected in the self-management model. This is not to suggest that such an assumption is accurate but that it has defined the limits of what Soviet authorities have officially recognized as legitimate participatory activity in the workplace or in other settings. Attempts to articulate individual or group interests that are in competition with the interests of other strata of society have been considered beyond the boundaries of legitimate behavior in the Soviet context. Legitimate participation is, instead, that which is directed at a cooperative pursuit of common social objectives.[8] In pursuing such objectives, participants do not replace, but supplement and assist the work of the state apparatus.[9]

The actual institutions that exist to facilitate collectivist participation by Soviet workers are quite numerous. They include such socio-political institutions as peoples' control committees, comrades' courts, the local soviets, and Komsomol and party organizations.[10] They also include several institutions whose focus is more exclusively centered on the workplace.[11] The 1983 "Law on Labor Collectives," for example, specifies that general meetings of the members of the labor collective must take place at least twice a year to discuss matters related to labor discipline, technical innovation, training, economic development, use of resources, collective agreements, organization and remuneration of labor, and the working, social, and cultural conditions of employees.[12] An extensive network of institutions also exists to encourage and support technical innovation and rationalization proposals from workers.

In addition, Soviet law states that all economic institutions employing more than 300 people are required to elect "production conferences" composed of workers, technicians, party members, and individuals from other groups found in the workplace.[13] The function of these production conferences is to discuss, evaluate, and oversee the same wide range of activities considered to be within the purview of the general workers' meeting. Decisions reached at both the general workers' meetings and the production conferences are supposed to guide the activity of yet another institution of worker participation in the Soviet enterprise, the trade union.[14]

While the specific functions and activities of all these institutions may vary, they do share some notable characteristics in common. They are, with few exceptions, essentially consultative institutions without formal powers to implement decisions in a manner independent of state and party authorities. They cannot, moreover, step outside the boundaries of collectivist participation to act as vehicles for the articulation and promotion of the goals of any "special interest" in Soviet society.

This limitation is characteristic even of the trade unions. Though Soviet unions can and, indeed, often do act to protect individual workers from managers' violations of labor law, they are severely constrained from promoting the special interests of workers when violation of existing law is not a factor. They cannot, for example, strike for better working conditions or mobilize workers politically in order to press for changes in laws and regulations in the same way that unions in pluralist settings do. The official function of Soviet unions might be described better as the upholding of Soviet labor law than as the defending of workers' interests.[15]

Pressures for Reform

Faced with declining rates of economic growth and lagging labor productivity, on the one hand, and the prospect that economic and political development might increasingly lead to pressures for greater political pluralism in Soviet society, on the other, Soviet authori-

[8]For a discussion of this theme in the East German context see Thomas A. Baylis, "Participation Without Conflict: Socialist Democracy in the GDR," *East Central Europe* (Boulder CO), No. 1, 1976, pp. 30–43.

[9]An exception is found in the Khrushchev period, when officially encouraged participation did seem intended to challenge the prerogatives of state officials. That tendency was quickly halted and reversed following Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964.

The contrasting approaches to political participation of Khrushchev and Brezhnev are discussed at length in George W. Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics*, London, Allen and Unwin, 1982, Chaps. 4 and 10. See also Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1980, p. 166.

[10]On these socio-political institutions see Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1979.

[11]For more detail on the participatory institutions discussed in the text, see Russell Bova, *Collectivism in the Workplace: The Participation of Soviet Workers in the Management of Production*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1985, Chap. 2.

[12]The full text of the "Law on Labor Collectives" was printed in *Pravda* (Moscow) and *Izvestiya* (Moscow) on June 19, 1983. For a discussion of this law see Darrell Slider, "Reforming the Workplace: The 1983 Soviet Law on Labour Collectives," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), April 1985, pp. 173–83. Also see Elizabeth Teague, "The USSR Law on Work Collectives: Workers' Control or Workers Controlled," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL), *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 184/84, May 10, 1984.

[13]*Spravochnik profsoyuznogo rabotnika* (Handbook of the Trade Union Worker), Moscow, Profizdat, 1978, pp. 73–74.

[14]For a detailed discussion of the activity and functions of Soviet trade unions, see Blair Ruble, *Soviet Trade Unions*, Cambridge and New York, Cambridge University Press, 1981.

[15]The limitation on the ability of unions to defend and promote workers' interests is further manifested in the requirement that Soviet unions also work to promote productivity and discipline among workers. See Blair Ruble, "Dual Functioning Trade Unions in the USSR," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, July 1979, pp. 235–41.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ties in the Brezhnev period looked to the promotion of collectivist forms of participation as a cheap solution. That "participation without power" might successfully promote the achievement of economic and political objectives valued by authorities was not exactly a notion unique to the Soviet Union. The "human relations" school of Western management theory has long stressed this very idea. In fact, Soviet writers in the 1970's cited Western management theorists of this persuasion and suggested, in some cases, that their ideas were applicable in the Soviet context.[16]

By the final years of the Brezhnev era, however, it was becoming increasingly clear to all interested parties that the success of the Soviet strategy was limited at best. Rates of economic growth continued to decline and appeared largely unaffected by the participatory system. In Poland, a very similar set of institutions of collectivist participation had clearly failed to deter worker activism or the rise of the independent Solidarity trade union movement. Although there were some circumstances (e.g., Polish nationalism, the Catholic Church, and gross economic mismanagement by the state) that made Poland an exceptional case, the clear message of rejection of collectivist forms of participation by Polish workers could not have been lost on Soviet leaders concerned about political stability in the Soviet Union.[17]

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the increasingly relaxed constraints on empirical sociological research, Soviet researchers were publishing findings that indicated a great deal of apathy among Soviet workers toward the institutions of participation found in the economic enterprise.[18] The problem was not that Soviet workers were uninterested in the idea of participation per se. On the contrary, a survey of workers in four automobile plants found that close to 85 percent agreed that it was both desirable and necessary to participate with respect to all questions affecting the enterprise.[19] Similarly, another study found that more than 40 percent of worker respondents agreed that it was necessary for each and every member of the labor collective to participate in some way, while an additional 44 percent suggested that though it was not always necessary that all participate, participatory opportunities should be available for those who desire to do so. Only 11 percent saw participation as completely unnecessary.[20]

Much less overwhelmingly positive are the data on actual levels of worker involvement in participatory activities in the workplace. An examination of data from seven industrial enterprises in the Southern Urals region of the USSR showed that the proportion of workers who "participated" ranged from a high of 30 percent to a low of 19 percent. Moreover, the data showed that anywhere from one-quarter to almost one-half of the participants in each of those enterprises were only nominal participants, i.e, devoted little time or energy to participatory activity. The number of active participants (defined as those who made suggestions, prepared questions, and generally devoted at least two hours a week to workplace participation) actually ranged from 13 to 21 percent of the workforce, with an average of 17 percent across the seven enterprises.[21]

It must be noted that when viewed from a comparative perspective, a 17 percent rate of active worker participation is quite respectable. Studies of workplace participation in Western Europe and Yugoslavia have found that a relatively low level of direct worker involvement in participatory activity is the rule rather than the exception.[22] Moreover, if assertion of workers' interests were the goal, participation by 20 percent of the workforce might be sufficient to get the job done, since the activity of a vocal minority might be able to win battles in the name of the workforce as a whole.

However, this is not the objective of workplace participation in the USSR. What Soviet authorities are attempting is to use participatory mechanisms to mold workers who are economically productive and politically acquiescent. They are seeking, in other words, to have a psychological or attitudinal impact on each individual worker. Success, therefore, requires that *each* individual worker become actively involved. In this collectivist context, participation rates of even 20 percent are disappointing.

---

[16]See, e.g., Dzerman Gvishiani, *Organization and Management*, Moscow, Progress, 1972.

[17]In response to what was happening in Poland, many articles in the Soviet press in 1981 were calling for participatory institutions in the Soviet workplace to be taken more seriously by union and plant officials. On this point, see Betsy Gidwitz, "Labor Unrest in the Soviet Union," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1982, pp. 39–40.

In March 1982, the old chairman of the Soviet trade union organization was also replaced, at least in part—one might suspect—in response to Polish events.

[18]A more detailed discussion of the empirical findings to be discussed below can be found in Russell Bova, loc. cit., Chap. 4. Also see Murray Yanowitch, *Work in the Soviet Union*, Armonk, NY, and London, M.E. Sharpe, 1985, pp. 108–17.

[19]V. I. Usenin and V. V. Krevnevich, *Rabochiy klass v usloviyakh nauchno-teknicheskoy revolyutsii* (The Working Class in Conditions of the Scientific-Technological Revolution), Moscow, Nauka, 1979, p. 265.

[20]Vladimir I. Mukhachev and Venyamin S. Borovik, *Rabochiy klass i upravleniye proizvodstvom* (The Working Class and the Management of Production), Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, pp. 39 and 47.

[21]Aleksandr K. Orlov, *Sovetskiy rabochiy i upravleniye proizvodstvom* (The Soviet Worker and the Management of Production), Moscow, Profizdat, 1978, pp. 141–46.

[22]See, e.g., Industrial Democracy in Europe International Research Group, *Industrial Democracy in Europe*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1981, especially Chap. 7.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The relatively low level of active participation by Soviet workers is, in large measure, a result of the fact that workers generally view the payoff and efficacy of participatory activity to be quite low. As Table 1 illustrates, it is difficult to detect much enthusiasm among workers regarding the performance and effectiveness of various participatory institutions.

Perhaps the most revealing measure of the lack of confidence that workers have in the organs of participatory management is to be found in data suggesting that workers turn to those organs for assistance in resolving work-related problems only on rare occasions. Asked where they would turn for help if they encountered problems on the job, most workers at the Chelyabinsk Tractor Factory indicated that they would turn either to their colleagues or to their brigade leader. In and of itself, this fact does not constitute an especially searing indictment of the participatory system. One would expect that however competent the performance of participatory organs, workers would normally turn, as a first resort, to individuals with whom they work on a daily basis and with whom, as a consequence, they are more familiar and comfortable.

Nevertheless, when it comes to dealing with higher authorities at the enterprise, workers tend to place more confidence in direct dealings with management representatives and the technical staff than they do in working through the trade union organization or the various other institutions of participatory management. Whereas 8.8 percent of the surveyed workers believed management representatives were the best source of assistance and another 4.8 percent pointed to the shop's technical staff, only 3.2 percent identified the trade union as their first choice; a meager 1.4. percent suggested that one should turn for help to one of the other organs of participatory management.[23]

The explanation for worker skepticism regarding the efficacy of participatory organs in the workplace is to be found at least partly in the fact that enterprise authorities are not believed to take the participatory rights of workers very seriously. Only 19 percent of the workers at a Smolensk electronics firm, for example, indicated that their comments and suggestions regarding the affairs of the enterprise were regularly and seriously taken into account by managers.[24] As one worker complained to a reporter from *Pravda,* foremen, shop superintendents, and trade union officials are often unwilling to give meaningful answers to workers' questions.[25] Even when enterprise authorities do meet their formal responsibility to pass along relevant information to workers, it is often done in such a way as to discourage worker activity. Based on his observations of the proceedings at shop workers' meetings and at meetings of the plant trade union committee at one enterprise, a Soviet observer noted that "the presentation of the director was rendered in a condescending tone, was overloaded with figures, and was barely audible."[26]

Table 1: Workers' Evaluations of Selected Participatory Organs

(in percent)

Organization	Good	Satis-factory	Poor	No response
Production conference	10.6	17.8	8.8	62.8
People's control committee	12.9	24.1	9.0	54.0
Komsomol searchlight (Mayak)	12.4	19.9	9.5	41.8
Organs of innovation and rationalization	4.3	12.9	6.8	76.0
Comrades' court	14.0	19.1	7.6	59.3

SOURCE: A.K. Orlov, *Trudyashchiyesya i sistema upravleniya proizvodstvom* (Working People and the System of Management of Production), Chelyabinsk, Izdatel'stvo Yuzhno-Ural'skoye, 1976. pp. 129–32.

The prevalence of such complaints has prompted Gorbachev himself to criticize the lack of responsiveness by managers to workers' participatory rights. According to Gorbachev:

Managers do not always listen to the workers' proposals, and trade-union committees are not showing the necessary persistence. One sometimes hears it said that some question or other could either be discussed at a meeting of the workers, or it could be decided within a narrow circle; that perhaps the enterprise director should be required to give an account of his work before the work collective or that perhaps this necessity could be dispensed with.[27]

Indicating his displeasure with this situation, he states that: "It is not a matter of whether one wants to do it or not.

[23]Specifically, 36.2 percent said colleagues were the best source of help, and 29.1 percent said brigade leaders were. See Aleksandr K. Orlov, *Trudyashchiyesya v sisteme upravleniya proizvodstvom* (Working People in the System of Management of Production), Chelyabinsk, Izdatel'stvo Yuzhno-Ural'skoye, 1976, pp. 170–71.

[24]V. A. Maslennikov et al., *Trudovyye kollektivy v sisteme sovetskoy sotsialisticheskoy demokratii* (Labor Collectives in the System of Soviet Socialist Democracy), Moscow, Yuridicheskaya Literatura, 1979, p. 165.

[25]*Pravda,* Apr. 25, 1982, p. 3.

[26]Maslennikov et al., op. cit., p. 168.

[27]M. S. Gorbachev, *Zhivoye tvorchestvo naroda* (Vital Creativity of the People), Moscow, Politizdat. 1984, pp. 29–30. Cited in Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Criticizes Implementation of USSR Law on Work Collectives," RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 88/85, Mar. 27, 1985.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is a matter of the law, which must be strictly obeyed."

Perhaps even more important than the failure to implement the existing law governing workers' participatory rights, however, are the deficiencies inherent in that law and in the collectivist system of workplace participation that it sanctions. In the first place, the failure to give participatory institutions anything more than rights of consultation makes it almost inevitable that their role will be taken less than completely seriously by managers. This is especially true given the fact that participation contains few inherent rewards for the manager. Quite to the contrary, it requires an expenditure of time and energy without resulting, in the eyes of management, in any significant contribution to the fulfillment of production responsibilities. One factory director states the matter this way:

The production conference at our factory is ineffective. It meets once a quarter and is unable to resolve many questions. The work of the production conference is not entirely coordinated. Its composition is heterogeneous as are the topics that it chooses to discuss. Thus its work is spotty, and a common theme is not apparent.[28]

Not surprisingly, many managers view production conferences and other participatory institutions less as an aid to their job than as one more hassle to overcome in the course of a day's work.

Perhaps even more important, participation represents a potential threat to the authority and prerogatives of management. Even in the absence of any real power on the part of participatory institutions, no manager is going to relish the idea of having to explain his decisions to rank-and-file workers, let alone to have those decisions second-guessed and criticized by them. In the worst case, encouragement of participatory input by workers would give rise to an increasing number of complaints and criticisms, the natural target of which would be managers. Although workers and their participatory institutions would still lack the power to act on the basis of those criticisms, they can attract the attention of party officials and others who are in a position to make examples and scapegoats of individual managers. At the very least, there is a conflict between the idea of participation and what David Granick once termed the "boss's ego."[29] Already constrained from above by the highly centralized nature of the Soviet economy, few managers are willing to dilute further their authority and independence of action by accepting the right of interference from below.

If there is little about the institutions of collectivist participation in the Soviet workplace that induces managerial responsiveness, there is also little about that system that encourages workers themselves to devote much time or energy to such activity. Even at its theoretical best, the system obliges managers to do little more than *consult* with workers and their representatives. Moreover, the assumption of essential class harmony that underlies the entire system does not allow for workers to utilize participatory mechanisms to promote their interests. Evidence from institutions of workplace participation in other societies suggests that worker motivation to become involved is highest when the connection with the promotion of their interests is clear. One study of Yugoslavia's workers' councils, for example, found that for most workers, participation was not of any intrinsic value but rather was seen as merely a means to promote other interests, often those of a material character. When it was not successful in that sense, participation was "literally all talk to them."[30]

Going Beyond Collectivism?

In searching for an approach that might breathe new life into workplace participatory institutions, the Gorbachev regime need not have looked far. Expansion of workers' rights has figured prominently in a debate on a "reformist alternative" for Soviet labor policy that has engaged Soviet labor specialists for at least a decade.[31]

Supplementing that debate has been a discussion of a more general and more philosophical nature regarding the question of interests in Soviet society. Contrary to official ideological orthodoxy, some Soviet writers have been suggesting that conflicting interests under socialism may continue to exist and even intensify, to the point of becoming non-resolvable antagonistic contradictions of the type that—according to official dogma—are only supposed to characterize class societies.[32] In

[28]Maslennikov et al., op. cit., p. 137.

[29]David Granick, *The Red Executive*, New York, Doubleday, 1960, pp. 226–31.

[30]Ellen T. Comisso, *Workers' Control Under Plan and Market*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1979, p. 174.

[31]For a detailed discussion of this reform debate see Joel C. Moses, "The Reformist Alternative in Soviet Labor Policy," paper presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, Aug. 29–Sept. 1, 1985. Also see Murray Yanowitch, "Pressures for More Participatory Forms of Economic Organization in the Soviet Union," *Economic Analysis and Workers' Management* (Belgrade), Vol. 12, 1978, pp. 403–17.

[32]See, e.g., the debate between N. A. Aitov and Ts. A. Stepanyan in the pages of *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* in 1979–80. Aitov, "Some Discussion Points in the Study of the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Sotsiologicheskiye issledovaniya* (Moscow), No. 3, 1979; and Stepanyan, "What Is Agreed and What Is in Dispute in Discussing the Social Structure of Soviet Society," ibid., No. 4, 1980. See also Ernst Kux, "Contradictions in Soviet Socialism," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1984, pp. 1–27.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

challenging official orthodoxy in this manner, such writers are, at least implicitly, removing the ideological obstacle that hitherto has barred participatory activity aimed at promoting special interests.

To what extent does Gorbachev's labor policy indicate an acceptance of these reform ideas? His program of "democratization" in the Soviet workplace appears to be moving along two tracks. The first track has focused on reinvigorating participatory mechanisms inherited from his predecessors. The performance of trade unions and other participatory institutions has been publicly scrutinized. Trade union officials, enterprise managers, party officials, and even workers themselves have been publicly chided for not taking full advantage of the opportunities that the participatory system has to offer. Disciplinary action has been threatened for officials who fail to abide by the law governing participation at the enterprise.[33] In short, the lip service paid to socialist democracy in the workplace that was commonplace before Gorbachev has now been replaced by the same policy of "glasnost' " or openness that has more generally characterized the Gorbachev era. The apparent expectation is that by ending the complacency of the previous era, all parties will be induced to take participatory activity more seriously.

The second track of Gorbachev's policy toward workplace participation, however, goes a step beyond the system that has been in effect in Soviet economic enterprises in the recent past. The new "USSR Law on State Enterprises (Associations)," adopted on June 30, 1987, reemphasizes the desirability of increasing the participation of the entire labor collective in the management of enterprise affairs and proposes the creation of two new mechanisms to facilitate that involvement.[34]

The most widely publicized of these new mechanisms is the election of managerial personnel by the members of the labor collective. According to Article 6 of the law, all members of the enterprise administration, from the director of the enterprise down to brigade leaders, must be elected. The idea of having Soviet managers elected is not entirely new. Proponents of reform in the Soviet workplace have been suggesting it for some time, and isolated experiments have been carried out.[35] For the first time, however, the law mandates that elections take place nationwide.

The second participatory innovation in the new law is the creation of a new institution in the Soviet enterprise called the labor collective council (*sovet trudovogo kollektiva*). According to Article 7 of the law, the labor collective council's responsibility is to exercise the authority of the labor collective in the periods between general meetings of the labor collective. All members of the labor collective are eligible to serve on this body, and they are elected for terms of two to three years by secret or open ballot at the collective's general meeting. The law specifies a long list of enterprise activities over which the council is empowered to exercise its authority and proposes that the council's decisions in those areas be mandatory for all members of the collective.

At first glance, it might appear that Gorbachev's attempt to reinvigorate participation at the workplace seriously flirts with the boundaries of collectivism. The introduction of competitive elections to fill all managerial positions looks like a step in the direction of pluralist participation, and the labor collective council reminds one of the workers' councils of the Yugoslav self-management system. Closer examination of the law on enterprises and the discussion surrounding it, however, suggest that the Gorbachev regime has no intention of moving in either direction.

In the first place, the binding authority given to participatory institutions remains highly circumscribed. The election of enterprise directors by the members of the labor collective must, according to the law, be approved by the "superior organ" (i.e., the bureaucratic organization overseeing the enterprise). Similarly, the election of leaders of enterprise subdivisions, including department heads, foremen, and brigade leaders, must be confirmed by the director of the enterprise. Thus, the director and his superiors in the economic bureaucracy—not the workplace electorate—retain the last word in the selection of managerial personnel.

In the case of the labor collective council, binding authority is attached only to those decisions made within the limits of the authority vested in the council, and an examination of the list of responsibilities assigned to the council reveals that its primary sphere of authority is the monitoring of worker performance and the promotion of enterprise productivity. The labor collective council is charged with promoting labor discipline, developing measures to improve enterprise effectiveness, and monitoring workers' wages and salaries to see that they are justified by the amount of work contributed. Indeed, Article 7 of the law states explicitly that "the council concentrates its main attention on the development of the initiative of the working people and increasing the contribution of each worker to the common cause, and im-

[33]Teague, "Gorbachev Criticizes . . . ," loc. cit.

[34]"USSR Law on State Enterprise (Association)," *Izvestiya*, July 1, 1987. For a translation, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 8, 1987, pp. R/1–33.

[35]See Yanowitch, op. cit., pp. 118–35; also Werner Hahn, "Electoral 'Choice' in the Soviet Bloc," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1987, pp. 29–39.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

plements measures to achieve high end results from the enterprise's activity and to earn the collective's economically-accountable revenue."

As if to dispel any doubts regarding the limits on the authority of the labor council and other participatory institutions, the law invokes a number of Leninist concepts that have come to serve as euphemisms for strong centralized control and whose meaning and significance cannot be lost on any knowledgeable observer of the Soviet system. For example, the law states that management of the enterprise is to be based on the principle of "democratic centralism," which, applied in the workplace, means "a combination of centralized leadership and socialist self-management of the labor collective." In the same vein, the law refers to the principle of "one-man management" (*yedinonachaliye*), which is ensured by investing in the director of the enterprise certain rights to organize the enterprise's activities.[36]

Not only does the law fail, in any significant way, to augment the binding authority of participatory institutions, it also falls far short of accepting the pluralist idea of participation as a competitive process aimed at the promotion of special interests. On the contrary, the law and the surrounding discussion repeatedly underscore the collectivist spirit on which all participatory activity must be based. As a *Pravda* editorial put it, "The primary meaning of democratic principles in the labor collective is solidarity for the sake of common objectives."[37] In his speech to the February 1987 All-Union Congress of Trade Unions, Gorbachev indicated that his concept of democracy was based upon "collectivism and on the solidarity of interests and efforts of all citizens."[38]

This collectivist spirit is reflected in the organization and structure of those participatory institutions currently being promoted by the Gorbachev regime. Reports from the first experiments in workplace elections, for example, indicate that the "electoral campaigns" are based exclusively on the candidates' qualifications, their past record in promoting efficiency and productivity, and their adherence to norms of socialist legality and morality.[39] Appeals and promises addressed to the special interests of various constituencies in the Soviet enterprise are not a part of that campaign process.

The composition of the proposed labor collective council also reflects the collectivist ideal. Membership on the council is, as previously noted, open to *all* members of the collective, including workers, foremen, technical staff, managers, and union officials. In no sense, therefore, does the council appear intended to act as an institution that promotes the interests and rights of *workers* as a distinct group. One should note in this regard that the law never refers to the labor collective council as an institution of workers' self-management but rather speaks of it as an institution designed to facilitate self-management by the entire labor collective.

By contrast, the new draft charter for Soviet trade unions does indicate that protecting workers' rights and interests is one of the primary functions of Soviet unions.[40] Referring to the charter, a recent article in *Pravda* attempted to explain why workers in a workers' state should need such union protection from managers who, after all, are themselves representatives of that state. The explanation given provides little indication that the scope of the unions' activity in the USSR has been, or is likely to be, expanded beyond its traditional charge of protecting workers from managerial actions that are contrary to either the letter or the spirit of Soviet labor law. Workers' rights need protection, according to the author of the article, because managerial callousness and bureaucratic indifference can exist even under socialism.[41] Such a position marks no significant departure. Rather, it reflects what has been a part of ideological orthodoxy in the USSR at least since the death of Stalin.[42]

If, as argued above, Gorbachev has no apparent intention of challenging the limits of collectivism in the workplace, the question remains as to what exactly he is trying to accomplish. Why is so much time and energy being devoted to "participatory reform" in the workplace? Is it simply part of some much larger campaign being orchestrated for the purpose of fooling gullible Westerners into thinking the Soviet system is really changing? Is it a lever for promoting Gorbachev's political power? Or is it designed primarily to resolve the very real political and economic dilemmas affecting industrial life in the USSR? What, in other words, are the functions of "democratization?"

The Functions of "Democratization"

The functions of Gorbachev's campaign to revitalize participation in the Soviet workplace must be viewed in the context of his larger attempt to address the "human

[36]Article 6 of the enterprise law, loc. cit..
[37]*Pravda*, Jan. 9, 1987.
[38]Ibid., Feb. 26, 1987.
[39]See, e.g., ibid., Feb. 15, 1987, p. 2.
[40]On the draft charter, see the report of the trade union chairman, Stepan Shalayev, to the 18th Trade Union Congress in February, published in *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1987.
[41]Ibid., Feb. 23, 1987.
[42]In fact, the idea that unions needed to be more active in looking after the rights and needs of workers was increasingly stressed even before Stalin's death by the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, especially at the 10th Trade Union Congress in 1949. See Emily C. Brown, *Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1966, p. 58; also, Blair Ruble, op. cit., pp. 23–24.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

factors" that impinge upon success or failure in economic activity. On the one hand, the attempt to deal with those factors involves the dangling of positive inducements to promote efficiency and productivity. The promise of better pay for better work or easier access to desired consumer goods and services are examples of the type of carrots that the Gorbachev regime has been promising in this regard. On the other hand, negative sanctions have also been applied. The campaign against alcoholism in the workplace, the crackdown on poor labor discipline, and the threat to make bonuses for all employees less automatic form part of the big stick that Gorbachev, like Yuriy Andropov before him, has been brandishing.

Inherent in Gorbachev's promotion of workplace participation are elements of both the carrot and the stick. The opportunity to become involved in the affairs of one's enterprise is being touted as a positive inducement for workers to improve work habits and to show greater concern for the performance of the enterprise. According to *Pravda,* democratization of the labor collective involves the instilling of "a proprietary sense in people with respect to their country" and the development of "initiative, without which one cannot attain the necessary acceleration in the economic and social aspects of life."[43]

If this attempt to co-opt Soviet workers was the whole story behind the participatory campaign, however, it would not be very interesting. Even though one might argue that Gorbachev is pursuing this strategy with a renewed sense of vigor and purpose, it is still a strategy that is, in its basic features, inherited from the Brezhnev era. What is of more interest is Gorbachev's attempt to reach back further into Soviet history to borrow from both Lenin and Khrushchev the idea that mass participation can be mobilized in the service of social control.

Indeed, mass participation can be an effective means of monitoring the behavior of rank-and-file workers. In a 1985 article promoting the idea of labor collective self-management, a Soviet observer emphasized what a powerful force public opinion can be in the campaign against drunkards and other violators of labor discipline. He cited a study of workers that found that 45 percent of those accused of violating labor discipline believe that discussion of their violations publicly in the labor collective would be viewed as a more unpleasant penalty than fines or other management-imposed sanctions.[44] Similarly, a *Pravda* editorial entitled "Everyone Is on View in the Collective" notes that public opinion in the industrial enterprise should be mobilized against "loafers, shoddy workers, and those who would misappropriate socialist property."[45]

Beyond the use of participation as a means of monitoring the activity of rank-and-file workers, Gorbachev has made it quite clear that he also sees participation as a means of controlling the behavior of the Soviet economic bureaucracy. It is in this area that Gorbachev's concept of participation most clearly differs from that of Brezhnev. Under Brezhnev, the bureaucracy was largely insulated from such extra-bureaucratic monitoring. Now it appears that such is no longer to be the case. In his speech to the trade union congress, Gorbachev noted the following:

During restructuring, I see the new role of trade unions to be, first and foremost, one of providing a counterweight to technocratic half-efforts in the economy, which, I must say, have become quite widespread in recent years, and of increasing the social monitoring of economic decisions that are adopted.[46]

Along these very same lines, *Pravda* has pointed out that "public monitoring is a reliable method in the struggle against excessive bureaucracy and formalism."[47]

This emphasis on "control from below" is not unconnected to Gorbachev's overall plans for "restructuring" the Soviet economy. As many Western observers have noted, a primary obstacle to extensive reform and decentralization of the Soviet economy has been the fear of a loss of political control at the center. As Leninists, Soviet leaders have always understood that in giving greater autonomy to economic officials at lower levels one runs the risk of creating a multitude of "industrial tsars," whose new-found independence can eventually pose a political challenge to central authorities.[48] To the extent that the Gorbachev regime follows through with its stated intention to give economic enterprises greater independence and autonomy, the promotion of public monitoring of enterprise officials becomes a potentially valuable insurance policy against precisely such political consequences.

That participatory activity at the workplace will remain at the service of central authorities and not develop into an independent phenomenon in its own right is to be ensured by the active involvement of the primary party organization in all of the activities of participatory institu-

[43] *Pravda,* Jan. 8, 1987.

[44] Yu. Tikhomirov, "Talk on a Topical Subject: Self-Management in the Collective," *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya* (Moscow), Aug. 27, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Aug. 30, 1985, pp. S/3–4.

[45] *Pravda.* Jan. 9, 1987.

[46] Loc. cit.

[47] *Pravda,* Jan. 9, 1987.

[48] On this point, see Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets,* New York, Basic Books, 1977, p. 307.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 2: Party Penetration of Participatory Institutions

(percentages and representation coefficients)[1]

	Party members		Komsomol member		Nonaffiliated	
Organization	Share of members	Coefficient	Share of members	Coefficient	Share of members	Coefficient
Factory union committees	25.5	1.73	12.2	.64	62.5	.94
Komsomol committees	23.3	1.60	76.7	4.02	0	.00
Production conferences	42.4	2.90	7.1	.37	50.5	.76
Peoples' control committee	43.1	2.95	10.9	.57	46.0	.69
Comrades' courts	39.3	2.69	8.1	.42	52.6	.79

[1]A coefficient of 1.00 means that representation of the group in question in a particular participatory institution is proportional to the representation of that group in the enterprise as a whole; coefficients higher than 1.00 suggests a disproportionately large representation of the group in a given organization.

SOURCE: Calculated from V.I. Mukhachev and V.S. Borovik, *Rabochiy klass i upravleniye proizvodstvom* (The Working Class and Management of Production), (Moscow, Izdetel'stvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1975, in Charles E. Ziegler, "Political Participation in the USSR: The Workers' Role in the Developed Socialist State," paper presented at the Midwest Slavic Conference, Cincinnati, 1980.

tions. Article 6 of the law on state enterprises is quite specific in this regard, noting that the party organization constitutes the "political nucleus" of the collective and "directs the work of . . . the organs of the collective's self-management."[49] If past experience is any guide to the future, one should expect that institutions of participation in the labor collective will likely be dominated by members of the Communist Party and the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). As indicated in Table 2, Soviet researchers have found that party and Komsomol members have consistently constituted a disproportionately large segment of the membership of participatory institutions.

Thus, Gorbachev's participatory strategy is intended to allow the central party leadership to have its cake and eat it too. It is aimed at reaping the benefits of reduced bureaucratic control from the center while, at the same time, seeking to ensure continued adherence to regime policies by unleashing public monitoring at the grassroots level.

Conclusion

It is, of course, not only the workplace that has been targeted by Gorbachev in his campaign for "democratization." There have also been calls for and experiments with multiple-candidacies in elections to soviets and party organizations up to and including the republic level.[50] The new policy of "glasnost' " in the Soviet media has affected almost every important institution in Soviet society to some degree.

The general character and purpose of this broader campaign are not unlike the character and purpose assigned to "democratization" in the specific case of the workplace. It is intended to instill a sense of common purpose in the Soviet masses, to engage them in a process of self-monitoring of their economic and political activity, and, perhaps most important, to cast their eyes upon bureaucrats whose own self-interest might otherwise lead them to subvert national interests as defined by Gorbachev and other top party leaders.

There is, as previously noted, precedent in Soviet history for virtually everything that Gorbachev is doing along these lines. Western or even Soviet observers who believe that Gorbachev is purposely opening a space for even limited political pluralism in the Soviet system are going to be disappointed; they have probably not been listening to the General Secretary very closely. His participatory reforms have remained within the boundaries of collectivism and have little in common with pluralist democracy. In fact, Gorbachev's emphasis on popular participation can be more accurately viewed as an attempt to mobilize the mass public to act as the collective eyes and ears of the central party leadership in its struggle to reduce some of the negative consequences of "bureaucratic pluralism." It is, in this respect, a reform program aimed at *reasserting,* not relinquishing, centralized control.

Yet, when viewed on its own terms, Gorbachev's participatory strategy is not without interest. Unlike the Brezhnev regime, which tended to view the mass public with suspicion and which saw a close tie between the interests of the party leadership and those of the massive party-state bureaucracy, Gorbachev has expressed greater confidence in the mass public and in its

[49]Loc. cit.
[50]See, e.g., Hahn, loc. cit.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

willingness and ability to work in accordance with regime interests. Many of his speeches and public statements have referred specifically to the need to recognize the political maturity of the Soviet people. According to Gorbachev:

The generations that are taking action today and that bear responsibility are generations that were born and raised under socialism. The expansion of socialist democracy may prompt some people to ask whether we will disorganize society, weaken management, and lower standards for discipline, order, and responsibility .... I'll put it bluntly. People who have doubts regarding the wisdom of further democratization are clearly suffering from one major shortcoming of great political significance and meaning: they do not trust our people.[51]

In contrast, it is formalism, resistance, and inertia in the bureaucracy that Gorbachev appears to regard as the real enemy of Soviet communism.

The obvious remaining question is whether or not Gorbachev's participatory strategy will work. The potential obstacles are clear. In the first place, there is the very real possibility of a bureaucratic backlash against Gorbachev. He might find that it is impossible to reform a bureaucracy that is so firmly entrenched. As a result, Gorbachev, like Khrushchev before him, may find himself removed from power, or he may have to dilute his participation campaign into empty slogans.

Even if Gorbachev is successful in overcoming conservative opposition to his program, there is no guarantee that the general public will view his attempts to encourage mass participation with anything beyond the apathy with which they have reacted to such undertakings in the past. As long as participation in the Soviet system remains divorced from the competitive pursuit of self-interest, in other words, as long as it is confined within the boundaries of collectivism, enthusiasm might be expected to remain muted.

Finally, there is also the possibility that, Gorbachev's intentions notwithstanding, workers in Soviet enterprises, as well as members of the Soviet public in general, will take advantage of Gorbachev's reforms and, despite all systemic safeguards, seek to turn institutions of collectivist participation into institutions that promote individual or group interests. Such an evolution is precisely what many conservatives in the USSR fear. At the very least, Gorbachev's participatory rhetoric might well produce a rise in expectations and a subsequent disappointment that will even further alienate segments of the public from the regime.

Clearly, Gorbachev's attempt to revitalize Soviet communism from within is fraught with risks and pitfalls. His own personal position as well as the stability of the entire system are at stake. That he is willing to gamble with such stakes is a reflection of the seriousness with which he views the problems of contemporary Soviet society.

[51] *Pravda*, Feb. 26, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On *Perestroyka:* Reforming Economic Management

Valentin Litvin

A CRITICAL element in the structural and institutional reforms being promoted by Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev is the restructuring (*perestroyka*) of the Soviet economy. Although the process of economic change in the Soviet Union is just beginning—and could accelerate, stagnate, or slip backwards—it is important to analyze the scope and depth of the transformations now taking place or proposed for the future in order to weigh their feasibility and potential political and economic ramifications.

Revising Planning Methodology

With growing diversification of the Soviet economy, the demands on the system of centralized economic planning have expanded immeasurably since the first five-year plan of 1928–32; yet there have not been changes of corresponding scope in the planning system and the methodology of planning. The planning system inherited by Mikhail Gorbachev at the time of his accession to power in March 1985 is the same basic four-tiered system with two main functional subsystems —one to plan output and the other to distribute production resources—that had existed for decades.

Briefly, this system has functioned in the past as follows. First, with regard to output, the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan), employing "control figures" (broad directives) approved by the party Politburo, formulated long-term, five-year economic development plans. These plans set targets designed to serve as both aggregate national economic goals and as specific production assignments for the principal economic sectors administered by the central ministries. The ministries, in turn, disaggregated these production targets and distributed them through the intermediate levels of their economic hierarchy (the republic ministries and the industrial associations and main administrations) to the enterprises. Based on the five-year plans, the operational annual, quarterly, and monthly plans were drawn up.

Plan targets set by Gosplan were based on the plants' and factories' output from the previous plan period and on their estimates of their future production capacity. Since many enterprise managers purposely quoted low estimates in hopes of being assigned smaller production quotas, Gosplan introduced an additional category of "capacity reserves" (*rezervy*) designed to balance out unusually low estimates and to increase production quotas. Needless to say, planning based on former "achieved levels" tended to block technological progress. Fearing that above-average performance would guarantee higher plan targets in the next period, industrial managers were not interested in introducing innovations and overfulfilling the plan.

The second major functional subsystem of the Soviet central planning system has been the balancing and allocation of production resources—known as "material-technical supply" (*materialno-tekhnicheskoye snabzheniye*). Long before each new five-year plan was formulated and approved and current production assignments were set, industrial associations and enterprises were required to fill out requests for production inputs (*zayavki*) which were sent through intermediate management levels to the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab). Based on these requests, Gossnab determined the distribution of resources and issued allocation orders (*raznaryadki*)

Valentin Litvin is an Instructor in the School of Russian Studies, Defense Language Institute (Monterey, CA). He was associated with the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricultural Academy of Sciences in Moscow from 1954–1978. Among his works on Soviet economics is The Soviet Agro-Industrial Complex: Structure and Performance *(1987).*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

promising the enterprises resources that did not as yet physically exist.[1] The allocation orders were issued on the presumption that the five-year plan would indeed be fulfilled and consequently that the estimated supply of resources would actually be available for allocation. Since this often was not the case, many enterprises ensured themselves against potential supply shortages by padding their requests for material requirements and stocking up their warehouses with tremendous reserves of unused machinery, equipment, and raw materials.[2]

Soviet economists and planners have suggested a variety of solutions for improving this system of centralized planning. In recent years, conservatives, preferring to leave the system intact,[3] have been willing to accept minimal or partial innovations such as decreasing the number of plan indicators Gosplan sends out to the ministries and enterprises and limiting planning to indications of major output and investment goals; changing output targets from physical units produced to the ruble value of products and thereby increasing the degree of maneuverability directors and managers have in choosing and changing the product mix and specifications of commodities; and switching from planning on the basis of previously achieved levels to "normative planning" (*normativnoye planirovaniye*)—or the computing of indices for each enterprise representing the productive potential of its entire set of resources, i.e., material inputs, labor, and land, and multiplying it by a "normative output" in order to define the plan targets for each enterprise. A majority of progressive economists and even some moderates, for example L. Loginov, G.Kh. Popov, and Leonid Abalkin, have suggested limiting "vertical planning" (by Gosplan, the central ministries, and the republic ministries) to some 250-300 high-priority commodity groups, leaving the enterprises to work out the bulk of their specific production obligations through contractual arrangements with other enterprises.[4] More radical thinkers, for example, Tatyana Zaslavskaya and Oleg Bogomolov, have proposed eliminating the central planning system entirely. In their opinion, all production and supply relationships among the various enterprises should be regulated by means of contracts. A June 1987 article in *Pravda* asked whether it would not be "more opportune not to fulfill the plan, but to just work? To just build houses, write books, treat patients, bake bread? To stop this flood of hollow figures, to throw off this obsession with plans?"[5]

Not surprisingly, the June 1987 plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which considered these proposals, endorsed the moderate line for reform of the centralized economic planning system. This was spelled out in the "Basic Provisions for the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management."[6] Central planners—in Gosplan and the all-Union ministries—will continue as previously to use Politburo "control figures" to develop five-year plans for the development of the national economy as a whole and for separate economic sectors. Under the new provisions, however, both the "control figures" and the plans will be indicative rather than directive. The "control figures" will inform a long-term (*perspektivnyy*) plan for Soviet economic development in the next 15 years. The five-year plans will perform the task of setting "plan aims" (*planovyye tselevyye ustanovki*)—economic indicators reflecting both the demand of the producer sector for industrial commodities and of the consumer sector for consumer goods. Industrial associations and enterprises, however, are to be allowed to construct their own plans based on "state orders" (*gosudarstvennyye zakazy*), i.e., contracts. Instead of "achieved levels," normative planning is to be applied as a tool for evaluating the enterprises' production potential and for determining plan quotas.[7]

The "Basic Provisions" also calls for reform of the system of resource allocation. Input requests and allocation orders will be abolished and replaced with a "flexible economic mechanism" whereby enterprises will buy necessary resources from the appropriate "departments of wholesale trade" (*otdely optovoy torgovli*) —wholesale stores run by Gossnab.[8] This new system has already been introduced on an experimental basis in some economic sectors, for example, in enterprises producing road construction machinery, in numerous technical design bureaus, and in research centers requiring highly specific equipment. Full-scale implementation of these reforms is supposed to occur within four to five years. Although this does not amount to marketization of the Soviet producer sector, it may constitute a first step in that direction.

[1]The scope of Gossnab's bureaucracy is best illustrated by the following data: Gossnab has 1.5 million employees, 20,000 of them working at Gossnab's central offices and approximately 200,000 at the main distribution centers. *Pravda* (Moscow), May 18, 1987.

[2]For example, the 1985 inventory of Soviet industrial enterprises showed a 436.5 billion ruble surplus (unused) production assets. Ibid.

[3]See, for example, V. Yaroshenko, "The Plan Must be Realistic," in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Mosow), No. 15, April 1987, p. 8; F. Bogomolov, "There Are No Ready-Made Prescriptions for Every Case," ibid., No. 15, April 1987 p. 6; E. Yasin, "The Soviet Economy Faces Change," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 12, August 1987, pp. 33–34.

[4]Ibid., June 3, 1987, and *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 19, May 1987, p. 6.

[5]Ibid., June 1, 1987.

[6]In Russian, "Osnovnyye polozheniya korennoy perestroyki upravleniya ekonomiki." The document was published in *Pravda*, June 27, 1987.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another change in the economic planning system approved by the "Basic Provisions" is further streamlining of the system through the amalgamation of both USSR and republic ministries. Aimed at creating a leaner, more efficient, and consolidated management hierarchy, the policy of streamlining was actually initiated in November 1985 when five governmental agencies responsible for the management of the Soviet food economy—the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Products, the Ministry of Fruits and Vegetables, the Ministry of Food Industry, and the USSR State Committee for the Supply of Production Equipment for Agriculture—were abolished and amalgamated in a new superagency—the USSR State Agroindustrial Committee (Gosagroprom).[9] During 1986–87, amalgamation of "technologically-related ministries" continued, with the creation of a USSR State Committee for Construction, a Bureau for Machine Building, and a Bureau for the Fuel and Energy Complex. In the future, the goal is for Gosplan to formulate plans not for individual industry branches but for "groups of branches."[10]

Marketizing the Economy?

Besides changing planning methodology and modifying central institutions, the "Basic Provisions" introduces several innovations that at least superficially resemble market reform. Among them are the principles of full-scale profit-and-loss accounting (*polnyy khozraschet)* and of self-accounting (*samookupayemost'*), which are to apply to industrial associations and enterprises, and which will place strong emphasis on such long-forgotten economic categories as profit (*pribyl'*) and profitability (*rentabil'nost'*). Profitability is defined as a plant's or factory's profit calculated per ruble of expenditures and resources. It is assumed that the level of profitability will reflect the efficiency with which material, labor, and monetary resources are being utilized, and will stimulate enterprises to cut down the prime costs of production—especially through the introduction of technological innovations.

The Soviet "enterprise" (*predpriyatiye*) has never functioned as an enterprise in the true economic sense of the word. Rather, it has been an administratively managed production unit within the restrictive framework of centralized management. As such, it has lacked built-in economic mechanisms to impel it to cut costs and raise productivity. The role of money in such an administratively managed economy has been extremely limited. The State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) with its 300,000 branch offices has acted mostly as an agency for verifying and ostensibly ensuring enterprise performance through bank transactions or the banking function known in the Soviet Union as "control by means of the ruble" (*kontrol rublem*). In fact, whenever enterprises incurred losses, Gosplan almost automatically subsidized these losses, thereby divorcing the entire system of financing from real economic processes.

Now, with the introduction of the principle of profit-and-loss accounting and the concept of profit, and with the enterprise becoming a self-supporting unit—interested in and committed to the final economic result of its operations—the role of banking in the Soviet economy can be expected to gradually grow. Since gross physical output, once the dominant indicator of the success or failure of enterprises, will be replaced by the economic category of profitability (which should prove to be a more effective measure of the economic efficiency of plants, factories, branches, sectors, and the economy as a whole), Gosbank loans—and not the state budget—will become the main source of capital investment and of indemnification of losses. This will make the Soviet banking system an active participant in economic activity rather than the passive registrar of that activity that it has been.

Market-like features are also present in the portion of the "Basic Provisions" dealing with profit sharing. The document offers two models for distributing enterprise profits. Under the first, once enterprises fulfill their basic financial obligations (covering budget costs, paying wages and bills, and repaying credits), remaining profit can be divided among workers and managers as premiums and bonuses. The second model specifies that plants and factories must first fulfill their debt and cost obligations and then use what remains of profits as remuneration for workers and managers. Clearly more radical, the second model abolishes fixed wages, making all earnings subject to the end result of workers' labor.[11] The June 1987 plenum described this model as "removing wage ceilings."[12]

The new financial autonomy of the enterprises in this regard has been confirmed by the new "USSR Law on State Enterprises (Associations)," endorsed by the June plenary session of the Central Committee and

[9]For a detailed analysis of the November 1985 reform of the USSR food economy, see my book: *The Soviet Agro-Industrial Complex: Structure and Performance,* Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1987.

[10]I.I. Prostyakov, *Khozyaystvennyy mekhanizm: osnovnyye napravleniya perestroiki* (The Economic Mechanism: The Basic Trends of Restructuring), Moscow, Ekonomika, 1986, p. 51. The amalgamation of the USSR Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Machine Building and of the USSR Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production is the latest example of this trend. See *Pravda,* July 15, 1987.

[11]*Pravda,* June 27, 1987.

[12]Ibid., June 26, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on June 30. Destined to go into effect in January 1988, the law states that "the enterprise has the right to determine the form of and system for compensating workers' labor in order to avoid equalization. It determines the use of funds as material incentives."[13]

Clearly the "Basic Provisions" and the "Law On Enterprises" reflect a change in the very definition of labor. In pre-Gorbachev times, manpower was classified as a "labor resource," and viewed in the same terms as material inputs. Though Soviet official propaganda spoke of the unity of the interests of the state and of "laborers," the evolution of Soviet socialism inevitably bought the two sets of interests into conflict. Marxist-Leninist ideology proposed that the individual willingly subordinate his interests to those of the collective, and treated work for one's own benefit or profit (*rabota na sebya*) as "anti-collectivist." Under Gorbachev, this labor doctrine has been revised. Manpower is now classified as a "human factor" in order to underline the active role of the individual in production.

In fact, the new "Law on Enterprises" substantiates the principle of self-interest, that is, working hard first of all to enrich oneself.[14] As it was stressed at the June 1987 plenary session,

"it is particularly important that the actual pay of every worker be closely linked to his personal contribution to the end result, and that no limit be set on it. There is only one criterion of justice: whether or not it is earned."[15]

Should such changes indeed be implemented and material incentives become the main motivating force of the economic development of the USSR, this would signal a major change in state-labor relations.

If the viability, that is, the efficiency, of an enterprise is to be measured by profitability, then what is to be the destiny of insolvent enterprises? The answer to this question may lie in the recent, if rare, instances of bankruptcy in the USSR—the first of their kind in the 70-year life of the Soviet economy. In March 1987, the unprofitable Leningrad construction enterprise—part of the extensive Ministry of Construction network—was closed, resulting in the firing of some 2,000 workers and managers.[16] A few months later, in May, a large research center of construction economics in Moscow was liquidated for being inefficient.[17]

In both of these instances, it was a simple matter to offer workers and managers other jobs because of the heavy demand for manpower in the Soviet economy. In the long run, however, as more insolvent enterprises close, and advanced technology begins to replace manpower, there may be unemployment. Aware of this fact, some Soviet economists have been seriously discussing the creation of a special unemployment compensation fund to cope with the problem of unemployment. Yet, while insolvency and unemployment are being acknowledged as theoretical possibilities, ministry functionaries are far from accepting them as future realities. Thus, although the Central Committee confirmed at its plenary session that, under the new system, "some citizens" would lose their current jobs, it hastened to add that "efforts would be made to find other work for them."[18]

Weakening of Party Control

The structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has facilitated its control and management of economic activity—both through geographical administrative organs, that is, regional party organizations—namely, the republic, oblast (provincial), *kray* (territorial), and *rayon* (district) party committees; and through primary party organizations (PPO) existing at every level of the administrative apparatus, from the enterprise up through the republic and central ministries.[19] Within this structure, the CPSU Central Committee, the central committees of the republics, the *obkoms* (provincial committees), and the *kraykoms* (territorial committees) all duplicate the sectoral structure of the Soviet economy in their internal organizations. For example, most of these party organs have departments of industry, construction, transportation, and agriculture. At the apex of this network of institutions is, of course, the Politburo, which is an organ of economic management as well as of political decision-making.[20]

[13]For text, see *Pravda,* July 1, 1987.

[14]T. Zaslavskaya, *Reshayuscheye usloviye uksoreniya sotsialno-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya—ekonomika i organizatsiya promyshlennogo proizvodstva* (Decisive Conditions for Accelerating Socio-economic Development—The Economics and Organization of Industrial Production), Novosibirsk, Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, March 1987, p. 19.

[15]*Pravda,* June 26, 1987.

[16]Ibid., Mar. 26, 1987.

[17]The information on the liquidation of the insolvent research center was published in the Soviet press under the heading "Bankrotstvo" (Bankruptcy). See *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta,* No. 24, June 1987, p. 5.

[18]*Pravda,* June 26, 1987.

[19]In 1982, there were 4,564 communist party committees on various levels of the administration, and more than 400,000 primary party organizations. *Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika* (Party Worker's Handbook), Moscow, Politizdat, 1982, p. 442.

[20]For example, the agenda for the April 18, 1987, session of the Politburo included five political and five economic issues. Among the economic issues discussed were: fulfillment of the 1987 plan, supplying the population with vegetable oil, and taxation of handicraftsmen. See *Pravda,* Apr. 18, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This mechanism of interaction between party and economic management provides for a system of dual —often conflicting—command at all levels of the economic administration. Furthermore, within this structure, all USSR and republic ministers, directors of industrial associations, and directors of factories and plants are members of party organizations and part of the *nomenklatura* system (i.e., they are officials appointed and dismissed by party *nomenklatura* organs). As party members in *nomenklatura* positions they are required to follow directives and general guidelines provided by their primary party organizations. These primary party organizations, headed by secretaries who monitor on a daily basis the implementation of party directives, are, in turn, required to report back to the corresponding party committee at the next higher level.

With the introduction of the new Law on State Enterprises some degree of decentralization may be introduced into this hierarchical administrative system. First, rather than be appointed by party organizations, directors of plants and factories, heads of plant and factory divisions, and foremen will now be elected officials, no longer subject to dismissal by the party organs.[21] Although party organs will be able to nominate candidates for the higher level of the economic management (i.e., directors of plants and factories), they will not be able to fully control the outcome of elections. The influence of party organization on the nomination and election of officials at the lower level of management (heads of departments, heads of shops and shifts, and foremen) will be minimal.

This new system of electing directors and managers could potentially undermine the existing system of *nomenklatura* by allowing increasing numbers of non-party members to assume management positions. This could result in diminished power for party functionaries to control the economy.

According to Soviet ideologists, these first steps toward decentralization of the economic decision-making process should lead to the development of self-management (*samoupravleniye*)—or what is termed "economic democracy" at the micro-level of the Soviet economy. In their opinion, this trend of "control from the bottom" could eventually lead to the development of self-management at the top.[22] Should this happen, and the economic mechanism work to eradicate administrative regulation, the power of party committees and organizations, which currently govern the Soviet economy, would be minimized.

Prospects

The record of Gorbachev's first full year in power seems to indicate that initial steps taken toward restructuring the Soviet economy have had significant impact on economic performance. In 1986, the USSR achieved 4.2 percent annual growth, as compared with 3.6 percent in 1981-85, and 2.7 percent during the post-war decades. National income went up 4.1 percent, as against the planned 3.9 percent and the annual average of 3.6 percent in the previous five years. Industrial output grew 4.9 percent, which is a third more than the average annual increase in the previous five-year period, making this the highest growth rate for the past nine years.[23]

Despite the impressive statistics, the future of Gorbachev's economic reforms remains unclear. The economic upswing of 1986 was not necessarily part of a continuous and stable upward trend. The one-time benefits of the introduction of new economic levers in the early stage of restructuring the system may dwindle as the process generates heightened requirements for capital investment. Although Soviet economists have calculated that the process will be able to bring self-sustaining growth in investment resources in three to five years, immediate needs for financial resources will be hard to meet. The lack of these resources probably explains why the positive economic momentum of 1986 was lost in the first quarter of 1987, with industrial growth up only 2.5 percent, and gross national product up only 1 percent.[24]

Furthermore, the new directives and resolutions specified in the most current reform documents are of the most general nature. They still have to be worked out in detail in order to create working documents—regulations and statutes—to define new relationships between the enterprises, between industrial associations and ministries, between ministries and Gosplan, and between all of these organs and Gosbank. In the Soviet bureaucratic system, the preparation of such legislative acts may take several years, in the course of which much may occur that will affect the context and success of those reforms.[25]

A lack of consistency and of far-reaching solutions in the current phase of Gorbachev's program for restructuring the Soviet economy may also have negative impact on future reforms. For example, Soviet planners agree that "normative planning" is more effective than

[21] Ibid., July 1, 1987.
[22] *Pravda*, Oct. 31, 1986.
[23] M. Gorbachev, "Reorganization and the Party's Personnel Policy," *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1987; *Narodnoye Khozyaystvo SSSR v 1985 godu*, Moscow, Finansy i Statistika, 1986, pp. 34, 92.
[24] *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, No. 18, April 1987, p. 8.
[25] Though the Gosagroprom was established back in 1985, legislative acts regulating its everyday operations have not as yet been passed.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

planning on the basis of achieved levels, but they refuse to let plants and factories define their own tasks and resource requirements; instead, they insist on planning the indices of normative inputs and outputs for each enterprise. Furthermore, the system of planning prices causes prices to reflect neither capital and labor consumption nor prime production costs, but to be purely "political," that is, based on political and economic priorities (thus establishing different prices for the same commodities depending on which sector is buying—the military, construction organizations, state farms, or consumers). Although Soviet economists understand the importance and necessity of "objective" prices for an efficiently functioning economic mechanism, they still try to plan such prices—an impossible task, considering the scope of the Soviet economy and the ever-changing technological and production conditions at each of the thousands of plants and factories.[26] Finally, while the degree of freedom in decision-making extended to Soviet directors is greater now, and the fact that managers are now to be elected is significant, true economic democracy lies in the right of the producer to dispose of the product—something that Soviet leaders are not ready to grant under the auspices of the current *perestroyka* program. The partial nature of proposed measures may cause the restructuring program to be ineffective in modernizing the economy and increasing productivity, and consequently, may lead to disillusionment with and growing opposition to reforms.

A number of additional factors—both objective and subjective—may also affect negatively the process of economic restructuring. One of them is resistance from the conservative wing of party *apparatchiks*. Although party functionaries working at the micro-level of the Soviet economy (district committees and PPO's) who daily observe the dysfunction of the economic mechanism and who are directly responsible for its operation may prove to understand the necessity of reforms better and may be willing to waive part of their power in exchange for a lesser degree of accountability, party bureaucrats at the level of provincial, republic, and higher administrative institutions pose a more serious obstacle to reforms. Criticizing the "acceleration mechanism" (*mekhanizm uskoreniya*) that Gorbachev sees as the gear of his *perestroyka*, they have already put into operation what one observer has called the "braking mechanism" (*mekhanizm tormozheniya*) aimed at hampering the reforms.[27] At the June 1987 plenary session, the pro-Gorbachev faction had to acknowledge that "the braking mechanism has not yet been overcome and has not been replaced by an acceleration mechanism."[28]

The fact that economic reforms have not as yet gained the active support of the majority of the population is another factor that poses a threat to restructuring. As Gorbachev himself stated, "with all the importance of control 'from above,' it is of fundamental importance in the conditions of the democratization of the society to raise the level and effectiveness of control 'from below.' "[29] Yet, workers' attitudes toward Gorbachev's economic and political innovations remains cautious. Workers are hesitant to trust changes, many of which have been promised and failed to materialize in the past. Only an appreciable improvement in living standards might persuade workers to support the reforms.

Still, it is possible that the Soviet leadership will overcome all these impediments and implement its program of economic reform. After all, a highly centralized system does have the advantage of imposing change on a wide scale once a decision is made "at the center." A directive issued by the center puts in motion all units of the organization at all levels. Reversing this motion in a bureaucratic organization is extremely difficult. (At the same time, there is an inherent contradiction in mobilizing a bureaucracy to demobilize itself.)

Although the June 1987 plenary session of the CPSU Central Committee endorsed all the principal innovations of Gorbachev's reforms, it relegated full-scale restructuring to the year 1990, when the current five-year plan will expire.[30] If that full-scale restructuring becomes reality, we can expect to see a broader and more fargoing marketization of the Soviet economy and the evolution of a greater degree of economic and political democracy. But, as the Russian saying goes: "*Pozhivem, uvidim*"— "We'll live and see."

---

[26] *Partiynaya Zhizn* (Moscow), No. 10, May 1987, pp. 38–43.

[27] *Kommunist*, No. 10, July 1987, p. 24.

[28] M. Gorbachev, loc. cit., p. 35. Gorbachev's numerous appeals to the Soviet intelligentsia—writers, artists, mass media workers—are an attempt to win over those segments of society who have ready access to the "masses' and who are able to mold public opinon in favor of the reforms.

[29] *Pravda*, Aug.25, 1987.

[30] *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On *Perestroyka:* Analyzing the "Basic Provisions"

John E. Tedstrom

THE MAIN document ratified by the June 1987 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and entitled the "Basic Provisions for the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management" represents the product of more than two years of effort on the part of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and his allies to effect a radical reform of the Soviet economic system. The most extensive such measure since the Khrushchev reforms, perhaps even since the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920's, the "Basic Provisions" is but one part of a broad Soviet reform effort that includes the reshaping of the social and political environment as well.

The timing of the "Basic Provisions" is quite significant. Faced with an increasingly outdated economy that has reduced Soviet ability to compete on the international market, Gorbachev has not only called for the restructuring of the economy, but has demanded that it occur at an *accelerated* pace. A whole section of the "Basic Provisions" is devoted to laying out specific deadlines for the implementation and completion of the various economic reform measures.

Given the importance and urgency of the "Basic Provisions," I shall attempt a brief analysis of the document in terms of the consistency and cohesiveness of its six major provisions. After summarizing each provision individually, I shall proceed to analyze its content and feasibility.[1]

John E. Tedstrom is a Research Analyst for the Hudson Institute's Center for Soviet and East European Studies (Indianapolis, IN). *The author would like to thank his colleagues Hans Heymann and Ralph Raymond for their thoughtful comments and to express his special gratitude to Professor Robert Campbell.*

I. To Switch to the New Economic Mechanism of Enterprise Activity.

Calling for "a most favorable economic environment for the enterprise," this provision establishes the enterprise as the primary economic actor in the Soviet economy and as the foundation upon which the restructuring of the economy is predicated. Essentially, it promises enterprises more economic independence than ever before, including responsibility for transferring to full cost-accounting and self-financing; providing for effective worker incentives within the enterprise; stimulating production within the consumer sector; ensuring resource savings; and introducing more extensive use of scientific and technological innovations. Furthermore, it charges enterprises with the independent drafting of their own five-year plans, which are to be based on state orders, direct orders from other enterprises, and consumer demand. Finally, it makes enterprise work collectives responsible for electing their leaders from among a broad field of competitors.

Clearly the responsibilites given to the enterprises under this provision far exceed the degree of independence granted them. In the Soviet Union, full cost-accounting (*khozraschet*) implies economic and financial *accountability*. In other words, an enterprise operating under this system must be essentially self-sustaining. The state will no longer subsidize enterprises that cannot generate revenues to finance their own activities; they will be forced to declare bankruptcy.

Although Western economists may at first applaud this development as a rational way to weed out ineffi-

[1]My analysis of the "Basic Provisions for the Radical Restructuring of Economic Management" is based on the text of that document published in *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), No. 27, July 1987, pp. 11-14. For an English translation of that text see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC), June 30, 1987, pp. R/1-22.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ciency, one should not forget the conditions under which these enterprises may soon be operating. Much of this will be discussed later, but a few general comments are warranted here.

First, uniform application of the principle of economic accountability is unlikely. In all probability, ministries will not allow crucial enterprises to declare bankruptcy but will ensure that important but unprofitable enterprises continue to receive subsidies. Enterprises within the military-industrial complex (VPK) will probably continue to receive preferential treatment, forcing their suppliers to operate irrationally in order to meet overly tight production and delivery schedules, and so constricting the flow of supplies to the civilian sector of the economy.

Second, the fact that this provision states that "control figures, long-term economic norms, state orders and allocations are [to be] the initial data and basis for drafting the enterprises' five-year plan" casts doubt on the significance of the touted horizontal linkages between enterprises. How are the enterprises to make their own purchasing and output decisions if they must still base their plans on centrally established control figures, and state orders and allocations? And what role can consumer demand play in the product mix if orders from above predetermine that mix? These key issues in the development of any decentralized, efficiently operating economy are not resolved in the reform plan.

Finally, this provision will force enterprise managers and other vested interests to try to reconcile competing (and perhaps irreconcilable) goals—that is, to improve economic efficiency in the marketplace on the one hand, and to satisfy central command on the other. In addition, they will be held accountable for poor economic performance. Given that ultimate control and authority still rests in the center, there is little doubt as to which goals most managers will feel compelled to achieve. Such exceptions to the application of the new economic mechanism will necessarily reduce its impact on economic development and growth.

II. To Raise the Efficiency of Centralized Economic Guidance Through Methods of Economic Management.

According to this provision, guidance from the center must be "perfected" so enterprises can operate more freely and effectively. From now on, instead of micro managing the economy, the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) is to focus its efforts on "implementation of the state's strategy of economic, social, scientific and technological development, [and] the adjustment of national economic processes on the basis of complete and reliable economic balance." Four aspects of the centralized planning mechanism are targeted for improvement: planning methodology, provisions for thematerial and technical supply of enterprises, price formation practices, and policies regarding financing and the granting of credit.

Planning methodology. This section states that annual, five-year, and longer-term (usually 15-year) plans will continue to be the framework for the development of the Soviet economy. All five-year plans are to be based on input from the enterprises, ministries, the State Planning Committee, and the Council of Ministers, and are to be ratified at congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The main change in the planning process is to be the transition to "economic methods of planning the activities of enterprises on the basis of planned targets, long-term stable economic standards, and state orders and allocations." According to the provision, planned targets ". . . should not be directive in nature and should not restrain the work of the collective in the elaboration of the plan, giving it wide scope for the choice of solutions and partners when concluding economic contracts."

This reform has two salient implications. First, because plan targets are no longer to be "directive," the enterprises will be ostensibly allowed more freedom to choose suppliers and to make operational decisions without direct influence from the center. Managers—those who are most familiar with the operations and problems of their enterprises—will now be free to make more decisions.

Second, vestiges of the old planning methodology will apparently remain in existence. For example, the continuation of the practice of centrally adopted plan targets virtually guarantees that managers will continue to work toward centrally established production quotas regardless of any promises by the center to the contrary. (By contrast, the essence of the Hungarian reforms was the complete elimination of central target figures.) Furthermore, although they now have the legal right to do so, enterprises will probably not change their suppliers since, in the heavily concentrated Soviet industry, the number of suppliers to chose from is very limited. Since incentives for suppliers to compete for business on the basis of price or quality also remain low, most industrial activity will continue to be centrally determined.

In short, the predominance of state orders and allocations over consumer demand will continue to bias the output mix of the economy. As a result, managers will be overly sensitive to centrally established gross indicators and less sensitive to issues of quality and resource-conservation.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Material and technical support. This section of the second provision calls for a "radical reorganization of the means of material and technical support" entailing a transfer to wholesale trade (*optovaya torgovlya*) between organizations instead of central allocation. Wholesale trade is now to be carried out through "free purchases and sales under direct contracts [*po priyamym dogovoram*] between producers and consumers . . . ." Designed to enhance the role of the purchaser and to accord enterprises more flexibility in obtaining material and technical support, this transition to direct wholesale trade relations is scheduled to be completed within four to five years. Special provisions permit "the filling of and support for orders placed by the state." According to these provisions, centralized economic management bodies may place state orders with enterprises, and , if necessary, may also list "the enterprises, organizations, and institutions having a right to purchase products made under the orders."

This provision is designed to enhance the managers' freedom of decision-making. Practically speaking, however, the present central supply system (Gossnab) will continue to be the single largest obstacle to enterprise autonomy. Central control over production quotas cannot exist without central determination of supply markets, since the bulk of output is fed back into the production process in the form of inputs. Thus, the continued ability of Gossnab to determine buyer-seller relationships will impede the Soviet quest for an efficient economy. There is little indication so far that the Soviets plan to initiate any meaningful changes in the supply system in the near future.

Price formation. The system of price setting, one of the weakest links in the Soviet economic system, has been the subject of much debate and controversy among Soviet economists and planners, some of whom have come to accept the concepts of scarcity pricing and marginal costs as fundamental components of an efficient economic system. In fact, in the case of several economic activities, the algorithms the Soviets use to form prices attempt to achieve marginal cost pricing (*zamykayushchyye zatraty*). These prices, however, tend to serve as theoretical reference points and are not generally used in actual transactions. The section of the second provision addresses the problem and provides for the integration of prices at all levels of production, from research and development to retail sale, in order that they may reflect more accurately the cost *and* societal value of each commodity.

The pricing issue has proven so controversial that the June plenum could not arrive at any consensus. Consequently, this section mostly calls for further discussion of the pricing issue on a country-wide basis. It also charges the USSR State Committee for Prices to prepare and carry out a radical reform of the system of price formation. Furthermore, this section notes that there is a need for a single system of control over prices, to overcome any inclination on the part of the newly empowered enterprises to increase prices, to eliminate any tendency toward monopolism, and to shield the producer from consumer pressure under the new conditions of self-financing.

It is probably unfair to comment critically on the new program of price formation when details have yet to be worked out. Yet there exists sufficient information to make a few general critical observations. First, although the Soviets want the price reform to accomplish a more accurate representation of marginal cost and marginal benefit and hence facilitate more "rational" economic activity, they fully realize that this is likely to conflict with one of the basic tenets of socialism—economic equality. Increased wage differentials in many sectors of the economy have already threatened economic equality and have raised concern among academicians and the populace as well. Clearly the Soviets have yet to determine how best to use price formation reform to achieve greater efficiency without further jeopardizing economic equality. We may conclude, therefore, that fully flexible prices that would reflect both scarcity and utility are likely to come slowly, if ever. The proviso for central control over prices in order to prevent inflation—the Soviet consumer's chief fear—and other maladies caused by market-formed prices is a critical one designed to ensure that the Soviet living standard will not be eaten up by increasing prices; it will not be quickly discarded. Yet, central control over prices is antithetical to flexible, rational pricing.

Second, the integration of commodity prices from the beginning of the production process to retail sale is an important and positive development. In market economies, this integration is a natural phenomenon. In the Soviet economy, a gap exists between the cost-plus prices used at the wholesale level and retail prices, which are designed to "clear the market" through application of either subsidies or a turnover tax. As a result, retail prices, reflecting neither scarcity nor consumer demand, necessarily distort economic behavior. An integration of wholesale and retail prices would close this gap and—depending on the impact of other reform measures—could send more accurate information to both producer and consumer.

Although the story on prices is yet to be played out, Gorbachev has probably gone as far as he can—or wants to—at this time. As a result, the most we can expect in this area in the near future is further debate on the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issue (with more radical elements calling for further liberalization) and some intermittent tinkering with prices and the pricing mechanism.

Financial and credit-granting mechanism. In order to facilitate the economic activities of enterprises, and to eliminate financial waste and pilfering, a radical restructuring of the financial and credit-granting mechanism is proposed. The Soviets consider this an integral part of the overall restructuring program, which makes sense given the new policy on the role and formation of prices, and the new economic activities of the enterprises. Their approach to issues of finance and credit indicates that they are aware that commodity-money relationships are a vital part of an efficiently operating economy.

The changes called for in this section are:

- making finance and credit one of the major instruments of the plan-based economic management and thereby increasing management efficiency;
- making five-year financial plans an integral part of the state plans for economic and social development;
- developing a fundamentally new financial policy for the USSR Ministry of Finance to be based on a combination of state and enterprise interests (This is to ensure, in part, control over the efficiency of management by using monetary levers.);
- making credit-granting institutions more interested partners in the economic activities of the enterprises;
- increasing the role of the USSR State Bank (Gosbank) as overall organizer and coordinator of all credit-granting arrangements;
- radically improving consumer insurance and savings bank services; and
- enhancing the financial and credit-granting mechanism in the sphere of foreign economic activity, including making the ruble convertible, first within the framework of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA), then (by implication) with other currencies.

The measures are somewhat vague and do not appear to represent a significant step toward rationalizing the role of finance and credit within the new Soviet economy. The first five measures listed aim at strengthening central financial control (*kontrol' rublyëm*) over economic performance and constraining the economic activities of enterprises and other entities. Such a development conflicts with the desire to integrate more fully the financial sector with the rest of the economy in a way that would enhance economic efficiency. Note, for example, that financial activity will be further centralized under the control of Gosbank. Thus, Gosbank is to become a "more active partner" in the economic activities of the enterprises, with interest rates, repayment schedules, and credit qualification requirements still being centrally established. We should not, therefore, expect credit-granting institutions to compete with each other for business. Moreover, even if money-commodity relationships are "rationalized" and play a more integral role in microeconomic activity, institutional changes in the financial sector will tend to work in the opposite direction.

The improvement of insurance and consumer savings services addresses a longtime void in the consumer services sector and will no doubt be popular with Soviet citizens. The change to a convertible ruble will probably become a complex process, even within the CEMA, with the Soviets standing to lose in terms of purchasing power if a real exchange rate with other, non-socialist currencies were ever negotiated. Clearly, few Soviets would advocate losing control over their currency and subjecting it to the fluctuations of the world financial markets. In any case, there is minimal outside pressure on the Soviet Union to switch to a convertible currency. For example, there is very limited demand in the world markets for ruble claims against Soviet resources. As a consequence, the convertible ruble is, at least for the foreseeable future, probably a non-issue.

III. To Remake Organizational Patterns of Management.

Recognizing the unwieldy size of the current economic bureaucracy, this provision calls for a reform of the organizational structure of the Soviet economic system. It explicitly notes that, by involving themselves in the day-to-day operations of enterprises, the central economic bureaucracies have made enterprise performance "less and less efficient," and it addresses the following points concerning a new organizational structure:

- the new organizational structure should facilitate the economic activities of the more independent enterprises;
- ministries should be relieved of day-to-day management duties;
- the standing bodies of the USSR Council of Ministers should focus work on inter-sectoral scientific and technical problems and on strengthening the export capabilities of the economy;
- activity of the control apparatus should be reduced and regulated and the People's Control Committee of the USSR should become the single integrated system of control, allowing the consumer greater say in the direction of economic activity; and
- the system of official statistics should be revamped radically to include both a wider base of information on

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

matters of social development and selective surveys, and to eliminate padded reports and other statistical deception.

The significance of this provision has several dimensions: First, it explicitly states that the economic apparatus in general and the economic ministries specifically should be relieved of day-to-day managment duties and focus instead on broader issues such as intersectoral cooperation, and ensurance of overall balance in economic activities. Second, the shift of control responsibilities to a restructured People's Control Committee is ostensibly designed to allow more room for consumer pressure on the enterprises. Third, it calls for improvement in the quantity and quality of economic and social statistics, which should provide both Soviet and Western specialists data better suited to more sophisticated analyses and accurate studies of the Soviet economy.

Most of the specifications of this provision are rather uncontroversial and appear to be logical components of the overall program. The measure stating that the economic bureaucracy will have to shift its focus from day-to-day management of the economy to broader strategic questions, however, will no doubt meet with a good deal of bureaucratic resistance since it stipulates that for such a switch to be effective, "streamlining" (i.e., staff reductions) of the state economic bureaucracy is necessary. Nonetheless, ministers will apparently retain responsibility for the performance of the enterprises under them, making it likely that they will continue to intervene in enterprise affairs when poor enterprise performance jeopardizes their success.

It is not clear what the impact of the "new" People's Control Committee will be. The provision specifies that this committee will be a highly centralized body whose decisions will apply to the entire country. It may be that one cumbersome bureaucracy is simply being replaced by another.

IV. To Ensure An Optimal Combination of Branch and Territorial Economic Management.

The main thrust of this provision is to enhance the role of territorial planning organizations. Accordingly, it specifies that long-term plans are to be territorial in focus, and are to take into consideration the activity of all enterprises in a given territory, regardless of the department to which they are responsible.

Furthermore, it charges the council of ministers of each union republic with heightened responsibility for solving economic and social development problems on a territorial basis. It also calls for the establishment of production-economic departments of executive committees of the soviets of peoples' deputies to be responsible for guiding economic organizations on the level of *kray* (territory) and oblast (province).

To ensure that economic plans and activities of the most strategically critical branches of the economy are balanced and cohesive, the provision assigns certain branches—such as heavy industry and geological survey—to all-Union bodies of management, while other industries are left to the responsibility of the republic and local government bodies.

Clearly, this provision forcefully establishes the importance of territorial planning under the conditions of the new economic mechanism. Moreover—in keeping with the structural reorganization of the economic apparatus—it sharply devolves responsibility for economic activity to more local institutions. It also appears to strengthen the role of municipal, provincial, and territorial economic plans.

One of the more interesting questions raised by this provision is what will be the impact of the reform on various territories in the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as some regions are blessed with greater supplies of economic resources (not to mention economic and enterpreneurial potential arguably inherent in particular cultures), we may see more rapid development in some republics than others.

It is worth mentioning that under this provision, two strategic elements of the economy will remain under the primary control of central authorities: heavy industry and geological survey (important for its role in the exploration of strategic resources such as oil and gas). Although this makes sense if we consider that some economic activities (such as coal mining) are more easily planned than others (such as consumer services), it will nonetheless sharply diminish the impact of decentralization since heavy industry produces a major share of total Soviet economic output.

V. To Enhance the Social Trend of Development.

This provision establishes the new conditions under which labor will work in the coming years. Stressing the human factor, it promises an increase in the level of the nation's prosperity.

Economically, this provision deals with the issue of wages. Stating that wages make effective incentives, it rejects the notion of wage leveling and, in fact, explicitly sets no limit to wage differentiation. Moreover, it establishes the collective contract as the primary basis for worker participation in the activity of the enterprise. This contract is to define working conditions, administrative rules, and the wage structure of the enterprise.

Politically, this provision is an attempt to assure the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet populace that its leadership is aware of their fears about inflation and job insecurity and will take appropriate steps to ensure that these economic maladies do not threaten social welfare. It calls for the maintenance of a stable and growing supply of food and consumer goods. It also calls for the improvement of municipal services such as education, housing, health care, and physical culture. Interestingly, the provision addresses the phenomenon of labor force disruption that is bound to occur in the transition to and during the period of the new economic mechanism, and thereby tacitly acknowledges the inevitability of unemployment. It stresses the need for programs to organize, select, train and retrain, and place labor personnel who are released from other jobs, or who are unemployed but able-bodied. Finally, it addresses such sensitive issues as labor discipline.

The issues concerning the "human factor" in production have received the most attention from the Soviet leadership. Given that labor discipline has been terribly lax in recent years, the tightening of discipline has become a relatively inexpensive way of increasing productivity. How much productivity can be gained through this discipline campaign is unclear and in all probability systemic changes will have to be introduced for the effects of this discipline campaign to be substantial and enduring.

The issue of wage differentials has proven particularly controversial. The economic inequality resulting from increased wage differentials is an anathema to Soviet ideologists and threatens the stable and secure employment arrangement to which the Soviet labor force has become accustomed. Moreover, it still remains questionable whether wages will prove to be a very effective incentive in the Soviet Union. Shortages of consumer goods, and heavy subsidies on food, housing, education, medical care, and other basics have meant that Soviet citizens with low incomes did not fare much worse than those with high incomes. Unless other measures (such as price reform) effectively redress these issues, it is unlikely that wage differentiation will have the beneficial effect that the leadership anticipates.

VI. To Efficiently Organize the Restructuring of Economic Management.

Declaring that "it is impermissible that unreliable organizational assurances, tardiness, and lack of coordination should lead, as in the past, to delays and incomplete implementation of the radical reform of economic management," this provision establishes an ambitious schedule for the implementation of the measures outlined in the other provisions. According to the schedule, by the end of 1987, the economic system is to be thoroughly prepared to start operating under the new "Law on State Enterprises," and by 1988–89, all enterprises should be actually operating under all the conditions of this law, including full cost-accounting and self-financing. In addition, the provision stipulates that the 13th Five-Year Plan (for 1991–96) is to be drawn up on the assumption that, by the end of 1990, the whole Soviet economy will be operating under the new economic mechanism.

The provision also states the need for upgrading the economic knowledge of personnel and increasing their ability to effectively employ economic methods of management. It calls for restructuring the system of training and retraining, for improving textbooks on economics for higher educational establishments, and for organizing business clubs where enterprise directors can discuss their experiences.

The importance of this provision lies in its instructions to the proper Soviet agencies to codify the provisions and measures outlined in the document, making them legally binding. Once these provisions are codified, they will make it difficult—though by no means impossible—for the opposition to drag its feet in implementing these reforms.

Conclusion

Even if the "Basic Provisions" document is effectively implemented, its impact on the structure and performance of the Soviet economy and on consumer welfare is likely to be limited. It does not redress the fundamental systemic obstacles to economic efficiency that plague the Soviet economy, and it leaves intact the central management of the economy (through planning, financial control, and personnel policies). We should remember, however, that dramatic and sweeping changes in the Soviet economic system are not possible overnight. Economic reform is too complicated and the political opposition to it too great. We should be careful, then, not to judge the success of the "Basic Provisions" in terms of whether the document creates a totally new, decentralized, and efficient economic system for the Soviets, but rather whether it is a step toward that goal. Examined in that light, the "Basic Provisions" seem a more positive step.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

On *Perestroyka:* Gorbachev, Yazov, and the Military

Dale R. Herspring

THE SELECTION of Dmitriy Yazov to replace the aging Sergey Sokolov as USSR defense minister on May 30, 1987, though perhaps a surprise to Western observers, was probably no shock to those inside the Soviet military establishment. Not only did Yazov have an excellent military record, but also several years before Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to power, he had taken a public stance in favor of a number of the factors that were to become key elements in the General Secretary's policy of *perestroyka* (restructuring). Beginning in mid-1986, Yazov's support of *perestroyka* caused him to be singled out for special attention in the military press. Indeed, by January 1987, he was being held up as a model commander.

Yazov's selection came at a time when the military's stance was generally less than enthusiastic about *perestroyka*. No doubt, Gorbachev would have preferred to allow Yazov more time to "season," but the landing of a small private West German airplane in Red Square on May 28 of this year left Gorbachev with no alternative. The military had to be held accountable for its actions or shortcomings just like every other segment of Soviet society. The immediate impact of the Yazov appointment has been to intensify the restructuring process within the military. Over the long run, assuming Yazov is successful, *perestroyka* could produce a far more efficient and formidable Soviet military machine.

To understand the context of Yazov's appointment, it is essential to trace the emergence of Gorbachev's proposals for *perestroyka*, their implications for the military, and the nature of the military's initial response to these demands.

Dale R. Herspring, a Foreign Service Officer with the US Department of State, is the author of numerous works on communist military affairs. He is currently working on a book to be entitled The Soviet Military: From Grechko to Yazov. *The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the US Government.*

Perestroyka—Initial Reactions

Gorbachev outlined the key elements of his policy of *perestroyka*, or *uskoreniye* (acceleration) as it was called at the time, in his speech to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in April 1985, shortly after becoming general secretary.[1] In this address, Gorbachev criticized the Soviet economic system—and especially the party-political apparatus—for failing to keep up with the demands of the times. He called for acceleration of social and economic progress "by making use of the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution and by making the forms of socialist economic management accord with contemporary conditions and demands . . . ."

His appeal focused on the need for more effective use of both human and material resources; a more creative approach to management; the acceleration of the tempo of work; and the revitalization of the party apparatus. He also stressed that ideological-political education should emphasize "acceleration of the country's socio-economic development." With regard to the human factor, Gorbachev spoke of the need to reinforce order and discipline, to hold workers responsible for their actions, and to develop a more creative leadership style:

[1] "On Convening the Regular 27th CPSU Congress and Tasks Connected with Preparing and Holding It—Report of M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), Apr. 24, 1985. (Though the word *perestroyka* appears several times in this speech, primarily in connection with the need to improve management, the emphasis is on *uskoreniye*. *Perestroyka* figures more centrally in subsequent addresses, particularly those to the 27th Congress and to the January 1987 CC Plenum [see below].)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

It is now no longer sufficient merely to be able to take executive action . . . the significance of such business-like qualities as competence, a sense of what is new, initiative, boldness, a readiness to take on responsibility for oneself, the ability to set a task and to see it through to the end, and the ability not to lose sight of the political meaning of management is growing greater and greater.[2]

Implicit in this speech was the view that the existing Soviet system—with the help of science and technology, improved discipline and work habits, and other measures—was fully capable of putting the country's economy back on its feet.

The military press was ambivalent in its response to this speech and Gorbachev's new emphasis. On the one hand, the military tended to view economic acceleration as a problem, not for the military, but for the civilian world in general and for the party in particular.[3] On the other hand, even though there were indications that Gorbachev's new emphasis meant that the military would have to do more with fewer resources,[4] the military leadership accepted that it was necessary to improve the level of military preparedness and efficiency. In the words of *Krasnaya Zvezda:*

In accordance with the decision of the April Plenum of the CPSU CC, Soviet soldiers are responsible to strive even more persistently to master combat skills, to raise vigilance and combat readiness, to strengthen discipline and regulatory order, to organize and with a high degree of expertise conclude the winter period of training.[5]

With regard to military management, three specific areas were singled out for attention in editorials in the military press: closeness to people (*blizkost' k lyudyam*), exactingness (*trebovatel'nost'*), and personal responsibility (*lichnaya otvetstvennost'*).

The first of these themes emphasized that officers who work closely with their subordinates and thereby know their strengths and weaknesses, and who set high standards for themselves and their troops, can expect fewer disciplinary problems and a greater willingness on the part of the troops to achieve given missions. To quote from a *Krasnaya Zvezda* editorial of May 23, 1985, entitled "Closeness to People":

Combat tasks and political training are successfully accomplished and a higher level of organization and discipline exists where it is known how to get people engaged in interesting, open discussions about what makes them happy and what bothers them, where factual thoughts are always supported, where a healthy atmosphere of morale is maintained.

The military press has also called for greater exactingness by commanders as a means of increasing managerial efficiency in the Soviet armed forces. In a June 6, 1985, editorial, *Krasnaya Zvezda* stated:

It is a question of activating the human factor, of the need to strive so that everyone works conscientiously at his place with full efficiency, deeply conscious of the purpose of the demands placed on him.

One might observe that persuading the leaders of a Red Army that has tended to rely on harsh discipline and unquestioning obedience of the efficacy and desirability of this approach would not be easy.

In an effort to avoid having to take responsibility when things go wrong—the key to bureaucratic success in and out of the military—some senior officers apparently routinely fail to provide clear, consistent instructions to their subordinates. This practice has led to confusion and loss of combat readiness. It is not surprising, therefore, that the linchpin of management reform in the military—as elsewhere in Soviet society—has been to raise personal responsibility. A June 11, 1985, editorial in *Krasnaya Zvezda* closely echoed Gorbachev's April Plenum speech on this point:

The importance of occupational characteristics such as competence, a sense for the new, initiative, boldness and readiness to take personal responsibility, the ability to follow the task to its final resolution is constantly increasing.

Consonant with Gorbachev's April speech, the military assigned primary responsibility for improving performance to its party apparatus. A May 1985 meeting of party activists in the USSR Ministry of Defense called for party organizations to increase their efforts to raise the level of exactingness and personal responsibility.[6] A month later, Admiral Aleksey Sorokin, First Deputy Chief

[2]Ibid.

[3]"Toward the 27th CPSU Congress," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Apr. 25, 1985.

[4]It is rumored that at a meeting in Minsk in July 1985, Gorbachev told senior military officers that they would have to do more with less. M. D. Popkov mentioned the meeting in the article "The Party—the Mind, Honor, and Conscience of our Epoch," *Voyennyy Vestnik* (Moscow), No. 2, 1986, p. 5. On the rumored substance of the meeting, see "Gorbachev: What Makes Him Run," *Newsweek* (New York), Nov. 18, 1985.

[5]"Toward the 27th CPSU Congress."

[6]"Increase Combat Readiness, Strengthen Discipline," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 25, 1985.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy (MPD), complained to a directorate gathering that the political apparatus in the military had failed to meet the demands of the April Plenum in a number of areas. In particular, he stated that Communists were neither doing enough to ensure that plans for training exercises are carried out nor setting good examples by improving personal qualifications or by meeting disciplinary standards. In the future, he concluded:

the main efforts are to be concentrated in ensuring the basic ***perestroyka*** *of the individual work of communists for supporting strict regulatory order, in creating in the military collective healthy conditions of morals and morale.*[7]

A week later, addressing a meeting of officers of the Southern Group of Forces, Sorokin again was critical of the work of party organs, and especially of their failure to eliminate "formalism" in political-educational work.[8]

It is clear from Sorokin's comments that the Soviet party leadership was encountering resistance—or at least passivity—on the part of the military with regard to the proposed new forms of management. A review of articles published during this period (from the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum to the opening of the 27th CPSU Congress in February 1986) by the country's three first deputy ministers of defense (Marshals Viktor Kulikov, Sergey Akhromeyev, and Vasiliy Petrov) confirms a general disinterest in the subject.[9] Even Defense Minister Sokolov's expressions of concern appear perfunctory[10] and lack the sense of urgency that is evident in Sorokin's comments.

The military's low-key response could not have pleased Gorbachev. In July, he met with senior military officers in Minsk and told the generals that "we now need energetic leaders who can command and communicate, people with initiative who are competent in their work."[11] Despite this veiled threat, the attitude of the military toward restructuring changed little in the months leading up to the 27th CPSU Congress in February-March 1986. Although there was an increase in the number of articles devoted to restructuring appearing in the military press, the issue was still primarily viewed as one for the attention of the military's party apparatus.[12] There was, however, some expansion of the meaning of the term. In fact, a fourth characteristic, that of psychological restructuring, began to emerge. This means that military personnel must learn to think in a new manner. Beyond new stress on psychological restructuring as well as on innovation,[13] concern was expressed about "irrational expenditure of materials and goods."[14] Nevertheless, Marshal Akhromeyev failed even to mention *perestroyka* in his 1986 Armed Forces Day speech (published two days before the opening of the 27th Congress),[15] and Defense Minister Sokolov on the same occasion limited himself to the following brief mention of the subject:

In line with the demands of restructuring, the following are of paramount significance: in-depth knowledge and precise execution of direct official duties by every serviceman, absolute truthfulness, the faculty of self-criticism in the assessment of the state of affairs, and the ability to organize and unite subordinates in an uncompromising struggle against shortcomings and deficiencies.[16]

Intensifying the Demands

Although the main focus of the 27th CPSU Congress was the economy, a number of issues were raised there that are likely to increase the impact of *perestroyka* on the military. First, whereas Brezhnev in 1982 had pledged to "ensure" that the military had everything it needed,[17] the new party program approved by the congress carried the less reassuring language that the party "will make every effort to ensure that the USSR Armed Forces are at a level excluding strategic superiority on the part of imperialism's forces . . . ."[18] Following Gorbachev's Minsk speech of the previous summer, this wording suggests that the General Secretary was serious about getting military spending under control.

[7]"A Worthy Greeting For the 27th CPSU Congress," ibid., June 25, 1985.

[8]"Raise the Effectiveness of Political Work," ibid., July 2, 1985.

[9]See, for example, V. Kulikov, "Our Pride, Our Glory," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Feb. 23, 1986; V. Petrov, "Having Learned the Severe Lessons," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Sept. 1, 1985; S. Akhromeyev, "Guarding Peace and Socialism," ibid., Feb. 23, 1986.

[10]Speech by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Sokolov, *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 8, 1985.

[11]"Gorbachev: What Makes Him Run."

[12]It is important to emphasize that the military press—like all military media—comes under the control of the Main Political Directorate. Consequently, editorials published in papers like *Krasnaya Zvezda* are generally prepared under the supervision of the MPD.

[13]"To Act—That Is the Approach Today," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Aug. 9, 1985; and "The Great Responsibility Is An Innovative Approach," ibid., Dec. 31, 1985.

[14]"Improve Military Life," ibid., Aug. 1, 1985.

[15]S. Akhromeyev, "Guarding Peace and Socialism," ibid., Feb. 23, 1986.

[16]S. L. Sokolov, "Decisive Source of Combat Might," *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1986.

[17]"A Meeting of Military Commanders in the Kremlin, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 28, 1982.

[18]"CPSU Program New Edition Adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress," *Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1986, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-SOV*), Mar. 10, 1986, p. 0/12.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Second, Gorbachev addressed at the congress the question of military doctrine. He spoke of the impossibility of winning a nuclear war, of the need to hold military forces "to a reasonable sufficiency," and of the need raised by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons to create "new forms of relations between different social systems, states, and regions."[19]

Finally, Gorbachev refocused on the human aspect of *perestroyka* with new vigor. The call at the April 1985 Plenum to improve economic performance by making use of reserves had not worked. Gorbachev now emphasized that progress depended on modifying behavioral patterns, on developing a new Soviet-style meritocracy in which party or family connections had little or no weight. As he put it, "the criteria for all advancements and transfers are the same—the political and business-like qualities, abilities, and real achievements of a worker and his attitude toward the people."[20]

In contrast to its response to the April 1985 Plenum, the high command now appeared to take the General Secretary somewhat more seriously. On the economic front, greater attention was paid to explaining the mechanics of economic restructuring to the average serviceman in articles written by civilian specialists.[21] An August 28, 1986, front-page editorial in *Krasnaya Zvezda* called on military personnel to get "maximum benefit from a minimal outlay of time and resources."

Moreover, Army General Aleksey Lizichev, who had taken over as head of the MPD in July 1985, echoed Gorbachev in stating that "the CPSU is doing everything necessary to ensure that the armed forces of the USSR are at a level that precludes strategic superiority by imperialist forces."[22] The concept of sufficiency had now become an official canon of Soviet military doctrine—one that could be used to justify limits on military spending. Moreover, on June 18, 1986, Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov declared the leadership's intention to involve all machine-building industries, including defense industries, in the production of light-industrial products.[23] Similarly, Lev Zaykov, a Politburo member and Central Committee secretary, stated in Irkutsk:

It has been decided that the military sectors of industry will not only take an active part in the production of civilian production and nationally needed goods, but also combine it with the technical reequiping of light and food industries, public services, and trade.[24]

The message was clear. The military, like the rest of Soviet society, would be expected to contribute directly to the country's economic revitalization.

On the personnel front, Lizichev's March 19 *Krasnaya Zvezda* article marked the beginning of an intensified effort by the military's political apparatus to push *perestroyka* within the armed forces. The new emphasis was evident in an increasing number of articles dealing with the topic in military journals and newspapers. *Krasnaya Zvezda* inaugurated a special section devoted to problems of *perestroyka* and published a number of letters to the editor on the topic as well.

In general, *perestroyka* began to be tied more directly to military life. On March 25, *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported a high-level meeting of officials from the Ministry of Defense and the MPD that endorsed Gorbachev's call for "accelerating the country's socio-economic development." The report stated that the congress documents would form the basis of the political-military activity in the coming months, and that professional competence (including efficient management), the quality of officer education, and personal responsibility would be emphasized. In calling on military officers to "think and work in a new manner (*po novomu*)," the report complained that "some officers speak of *perestroyka,* but in practice nothing changes."

However, there was still considerable complacency. In a lengthy article published shortly after the 27th CPSU Congress, the Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Army General Ivan Shkadov, mentioned *perestroyka* only once. His comment that "in recent years, a series of steps have been taken to modernize the system of training officer cadre, to improve the complex of military-training establishments for officers and cadre" suggested that he had the situation well in hand.[25] Even the party organization within the military appeared to be lukewarm toward *perestroyka,* if one is to believe Lizichev. At a November 1986 meeting, he complained:

Even the election-and-report meetings are far from taking a demanding look at ***perestroyka****, from fully collective work in the search for new forms and methods on the way to effectively resolving tasks. In places, criticism*

[19]See "The Political Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Report of General Secretary of the CC CPSU Comrade M. S. Gorbachev," in *XXVII S"yezd kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza: stenograficheskiy otchët* (The 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: Stenographic Report), Moscow, Politizdat, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 24, 98.

[20]Ibid., p. 107.

[21]See, e.g., V. Kulikov, "The Main Jumping-Off Point," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* May 22, 1986.

[22]A. Lizichev, "At a Turning Point in History," ibid., Mar. 19, 1986.

[23]N. I. Ryzhkov, "On the State Plan for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for the Years 1986–1990," *Pravda,* June 19, 1986.

[24]"The Reward of the Homeland—A Stimulus for New Achievements," ibid., June 29, 1986.

[25]I. Shkadov, "A Matter of Great Importance," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Mar. 16, 1986.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

carries a formal, superficial character. At many meetings, criteria characteristic of bygone days, an insufficiently fresh form of analysis, a lack of sharp conclusions and self-criticism predominate.[26]

By the beginning of 1987, then, it was clear that if the military—like most of the rest of Soviet society—was not openly resisting *perestroyka*, neither was it rushing to embrace the approach.

Gorbachev Gets Tough

The comments of General Secretary Gorbachev at the January 1987 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee betrayed his irritation with the slow progress in implementing *perestroyka*. Acknowledging that "the cause of *perestroyka* is more difficult and the problems that have accumulated in society more deep-rooted than we first thought," Gorbachev called for "truly revolutionary, comprehensive transformations in society." The key to his approach was cadres:

It . . . happens that certain executives find themselves in the wrong position and in no way up to the mark . . . . It seems essential to admit such errors, to rectify them, and without dramatizing them, to assign the person concerned to a job that corresponds to his abilities.[27]

Gorbachev's speech clearly sent a shock wave through the military, as did the two important developments that followed in its wake. Toward the end of January 1987, General Shkadov was relieved as personnel chief and replaced by the hitherto little-known General Yazov. In addition, in recognition of his efforts on behalf of *perestroyka*, General Lizichev was given the honor of authoring the annual article devoted to military affairs in the authoritative party journal *Kommunist*.[28]

In response to these unequivocal signals from Gorbachev, other top Soviet generals began to clamber onto the *perestroyka* bandwagon. Numerous articles on the subject written by the Soviet military leadership appeared in the Soviet press early in 1987. Defense Minister Sokolov devoted an unusually large part of his Armed Forces Day article in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* to restructuring, while Marshal Akhromeyev, who generally avoids discussing personnel issues, singled out the importance of restructuring for developing efficiency, initiative, exactingness, sober assessments, and personal responsibility.[29] First Deputy Minister, Army General Pëtr Lushev, wrote several articles devoted to cadres and psychological restructuring. Similarly, Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Army General Yuriy Maksimov; the head of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin; and the head of the Air Defense Forces, Marshal Aleksandr Koldunov, all published articles citing *perestroyka* as a key factor in maintaining a high level of combat readiness.[30]

Perestroyka now became a prominent issue in the military press, and those who did not support it wholeheartedly were severely criticized. Marshal Sokolov indicated to a meeting of the Defense Ministry's party activists that the decisions made at the January CC Plenum were "all-embracing." After reciting a litany of shortcomings within the military, the Defense Minister observed that some individuals had already been relieved of their duties, and implied that others who failed to show adequate responsibility, exactingness, and discipline would suffer the same fate.[31] At the same time, General Lizichev called on party activists to bear "direct responsibility for work and the practical implementation of the most important measures connected with resolving defense tasks, the development and training of the armed forces," and complained that party organs showed "rudeness, inaction, and contempt for relations with people, for their needs and questions."[32] A May 28 editorial in *Krasnaya Zvezda* noted that "the increased responsibility of Communists—commanders, political workers, engineers, economic planners—for the maintenance of order" is the key to a high degree of military efficiency.

---

[26]"Criticize Sharply, Act Decisively," ibid., Nov. 15, 1986.

[27]"Concerning Restructuring and the Party's Cadre Policy, Report of General Secretary of the CC CPSU M. S. Gorbachev to the CC CPSU Plenum of January 27, 1987," *Pravda*, Jan. 28, 1987.

[28]A. Lizichev, "October and the Leninist Teaching on the Defense of the Revolution," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, February 1987, pp. 85–96. This annual article, published in *Kommunist*—usually on Army-Navy Day—is normally authored by the minister or a first deputy minister of defense. Though the selection of a man of Lizichev's rank is not unprecedented, he appears to have been singled out for the honor because of his support for *perestroyka*.

[29]S. Sokolov, "Watching Over the Peace and Security of the Homeland," *Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1987; and S. F. Akhromeyev, "The Glory and Pride of the Soviet People," *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Feb. 1, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 27, 1987, pp. V/1–4.

[30]P. Lushev, "Time-Tested," *Izvestiya*, Feb. 23, 1987; idem, "The Army of the Great October," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 23, 1987; idem, "The Lofty Responsibility of Military Cadres," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1987, pp. 9–17; Yu. P. Maksimov, "Restructuring Puts Everyone to the Test," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Feb. 5, 1987; V. Chernavin, "The Standing of Seagoing Personnel," ibid., Mar. 21, 1987; and A. Koldunov, "Talk," Moscow Television Service, Apr. 12, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 16, 1987, pp. V/2–4. Given the circumstances of his ouster a few months later, Koldunov's comment to the effect that "commanders, political organs, and staffs are acting with increased responsibility and are raising and improving combat readiness, organization, and discipline of personnel" has a certain irony.

[31]"Restructuring Is Everyone's Cause," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 18, 1987. The significance of this article is discussed in Melanie Russell, "Restructuring in the Soviet Armed Forces," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (hereafter RFE-RL) *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 118/87, Mar. 23, 1987.

[32]"On the Path of Restructuring," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Mar. 30, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Enter General Yazov

The ability of West German civilian Mathias Rust to fly a Cessna 172 through 700 kilometers of Soviet air space and land at the gates of the Kremlin on May 28—Border Guards Day, no less!—was a humiliating experience for the Soviet Union's political and military leadership. It also suggested that Gorbachev had been right all along about the need for major changes in the way the military functioned.

Gorbachev was quick to seize on the opportunity by calling an emergency meeting of the Politburo on May 30. The result was a statement charging the Air Defense Forces with "impermissible lack of concern and resolve to intercept the intruding aircraft" and criticizing the Ministry of Defense for serious organizational shortcomings. Marshal Koldunov was relieved as commander of the Air Defense Forces, and "a decision was made on strengthening the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Defense" namely the retirement of Marshal Sokolov and his replacement by General Yazov.[33]

Although Yazov never appeared on Western lists of likely successors to Sokolov, the 63-year-old general appears to be a perfect choice from Gorbachev's perspective. Indeed, in retrospect, one can find signs that Yazov had for some time been headed for bigger and better things under the new General Secretary.[34]

Yazov was born into a peasant family on November 8, 1923, in the small village of Yazovo in Omsk province. He was one of four children (two boys and two girls); his father died in 1934. Yazov joined the army in 1941 and was sent to an accelerated course for infantry officers in Moscow. In 1942, at the age of 19, Yazov was commissioned and saw service on the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts. He was wounded during the war, but returned to combat after a short period of convalescence. After the war, he served in a variety of positions and in 1956 graduated from the Frunze Military Academy. At various times during this period, he commanded a company, then a battalion, and was in charge of training for a military district. In 1959, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel, and in 1961, he took command of a regiment in the Leningrad Military District. By 1965, he was a full colonel.

After graduating from the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in 1967, Yazov was given command of a division in the Transbaykal Military District. By 1970, he was a major general. From 1972 to 1974, Yazov commanded a unit in the Transcaucasus and was then transfered to the Main Personnel Directorate of the Defense Ministry. Subsequently, he became First Deputy Commander of the Far East Military District, and in 1979, commander of the Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia). In 1980, he was appointed head of the Central Asian Military District, and in the next year gained candidate membership on the CPSU Central Committee. Yazov reportedly served with Army General Ivan Tret'yak (currently head of the Air Defense Forces) and graduated from the Voroshilov Academy with Marshal Akhromeyev and Army General Valentin Varennikov (respectively chief and first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces).

Since Yazov was commander of the Central Asian Military District at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it is possible that he played a role in that undertaking—if only in ensuring logistical support. However, there is no solid evidence directly linking him to that Soviet action. During his tour as district chief, however, Yazov is credited by one source as having introduced new techniques for combined-arms operations and having developed new training techniques for upgrading the skills of Soviet soldiers.[35] In February 1984, Yazov was promoted to army general and placed in charge of one of the Soviet military's prime commands—the Far East Military District. He remained there until January 1987, when he was recalled to Moscow to become deputy minister of defense in charge of personnel.

In addition to his impressive military background, Yazov's writings suggest that he is a natural ally of Gorbachev.[36] Yazov differs from many of his military colleagues not only in his support for the principles of

---

[33]"At the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee," *Pravda*, May 31, 1987.

[34]Biographical information on Yazov is drawn from a number of sources, including the author's files; *Voyenno-entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'*, Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1986, p. 844; "Descended from Yazovo," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Apr. 13, 1985; and Alexander Yanov, "Why Yazov?" RFE-RL, *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 212/7, June 1, 1987.

[35]Yossef Bodansky in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (London), Mar. 31, 1984, p. 485, cited in Yanov, loc. cit.

[36]For examples of Yazov's articles and speeches during the 10 years prior to his becoming defense minister, see: "Official Zeal," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Apr. 2, 1978; "At Full Power," ibid., Nov. 23, 1979; "Speech by D. T. Yazov," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma Ata), Feb. 6, 1981, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (Washington, DC—hereafter *JPRS*), No. 77681, Mar. 26, 1981; "A Sense of What's New," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Nov. 24, 1981; "A Moral Primer," ibid., July 9, 1983; "Today Is Soviet Army-Navy Day: Reliable Guard of the Homeland," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Feb. 23, 1984, trans. in *JPRS UMA*, No. 084-032, Apr. 18, 1984; "The Great Exploit of the Soviet People," *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (Dushanbe), May 9, 1984, in *JPRS-UMA*, No. 084-056, Aug. 24, 1984; "Work with the Komosomol," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 11, 1984; "Ready for an Exploit," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), June 28, 1984; "The Proper Order Indoctrinates," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil*, No. 6, March 1984, pp. 34–41;"Closeness to People," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 17, 1985; "Personally Responsible for Discipline and Order," *Kommunist Vooruzhënnykh Sil*, No. 15, August 1985, pp. 17–24; "Yazov Speaks at Khabarovsk," Khabarovsk Domestic Service, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 12, 1986; "Address by Army General Dmitriy Yazov," Moscow Domestic Service, Feb. 23, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 26, 1987, pp. V/8-9; "An Authority Replies," *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (Moscow), Apr. 1, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perestroyka, but also in his intense interest in personnel-related questions rather than in combat operations.

In 1978, Yazov authored an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda* in which he outlined the most important characteristics of a commander. They included initiative, creativity, a spirit of innovation, competence, selflessness, good relations with the troops, a high standard of discipline, and a willingness "to assume responsibility for decisions."[37] The following year he wrote another article for *Krasnaya Zvezda*—this one devoted to adapting military affairs to the scientific-technological revolution. In it, he criticized officers who believe that training troops to deal with high technology is a problem only for specialists.[38] In 1981, he wrote of the need to develop innovative approaches to training (in this case, the use of simulators), and observed that the Military Council of the Central Asian Military District "considers its permanent task to be educating military personnel in a spirit of dissatisfaction with what had been achieved and inculcating in them a sense of the new."[39]

In a July 23, 1983, *Krasnaya Zvezda* article, Yazov focused on the importance of the moral example set by a commander in maintaining a high level of combat readiness. In 1984, in a major article in the military's authoritative journal *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil,* he called on officers to assume greater personal responsibility for discipline.[40] In the June 11, 1984, issue of *Krasnaya Zvezda,* he criticized the Komosomol for shortcomings in its work within the military, which had led to disciplinary problems, and in the June 28 issue of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura,* he criticized pre-conscription training and called on responsible officials to "bravely draw conclusions and take timely measures."

Two additional articles by Yazov appeared in 1985. The first stressed the need for close ties with the troops. "Closeness to people," Yazov emphasized, "is not determined by the number of hours spent with them, but by the actual influence on them and the ability to listen to the soldier and understand him."[41] In the second article, Yazov focused on the necessity for a commander to take full responsibility for his unit, something that requires a demanding attitude toward oneself and one's subordinates, no tolerance for shortcomings, a concern for people, initiative, and an irreproachable moral character. He specifically related these comments to the April 1985 Central Committee Plenum.[42]

Reviewing these writings, one finds a striking congruence between the ideas of Yazov and those of Gorbachev. Though Yazov does not use the term *perestroyka* to interrelate his thinking, his views clearly mirror those put forth by Gorbachev.

It has been rumored in the Western press that Gorbachev first met Yazov when the General Secretary visited the Far East in July 1986. Whether or not this is the case, Yazov was already being singled out for special attention in the military press prior to that event. On July 10, for example, *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported a meeting of party activists of the Far East Military District at which Yazov was the principal speaker. According to that account, Yazov was sounding much like Lizichev in criticizing shortcomings—in this case, in his own command! Many collectives, he stated, were passive and had failed to introduce new methods for dealing with problems; moreover, they had overevaluated their achievements and hidden their shortcomings. He reportedly "sharply criticized" leadership styles, arguing that too much reliance was being placed on paper work and a formalistic approach to dealing with subordinates. Coming at a time when most other senior military officers appeared to be avoiding discussion of *perestroyka,* Yazov's blunt comments caused him to stand out.

Yazov's meeting with Gorbachev shortly after the publication of this article certainly did nothing to hurt the General's standing in Moscow. In October, he and Army General Valeriy Belikov, Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, were singled out for outstanding work with the Komsomol organization.[43]

However, the most important article praising Yazov's efforts on behalf of *perestroyka* came in January 1987, only days before he was appointed chief of personnel. The article was written by a *Krasnaya Zvezda* correspondent sent to the Far East to evaluate changes introduced in that military district since Gorbachev's visit six months earlier. Yazov emerged from this article as the model commander, who is willing to go to the field with his troops, knows them and their problems, and is bluntly objective in his evaluations. The article states that during his meeting with Gorbachev, Yazov told the General Secretary that:

discipline in the district had not improved recently and had even worsened in individual units and subunits. He presented accurate figures. Hundreds of officers and dozens of generals attended this talk. Now this talk is called in the district nothing other than a lesson in truth.[44]

The article also observes that officers under Yazov's

[37]"Official Zeal," loc. cit.
[38]"At Full Power," loc. cit.
[39]"A Sense of What's New," loc. cit.
[40]"The Proper Order Indoctrinates," loc. cit.
[41]"Closeness to People," loc. cit.
[42]"Personally Responsible for Discipline and Order," loc. cit.
[43]See "Character Is Required," *Krasnaya Zvezda,* Oct. 31, 1986.
[44]"With the Force of Truth," ibid., Jan. 16, 1987.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Table 1: Changes in Soviet High Command, 1985–87

Position	Old occupant	Date of change	New occupant
Commander-in Chief, Ground Forces	Marshal Vasiliy Petrov	February 1985	Army Gen. Yevgeniy Ivanovskiy
Chief, Main Political Directorate	Army Gen. Aleksey Yepishev	July 1985	Army Gen. Aleksey Lizichev
Commander, Strategic Rocket Forces	Army Gen. Vladimir Tolubko	July 1985	Army Gen. Yuriy Maksimov
Commander, Navy	Fleet Adm. Sergey Gorshkov	December 1985	Fleet Adm. Vladimir Chernavin
First Deputy Minister of Defense	Marshal Vasiliy Petrov	July 1986	Army Gen. Petr Lushev
Chief, Civil Defense	Army Gen. Aleksandr Altunin	July 1986	Army Gen. Vladimir Govorov
Chief, Main Inspectorate	Army Gen. Vladimir Govorov	July (?) 1986	Army Gen. Ivan Tret'yak
Deputy Minister, Personnel	Army Gen. Ivan Shkadov	January 1987	Army Gen. Dimitriy Yazov
Commander, Air Defense Forces	Ch. Marshal Avn. Aleksandr Koldunov	June (?) 1987	Gen. Ivan Tret'yak
Chief, Main Inspectorate	Army Gen. Ivan Tret'yak	June (?) 1987	Army Gen. Mikhail Sorokin
Deputy Minister, Personnel	Army Gen. Dimitiry Yazov	July 1987	Army Gen. Dmitriy Sukhorokov

SOURCES: Author's files.

command caught concealing information were given severe party and military punishments. Finally, the article noted the emergence of the first positive results: officers spending more time with the troops, the more accurate reporting of shortcomings, increased effectiveness of party organizations, a decline in disciplinary problems, and improved combat training. All sweet music to Gorbachev's ears.

A major element in Western surprise over Yazov's appointment was that the general was junior to many other supposed candidates and did not occupy one of the key posts within the Ministry of Defense, such as a first deputy ministership. However, Yazov's was not the first surprising appointment within the upper ranks of the Soviet military under Gorbachev. Since the beginning of 1985, there have been 11 changes at the level of deputy and first deputy minister of defense (see Table 1)—most of them surprises, at least to outsiders. Only the appointments of Vladimir Chernavin and Yevgeniy Ivanovskiy were anticipated; all of the others were to one degree or another unexpected. Lizichev was selected over several more senior officers to head the MPD. Yuriy Maksimov, a ground forces officer, was put in charge of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Lushev came out of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany to take over Vasiliy Petrov's first ceputy ministership. Tret'yak, a ground forces officer who appeared to be headed for oblivion as head of the Main Inspectorate, emerged as chief of the Air Defense Forces upon Koldunov's ouster. Vladimir Govorov, Tret'yak's predecessor as Chief of the Main Inspectorate, surprisingly replaced Civil Defense Chief Aleksandr Altunin after the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster. Yazov's own move to Moscow to become a deputy minister for personnel was also a surprise, as was his replacement by Dmitriy Sukhorukov, former head of Soviet airborne forces. Similarly, the transfer of ground forces/airborne officer Mikhail Sorokin to head the Main Inspectorate came as a surprise.

The bottom line is that in appointing Yazov as defense minister, Gorbachev was not necessarily breaking new ground. Rather, he was proceeding along a course that had been established over the preceding two years. Finally, the speed with which Yazov was appointed and the increasingly higher profile he had begun to assume in the military press prior to May 30 suggest that, Gorbachev had been eyeing Yazov for some time.

Ramifications

The initial Western press reaction to the Rust incident and Sokolov's precipitate replacement by Yazov was to suggest that the military's position had been seriously weakened. As *The Economist* put it: "The vigor of Mr. Gorbachev's reaction bodes ill for the armed forces."[45] No doubt, the military's fortunes have declined under Gorbachev, but Sokolov's ouster was not simply the result of a party-military clash.

To begin with, as noted at the outset, Gorbachev had no alternative but to oust Sokolov, Koldunov, and others responsible for the very serious violation of Soviet security. To have let the generals off the hook would have made a mockery of *perestroyka*. In addition, the ousters served as a clear warning to those remaining doubters in the Soviet military that Gorbachev is deadly serious about *perestroyka*—foul up, and your career is over! It is quite conceivable that Gorbachev would have pre-

[45]"Gorbachev Takes on the Generals," *The Economist* (London), June 6, 1987, p. 47; see also Gary Lee, "Flight Has Left Soviet Military Vulnerable to Public Criticism," *The Washington Post*, June 18, 1987; John Dahlbert, "A Gorbachev 'Clone' Lands at Top of Military," *The Washington Times*, June 1, 1987; Bill Keller, "For Gorbachev, A Consolidation of Soviet Power," *The New York Times*, May 31, 1987; idem, "Gorbachev Seizes the Chance to Restructure the Military, ibid., June 2, 1987; and Robert Hutchinson, "Gorbachev Tightens Grip on Soviet High Command," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, No. 23, June 13, 1987, p. 1192. See also the author's "The Soviet Military in the Aftermath of the 27th Party Congress," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1986, pp. 297–315.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ferred to leave the clearly interim Sokolov in place for somewhat more time while Yazov learned about the machinations of high-level Soviet military politics from first-hand Moscow experience, but the Rust incident forced his hand.

Though Gorbachev lacks Brezhnev's strong attachment to the military, he does not appear to be particularly anti-military. If he had wanted to civilianize—and hence further humiliate—the military, he could have appointed as defense minister someone like Lev Zaykov, the Central Committee secretary in charge of military industry. Gorbachev, however, gives the impression of one who does not care who runs the military—or any other organization—so long as they embrace *perestroyka*. If the generals are prepared to do the job, all the better.

From the vantage point of the marshals and generals, Gorbachev is not all bad. Although loss of status under his administration is doubtless unwelcome, as are his continuing efforts to cut back on military spending, most of the top military appear to recognize the need to rebuild the Soviet economy and streamline the military establishment (even if they fight for every ruble they can get). Given the extent of waste and corruption within the Soviet military prior to Gorbachev, *perestroyka* offers some hope of increasing overall efficiency and creating a leaner and meaner force that costs less.

Gorbachev has the look of a technological determinist who believes the only way to take advantage of technology is through the creation of a Soviet-style meritocracy. The top-level military officers appointed since he took over appear to share his views in these areas. They feel that it is vital that the USSR not fall behind in the high-technology arms race.

What about doctrine and arms control? Since Gorbachev came to power, the Soviets have been very active in both areas. It is important to recognize, however, that the doctrinal trend observed under Gorbachev (e.g., less reliance on nuclear weapons) has long been visible within the Soviet military establishment. In a sense, Gorbachev is following the military's lead in this area.

There is no doubt that some in the military high command are uncomfortable with the pace and scope of Gorbachev's proposals in the area of arms control. However, with the exception of his unilateral steps (e.g., the unilateral nuclear test ban moratorium) and his apparent acceptance of intrusive verification measures, the military seems to accept his policies. And if Gorbachev's proposal for the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear missiles was not designed by the military, it arguably does not violate their perceptions of Soviet national security interests.

This brings us to the future. Will the Soviet military be different under Yazov? In one important aspect, yes; in others, little will change. Yazov is clearly committed to *perestroyka* and will push it with increased intensity. The July 19, 1987, *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported on a Yazov speech blasting senior officers for failing to wipe out "negative tendencies" in the armed forces. "We must," he said, "look the truth in the eye: certain of us have lost the sense of duty and responsibility for the fulfillment of our duties and tasks."

At the same time, Yazov has given topics such as arms control or doctrine only the most perfunctory attention in his public writings. This suggests that when he must make authoritative statements in these areas, as on July 27,[46] they are likely to be drafted by the General Staff. In effect, one anticipates a division of labor in the top ranks of the Soviet military, with Yazov taking the lead on personnel-related issues while individuals such as Akhromeyev and Colonel General Nikolay Chervov remain the central players on arms control, and Akhromeyev and Colonel General Makhmut Gareyev play the key roles on doctrine.

For the West, nothing will change in the immediate future. It is clear, however, that Gorbachev is serious about *perestroyka* and that he has found a general to lead the Soviet armed forces who is as committed to this policy as he is. In the long run, if the Gorbachev/Yazov team is successful in gaining military acceptance of *perestroyka*, the military threat facing the West could increase significantly. As Marshal Ogarkov has argued on several occasions,[47] war is not merely a matter of numbers. Quality also counts. Based on their actions to date, both Gorbachev and Yazov recognize this and are out to do their best to improve Soviet performance in this key area.

[46]D. T. Yazov, "The Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Is the Doctrine of the Defense of Peace and Socialism," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 28, 1987.

[47]See the author's "Nikolay Ogarkov and the Scientific-Technical Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," *Comparative Strategy* (New York), Vol 6, No. 1, 1987, pp. 29–59, for a discussion of Ogarkov's views.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Correspondence

NOTE: Readers are welcome to comment on matters discussed in this journal. Letters should be addressed to The Editors,
Problems of Communism,
US Information Agency,
301 4th Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20547, USA.

A QUESTION OF ALLIANCE

TO THE EDITORS: I am surprised at the title "Moscow's Indian Alliance" affixed to Dr. Jyotirmoy Banerjee's article in your January-February 1987 issue. Not only does it reflect unfairly on the contents of the article, but it is also misleading about the nature of the actual relations between India and the Soviet Union.

India is genuinely nonaligned in East-West relations and has always and consistently tried to be friendly with both the blocs and with the two superpowers that head them. It happens, however, that the United States's policies and actions have been less sympathetic to India's overtures than have those of the Soviet Union. The latter has been far more helpful to India than the United States (as, even US allies such as Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany have been more forthcoming than Washington) in the matter of supplying arms on a commercial basis and licensing their indigenous production. This is equally true in respect to the fields of economic and scientific cooperation—the former consisting largely of counter-trade.

Naturally, therefore, India is friendlier to the Soviet Union than to the United States, without, however, compromising India's nonaligned status. In fact, India successfully incorporated in Article 4 of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship that the Soviet Union "respects India's nonalignment. . . ." It might be observed that this provision is found only in the Soviet treaty with India and not in similar friendship treaties between the USSR and other nonaligned nations.

India is too large in size and too old an historic entity (like China) to be an ally of any other state. It can be friendly—*no more* and no less—to other states. And with respect to the Soviet Union, as Dr. Banerjee has stated, India has many differences in the field of foreign policy/foreign relations (in addition to those in domestic policies). If these are not always expressed in official statements of the two nations, the position is not very different from the US treatment of its friends; one does not shout from the rooftops differences with one's friends.

The difference between a "friend" and an "ally" is much more than semantic. It is the inability of some critics in both the East *and* the West to perceive this vital difference that is often the source of confusion and misunderstanding between India on the one hand, and the United States and the Soviet Union, on the other. India has been performing admirably a difficult exercise in seeking to maintain good relations between both the superpowers. The task is not made easier when friends in one or the other superpower state, unwittingly or otherwise, misperceive India to be an "ally" of the other.

M. S. RAJAN
Professor Emeritus
of International Organization
Jawaharlal Nehru University
New Delhi

MR. BANERJEE RESPONDS: Since I live in the Marxist-ruled state of West Bengal, let me attempt a "dialectical" resolution of the "contradiction" over the published title of my article. Professor Rajan is absolutely right. India's self-image is that of a nonaligned state.

Our Soviet friends, however, have a somewhat different interpretation of nonalignment, as I had occasion to analyze in my article. It is my understanding that Moscow has had reasons to see in India something more than just a "friend." Perhaps an intermediate category between a "friend" and an "ally" would be appropriate to describe how *Moscow* views India. The nuance of the title seems accordingly to focus more on Moscow than on India.

If, however, my "dialectics" has failed to resolve the "contraction," then it is up to the Editors of *Problems of Communism* to fill the gap, since it is they who had supplied the title.

JYOTIRMOY BANERJEE
Jadavpur University
Calcutta

TROTTING OUT TROTSKY

TO THE EDITORS: Readers might be interested to know that the famous Trotsky quote cited by Milan Hauner in his article "Soviet Eurasian Empire and the Indo-Persian Corridor" (*Problems of Communism*, January-February 1987)—viz, "The road to London and Paris lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab, and Bengal"—turned up a few years ago in a Soviet volume.

On p. 118 of R. A. Ulyanovskiy, Ed., *The Comintern and the East* (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1979), the above Trotsky statement is reproduced. However, Ulyanovskiy adds the following critical comment: "Naturally, the Central Committee with Lenin's active participation turned down this adventuristic scheme."

ALBERT L. WEEKS
Editor, *Brassey's Soviet and Communist Quotations*
New York, NY

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of Communism

SUBSCRIPTIONS

ANNUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS or copies of recent (the last three) issues of *Problems of Communism* may be obtained by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 (USA). Subscription blanks for one-year and single-issue requests are provided on the facing page. For further information, see the inside front cover.

CURENT PRICES: Annual subscriptions, US mailing address, $9.00 each; outside the US, $11.25 each. Single copies, US mailing address, $4.25 each; outside the US $$5.31 each. A 25 percent discount is allowed on orders for 100 or more subscriptions or single copies mailed to a single address.

ENCLOSE CHECK OR MONEY ORDER, payable to "Superintendent of Documents, USGPO," or if paying by VISA or Master Charge, please indicate credit card number in the space provided on the subscription blank.

Problems of Communism

REPRINTS, MICROFILM, REPRODUCTION

A variety of services, ranging from reprints, through microfilm and microcard editions, to reproduction of individual issues or articles are commercially available. Those firms which offer one or more such services and which have come to the Editors' attention are, in alphabetical order:

Bell & Howell Micro Photo Div.
Old Mansfield Road
Wooster, OH 44691

J. S. Canner & Co.
49–65 Lansdowne Street
Boston, MA 02215

Infordata International, Inc.
175 East Delaware Place
Chicago, IL 60611

Inst. for Scientific Information
3501 Market St.
Philadelphia, PA 19104

Johnson Reprint Corporation
111 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10003

Microforms International Mktg. Co.
Fairview Park
Elmsford, NY 10523

University Microfilms
300 Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

John T. Zubal, Inc.
2969 West 25th Street
Cleveland, OH 44113

Annual indices for Volumes IV-to-date appear in the November-December issue (No. 6) for each year. A combined index to the first three volumes is contained in Vol. III, No. 6 (November-December 1954).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED